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This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self‐Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self‐determination theorists have advanced a form of self‐regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self‐determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic‐phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility‐laden contexts of everyday practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of subjectivity has been treated peripherally by philosophy. It has appeared in philosophy not as a specific human phenomenon, but attached to other concepts without specifying its ontological definition, such as intersubjectivity, the place of the Other in the emergence of the self, consciousness and so forth. This paper reconstructs some of the overlooked moments and ideas of several classical philosophers, such as Marx, Dewey, Merleau Ponty, Cassirer and Foucault, in order to identify in their works important antecedents to advance a different concept of subjectivity. The concepts and questions which are raised by those philosophers and which are revived in this paper have remained overlooked both by philosophy and psychology because of the lack of any representation of subjectivity capable of making them more visible. The ontological monopoly of language and discourse in explaining all human phenomena, taken together with the critique of theoretical systems and of epistemology, has found in social constructionism its strongest expression in psychology. The value of theoretical systems in generating intelligibility about complex and configurational phenomena is recovered, along with the need to develop new epistemologies capable of generating intelligibility on such systems. Finally, I argue that a new theoretical and epistemological avenue is opened up for the development of psychological thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ultimate values can be defined as abstract rules or goals transcending specific contexts and defining the utmost purposes of existence. Although the literature about human values is vast, several fundamental questions about ultimate values remain open. What are the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate values? What is the impact of inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively? Regarding learning, what is the role of society? Empirical evidence shows dramatic variability in ultimate values pursued by different people. Why? These open questions suggest that a precise picture of ultimate values is lacking. This paper offers a computational theory of ultimate values. The key idea is that our brain represents values along a hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon experiences with inherent affective nature (basic values). Based on these representations, the proposal is that the brain infers the rules that foster basic values in a variety of contexts. These would become ultimate values and drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing context. We discuss how the theory can contribute to understanding a variety of aspects of human values, including morality, to what degree values are innate or culturally determined, and how values shape and are shaped by society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The passing of Nelson Mandela and other figures of (diverse) contemporary importance may prompt the interesting question of how we might or should understand the psychological, social and moral function of lamentation in human life. This paper aims to show that such responses are not just of emotional and interpersonal significance, but also of serious moral import. To this end, the paper proceeds via exploration of conceptually and morally suggestive correspondences or resonances between the logical grammar of lamentation-which, to be sure, has received almost no latter day analytical attention-and that of gratitude or thankfulness in which there has been an enormous explosion of academic interest in recent years. The paper argues that there is no less case for a moral virtue of lamentation, than for a virtue of gratitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dualism of emic and etic plays a crucial role in the emergence of three culturally informed approaches of psychology: cross-cultural psychology ( CCP), cultural psychology ( CP) and indigenous psychologies ( IPs), a distinction largely accepted nowadays. Similarities and/or differences between these positions are usually discussed either on the level of phenomena (data) or theory. In this paper, however, the discussion takes place on a meta-theoretical or epistemological level, which is also emerging elsewhere. In following several earlier papers of the author, first, four perspectives are distinguished that underlie present day psychology. Second, these are used as a framework for linking them to the three 'camps'. This analysis will show that these perspectives are characterized by different underlying worldviews, interests as well as methodical preferences. Third, it is claimed that this level of discussion is quite fruitful for the ongoing discourse on the three camps, but also helps one to understand, why the duality between emic and etic approaches is-implicitly or explicitly-at the core of these discussions, because their relevance turns out to differ in the three camps. In that sense, the emic/etic duality is used here as a 'litmus test' to exemplify these deeper differences between the camps, thereby highlighting them. Fourth, in order to overcome not only the dilemma between the unique and general in psychology, but also to clarify the relation between the individual and culture it is proposed that psychology should take human action as its unit of analysis, thereby connecting historically to the early beginnings of psychology at the end of the 19th century. It will be argued that a culture inclusive action theory may overcome this tension and may help to integrate western and other indigenous psychologies, and hence it could be advantageous to integrate CP and IPs as well. This is possible because the proposed theory hopefully provides a universal framework for psychological concepts, yet allows for their culture specific expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently Hampton (2004) has argued that natural selection could have equipped the human mind with a set of adaptations for nothing in particular. In this way Hampton challenges the current orthodoxy of Evolutionary Psychology, which claims the mind is a collection of domain-specific cognitive mechanisms. This paper outlines the core of Hampton's thesis as well as the key commitments of Evolutionary Psychology. This is followed by a discussion of the principal levers of Hampton's argument, which are the problems of uncertain futures and of social novelty. Both of these problems pertain to flexibility in the face of new inputs, and Hampton claims that our ability to deal with such situations is indicative of an underdetermined, yet evolved, cognitive architecture. This paper rejects these problems on the grounds that they are misconstrued; a system that can process an input can only do so if it is prepared to do so, therefore true novelty would defeat an organism. This rejection is more formally expressed in terms of information theory, and the various consequences of this conception are drawn out. The paper concludes with some comments about the appropriate grain of analysis for evolutionary theory within the behavioural sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has its roots in qualitative analysis of accounts produced by an Italian serial killer. Theoretical references are related to symbolic interactionism and its developments in the field of psychology and criminology. The whole contribution is aimed to twofold purposes: A) to provide a set of criteria specifically addressed to study deviant action as system of meanings into two related contexts: the single action itself and the whole life history. According this point, paper introduces the concept of“deviant career” and it explains its development and steps; it also provides some psychological social points of views and contributions that scientific works offers. B) to think about potentialities of accounting interviews as powerful tools in clinical practice and empirical research too. Specifically, we discuss narrative about behaviour and life story as a resource in order to take suggestions about meanings, goals and rules of action. It also suggests something about functions that crime discharges in the whole pathway of one's life. Juridical case analysis, run by means of the software ATLAS.ti, is aimed to demonstrate theoretical reasoning proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite increased interest in "intuition" within cognitive psychology, the conceptual framework of this notion remains problematic. This paper argues that conceptual shortcomings stem from a tendency to ignore the philosophical heritage of intuition or to dismiss the relevance of this heritage to contemporary theory. The paper outlines major understandings of intuition within psychology and prominent philosophical traditions, highlighting important points of inconsistency in these and examining consequences of the inconsistency. It also considers psychological conceptions of intuition that more readily overlap with philosophical accounts and offers some suggestions toward a more philosophically informed notion of intuition relevant to contemporary psychological theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accepting Cole's the premise that, 'cultural-inclusive psychology has been ... an elusive goal' (1996, pp. 7-8) but one worth striving to attain, I first set out to identify my domain of interest and competence as an intellectual. Deciding it to be social interaction between individuals, I then searched out theoretical approaches to this domain that encompassed as many approaches to this trans-historical concern that have emerged from cultural traditions bequeathing us their legacies. Doing this search comprehensively required me to move outside my Judeo- Christian, Greco- Roman, Renaissance heritage and its international diffusion via the European Empires since the 1500's, embodied most recently the American dominance of intellectual discourse since the Second World War. In my case, this journey has taken me in to Chinese culture and psychology where I have worked towards integrating the Chinese worldview and its psychological measures into the discipline of social psychology. Striving for a more inclusive culture-view, I am now using multi-cultural data bases to transcend this two-cultural focus and incorporate wider measures of cultural variation into our theorizing and empirical validation of universal models for social interaction. This paper describes my current procedures for such culture-mapping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brain processes and social processes are not as separated as many of our Social Psychology and Neuroscience departments. This paper discusses the potential contribution of social neuroscience to the development of a multi-level, dynamic, and context-sensitive approach to prejudice. Specifically, the authors review research on event related potentials during social bias, stereotypes, and social attitudes measurements, showing that electrophysiological methods are powerful tools for analyzing the temporal fine-dynamics of psychological processes involved in implicit and explicit prejudice. Meta-theoretical implications are drawn regarding the social psychological modeling of social attitudes, and for the integration of social neuroscience into a multi-level account of cultural behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues the Wittgensteinian point that we can undo the psychologizing of psychology by conceiving of mental life as lived in the space of reasons. It is argued that mental life -- human action, feeling and thinking -- is constituted by normative connections and necessities rather than causal ones. The consequence is that mental life is irreducibly moral, and if the sciences of mental life are to become adequate to deal with their subject matter, they should construe themselves as what was once referred to as moral sciences. It is argued that the source of the normativity of mental life is found in historically evolved social practices, although not all normativity is conventional or historically contingent. Finally, some objections to the idea that mental life is normative are discussed; first, that this idea represents an intellectualist or rationalist fallacy, and second that it violates our conception of mental illness as something mental, yet outside the space of reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All relevant sources agree that weeping is a human universal. There is disagreement, though, as to whether tears experienced during episodes of happiness or joy derive from the experience of joy itself, or whether such tears result merely from incidental physical constriction of the lacrimal gland (]) or from a“sadness rebound” induced by anticipated loss of the source of joy (];]). It is argued here that adult weeping does not exclusively express suffering but rather is an emotional and physical register of changes in self, both positive and negative. In outlining the argument concerning weeping the paper also presents an account of the registration and consolidation of changes in self-identity and self-feelings, and therefore provides an account of the internal process of transformation of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines methodological issues associated with the theory of planned behaviour and explains that an alternative account of data used to support this theory can be provided by positioning theory. A case is presented that shows tests of the theory of planned behaviour fail to eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations for co-variation in its data. An agency or person-centered alternative shows how a causal interpretation can be reinterpreted as evidence of the actions of a person. Unlike the conceptualisation of the individual as behaving in keeping with postulated underlying cognitive laws or rules we assume that the person has, through socialisation, acquired the skills necessary to initiate and manage their own actions. Unlike the interest in TPB data as a causal explanation of action we draw attention to the interpretation of patterns in these data as an aggregate of each person using a common mode of explanation to justify and explain their intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an ecological approach to the perception and interpretation of signs. The theory draws upon the ecological approach of James Gibson (1966; 1979). It is proposed that cultural and natural perception can both be explained in terms of the direct pick-up of structured information and the Gibsonian concept of affordances (Gibson, 1979) without having to invoke a sharp distinction between direct and indirect perception. The application of the theory is exemplified through attention to language and to the visual and audio arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two most common names to invoke for a perceptualist aesthetics are Rudolf Arnheim and E. H. Gombrich. But the similaritied and differences between them have never been explicitly drawn. This paper undertakes such an analysis based on the three categories of representation, expression and historical objectivity. Arnheim's less stringent solutions to the problems of representation and expression are applauded but Gombrich's unique attempt to ground both of these categories in a form amenable to non-historicist approach to history are also praised. Gombrich's anti-historicism derives from Karl Popper and Arnheim is fleshed out with the theories of Maurice Mandelbaum. The parallel comparison of Popper-Mandelbaum helps to underscore differences and show an alternative to Gombrich and Popper's nominalism. Ian Verstegen , Arnheim and Gombrich in Social Scientific Perspective, pp. 000–000 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances a theory as to why Vygotsky’s research program has remained at the center of international psychological debates, despite its grounding in Marxist philosophy. An important part of the psychological appeal of Vygotsky derives from the fact that he was describing the mental constructs and rule-governed behavior of human development in their account of social, cultural, and historical reality. There have been a number of attempts to create a Marxist psychology during the 1920s and 1930s. These have been less successful because of misunderstandings of Marxism, and indeed of psychology. If Marxism drew on German Hegelian philosophy, British political economy, and French political socialism, then psychology drew on German materialist physiology, British empiricist philosophy, and French Cartesian dualism. Marx attacked the poverty of philosophy and wrote a Critique of political economy, similarly, Vygotsky wrote Educational psychology and attacked the poverty of psychology in his magnum opus, Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology. Vygotsky argued that we must write our poverty of psychology then lay the foundations for a Marxist psychology. That is to create psychology’s own capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One question in moral psychology concerns the role of emotions to motivate moral action. This question has recently become more urgent, because it is now clearer that cognitive developmental theories cannot offer a complete explanation of moral functioning. This paper suggests that emotion, as is typically understood in psychology, cannot be seen as the basis for an acceptable explanation of moral behaviour and motivation. However, it is argued that it is possible to understand emotions as embedded in agentic processes, and regulated by conscious concerns. So understood, emotions acquire an important role in the person's moral life. These conclusions are reached through an extensive review of psychological and philosophical conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]