Search

Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we "live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin." Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief‐stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self‐conception in the latter half of the 20th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the core of what makes humans, and their behaviour, social, is the interplay between self and other. Our identities, for example, are essential to our functioning as social beings as they allow us to make sense of ourselves, and others, across different contexts. We care about how others see us and achieving congruence between how we see ourselves, how we think relevant others see us, and indeed how relevant others actually see us in turn, becomes integral for achieving a positive sense of self. Therefore, humans require recognition from relevant others. This recognition can take many different forms, from legal recognition of one's rights in society, to social recognition of one's belonging to different groups. Moreover, the absence of recognition can lead to serious repercussions and consequences, resulting, on an individual level, in a reduced mode of being and feelings of exclusion, and on a social and political level, in tensions and conflict. The current special issue takes a multidisciplinary approach to contribute to the growing debates and discussions around the importance of understanding recognition and its role in social behaviour. As the introduction to this special issue, this paper argues that the concept of recognition enables a better understanding of how identification and belonging become entangled with power struggles and expressions of agency. Doing so leads us to conclude that a social psychology of identity and intra/intergroup relations which does not consider power relations, as bound up in processes of recognition and its denial, fails to consider the key processes and broader impact that exclusion, subtle or explicit, has on individuals' well‐being, belonging and ability to act in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hence, Wachelke's ([12]) theoretical framework elaboration seems to be still halfway to the assumption and deployment of a true relational epistemological frame, hindering the possibilities of a real dialogue with the basic assumptions of SR theory and cultural psychology. Does social psychology need a new semiotic overarching framework for grasping social knowledge? Commentary on J. Wachelke: Semiosis, thought and codes: A theoretical framework for social knowledge. [Extracted from the article]

Keywords: classical tolerance; democracy; identity politics; political freedom; postmodern tolerance EN classical tolerance democracy identity politics political freedom postmodern tolerance 237 241 5 06/24/22 20220601 NES 220601 INTRODUCTION In his paper "The meanings of tolerance", Maykel Verkuyten (2022) deals with the case of a student who posted comments on Facebook that expressed his disapproval of homosexuality and same sex marriage because it was considered a sin and abomination in his Christian belief. Classical tolerance, democracy, political freedom, postmodern tolerance, identity politics In his study Verkuyten distinguishes "classical tolerance" and a different, "modern" understanding of the term tolerance. CLASSICAL TOLERANCE Despite a long history of the term tolerance its traditional meaning can be summarized as follows: Classical tolerance is understood as enduring and putting up with issues one dislikes and even may disapprove of. [Extracted from the article]

The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (ATSE) research program has produced cumulative insights on how instrumental exchanges lead to the development of affectual attachments. With its focus on task responsibilities, ATSE leaves space to interrogate how factors not related to task execution are at play in the production of interpersonal bonds. In this paper, we integrate insights from social psychology, cultural sociology and organizational research to develop a theoretical framework suggesting (a) why and how cultural tastes contribute to social cohesion and (b) the conditions under which cultural tastes remain a source of strategic advantage or, worse, symbolic exclusion. Our theory rests on the basic proposition that shared cultural tastes increase the likelihood of experiencing positive emotions, which in turn are key in the development and maintenance of affectual attachments. Variations to this proposition are subsequently introduced, considering culture in declarative and nondeclarative forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a theoretical social psychological framework for social knowledge based mainly on the triadic concept of sign relations and the process of semiosis. The framework is based on concepts from authors aligned with interpretative semiotic approaches, such as Peirce, Deely and Eco. After defining signs and sign relations, I propose to conceive social knowledge as sign relations happening in communication processes, and employ the notion of code to account for socially shared group conventions. I suggest that the analysis of code properties such as content, social acknowledgment and history can identify differences in social knowledge forms and the concrete contexts that sustain them. The framework is discussed in comparison with other social and cultural psychological approaches based on semiosis. Finally, methodological implications are commented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]