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Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper combines Alfred Shultz and Herbert Simon's theories of action in order to understand the grey area between dynamic and completely unstructured decision making better. As a result I have put together a specific scheme of how choice elements are represented from an agent's personal experience, so as to create a bridge between the phenomenological and cognitive-procedural approaches of decision making. I first look at the key points of their original models relating Alfred Schutz's 'provinces of meaning' and Herbert Simon's 'satisficing' mechanism. I then consider the particular concept of intentionality and reasoning by analogy for different choice settings. Finally I have suggested a perspective based on creative behaviour and sense-making for ill-structured conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Axel Honneth's theory of recognition outlines the personal and social contexts of family, law and community solidarities in which recognition – and misrecognitions – are experienced. His work has implications for Mezirow's theory of transformative learning. Transformative learning is critiqued for an over dependence on the Dewey/Habermas foundations that demand high levels of rationality and for an over reliance on individual learning to the exclusion of social learning. Honneth's ideas are explored in order to further develop the understanding of how experience is central to transformative learning. Disorienting dilemmas and the perplexities that lead to transformative learning are reinterpreted as experiences that have personal and social dimensions. Experience – often seen as individual and unique ‐ cannot be disconnected from social contexts. Honneth helps us resolve these issues and allows us to re‐interpret transformative learning as the transformation of experience. Finally, two further concepts are introduced: a) the dialectic nature of experience (Negt); and b) the importance of completeness (Negt). These further enhance the experiential grounding for emancipation and the emancipatory project of transformative learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russi (2021) suggests 'eavesdropping' as a way to appreciate the practical implications of Shotter's (2015) stance that social inquiry is an art/craft beginning with experience, rather than a technique pre‐determined by theory and methods. Following Russi's instruction to eavesdrop on his eavesdropping, I explore his concepts of experience and listening. Contrary to Russi I issue a plea for theory, as theoretical frameworks are key for tracking the politics of knowledge surrounding social inquiry. Illustrating the process theoretical character of Russi's concepts of experience and listening, I argue for the possibility of theory as emergent within experience. Here my concept of cultures of listening is relevant, as it helps to consider eavesdropping as a form of dark listening (Motzkau & Lee, forthcoming). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William James is remembered as the philosopher of pragmatism, but he was principally the founder of modern scientific psychology. During the period of his most intense scientific involvement James developed a trenchant critique of science. This was not a rejection of science but an attempt to identify limitations of the contemporary conceptualization of science. In particular, James emphasized the failure of science to understand its basis in human emotions. James developed a scientific theory of emotions in which the importance of emotion in cognition and decision-making is central. James’ appreciation of the significance of emotions in science has continuing value. Nevertheless, his characterization of science in terms of its method introduces tensions in his account that an emphasis on the social dimensions of science, which he implicitly acknowledged, tends to resolve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]