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The paper unpacks the far-reaching theoretical and practical issues that underlay the classical debate between cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser and discursive social psychologists Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter on Watergate witness John Dean's memory. Accounting for their disagreements, Neisser claimed the mantle of the cognitive-ecological approach to memory and emphasized the psychologist's ultimate priority of truth over discourse, while Edwards and Potter claimed that of discursive/rhetorical psychology and focused exclusively on discourse over truth. As such, the debate at the time ended in mutual misunderstanding and the shadow of theoretical incommensurability. However, a rhetorical analysis of the arguments suggests that Neisser was right about truth when he intuitively sensed the importance of discourse, and Edwards and Potter were right about discourse when they did not lose sight of truth. Therefore, beyond the impasse there has remained a promise inherent in the debate: it demonstrated an imaginative attempt to undermine the absolute dichotomy of truth and rhetoric and demonstrate their mutual inter-dependence. As will be argued, such integration of traditional concerns of the psychologist entails the re-conceptualization of the discipline as political and moral science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, two alternative naturalistic standpoints on the relations between language, human consciousness and social life are contrasted. The first, dubbed 'intrinsic naturalism,' is advocated among others by the realist philosopher John Searle; it starts with intrinsic intentionality and consciousness emerging from the brain, explains language as an outgrowth of consciousness and ends with institutional reality being created by language-use. That standpoint leans on what may be described as the standard interpretation of Darwinian evolution. The other type of naturalism, in contrast, making use of the concept of evolutionary niches, suggests that the search for the explanatory mechanisms of language and consciousness should begin with the human community (of social action), because that is the cultural niche for everything distinctively human to evolve, including language and human consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A national anthem is arguably one of the most powerful symbols for a nation-state, with impact beyond its ceremonial purposes. One source of its power lies in the lyrical content, bearing imprints of the past and texts for potentially guiding future behavior. In this paper we study the social foundations of national anthems with the Chinese national anthem as a case by analyzing its production through two changing texts-the lyrics of the anthem and key political documents from the period of 1949-2005. The current national anthem, 'March of the Volunteers,' adopted in 1949, was forbidden during the Cultural Revolution, and was restored in 1978, albeit with a new set of lyrics, and used until 1982 when the original lyrics were restored. Drawing upon the literature on collective focus (as defined by Cerulo) and social relations (as informed by Weber), we build a theoretical model for understanding the changes in the Chinese national anthem. According to this model, the creation of collective memory in the form of a national anthem is conditioned by the cognitive and social context in terms of the type of collective focus (singular or multiple) and the kind of top-bottom social relation (rational or traditional). The changing fate of the Chinese national anthem illustrates the efficacy of the theoretical model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an approach to the question of meaning and understanding based on the idea of constitutive rules and their relationship to the social objects they are used to create. This approach implicates mutual attention as an essential aspect of the social processes constitutive of social objects and mutual intelligibility. Social objects as such include the meaning, perception and coherence of things, identities and talk, etc. There is a relatively unexplored but important line of argument in sociology that has, from the beginning, explained the coherence and mutual intelligibility of social objects and associations in terms of constitutive practices and social facts. This line of argument begins with Emile Durkheim (1893) and carries through the work of Harold Garfinkel to current studies of work and interaction, human computer interaction and talk. The argument is that we use constitutive practices (Constitutive rules or constitutive background expectancies) to create social objects and make coherent and shared meanings. To act is in this sense for Garfinkel ([1948]2006) to 'mean'. Explaining the consistency of social objects and orders in terms of constitutive orders, rules, or practices is an approach that meets the challenges posed to social science and philosophy by ), ) and ). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological sociology was founded at the beginning of 1930s by Alfred Schutz. His mundane phenomenology sought to combine impulses drawn from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Weber's action theory. It was made famous at the turn of 1960s and 1970s by Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and Berger & Luckmann's social constructionism. This paper deals with the notable accomplishments of Schutz and his followers and then proceeds to a shared shortcoming, which is that the phenomenological approach is unable to understand meaning in any other way but as actors's knowledge. Therefore, phenomenological sociologists are forced to describe the actor's interpretations of meaning as transparent to the actor him/herself, even if they sometimes make heroic attempts to escape the limitations of the phenomenological conception. The limitation is apparent in Husserl's and Schutz's definition of meaning as a 'reflective intentional act', Garfinkel's use of the term 'accounting' to refer to a signifying effect, and the way Berger and Luckmann describe their social theory as 'sociology of knowledge'. Today, similar confusions are present in Michael Polanyi's 'tacit knowledge'and in Giddens' structuration theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people with disabilities are asked about the quality of their lives, they report only slightly lower quality than nondisabled people. Nevertheless, most nondisabled people (especially including bioethicists and health care economists) estimate the quality of life of disabled people to be extremely low, and they sometimes argue that the high QOL reports of disabled people should be discounted. Social psychologists have begun to systematically study human happiness in a new field called hedonics. This paper reports and interprets the recent empirical results of hedonics research to see whether disabled peoples' high reports of their own quality of life are more reliable than the lower estimates of bioethicists and other nondisabled observers. The outcome is relevant to policy disagreements surrounding disability. If bioethicists are correct about the intrinsically low QOL of people with impairments, then the disability rights (DR) movement's political goals of environmental modification are diminished in value. Careful inspection shows that at the present state of research, hedonics is on the side of DR advocates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces two theoretical approaches on symbolic boundaries that have become standard within Science and Technology Studies (STS), but which have little theoretical connections and seem to be talking about different types of boundaries. I will conceptually combine these two approaches, as well as providing a deeper explanation of what is going on when scientists draw boundaries, by utilising theoretical concepts from social psychology: social representations and identities. I will explore how the two boundary concepts can be explained through social representations and identities with an example of popular science authors' depictions of the philosopher of science, Karl Popper, and where the philosopher can become both a boundary marker that separates science from other pursuits as well as defining scientists' identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its emergence in the first half of the twentieth century, there has been considerable discussion of the viability and value of analytic induction (AI) as a conceptualisation of social scientific method; one which challenges the correlational approach to causal analysis characteristic of much quantitative work. However, less attention has been given to the philosophical sources on which Znaniecki, Lindesmith, and other exponents of AI relied. This paper explores some of these, and focuses in particular upon the use made of Lewin's distinction between Aristotelian and Galileian forms of science. The status of AI is ambiguous in relation to this; and it is a distinction that raises some fundamental issues more generally about the methodology of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a defining aspect of technology is the role that it plays in extending human capabilities. The conception of extension defended here is first compared with some well known extension theories from the philosophy of technology and then developed both by considering extension as a form of 'enrolment' and by integrating this conception of extension within a more general, ontological, conception of material artefacts. By drawing attention to the 'extension' aspect of technology, however, the intention is not only to distinguish technology from other material artefacts, but also to attempt to contribute to understanding of the peculiar position technology occupies in modern societies [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social science requires a dual ontology: one for the physical realm, and one for the symbolic realm of meaning. Much research produced in social science remains based in an old paradigm, which entirely neglects the symbolic realm. While social scientists attempting to forge a new paradigm have embraced a discursive approach, this approach lacks a coherent framework that can be systematically applied in the analysis of meaning. This paper presents the positioning diamond as a framework that can be employed in discourse analysis across social science disciplines. The four facets of the diamond—storylines, identities, rights and duties, and the social force of acts—can be analyzed at three levels of discourse: the content, narrator-interlocutor, and ideological levels. The framework can be employed to provide explanations of most types of human thought and action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes use of a new development in social psychology, Positioning Theory, the study of the way rights and duties are ascribed, attributed and justified to and by individuals in local social groups. It links this theory with a generally Vygotsky inspired approach to understanding the means by which people are brought into terrorist networks. Focusing on the use of the Internet as a device to bring mentor and novice together, the unique role of chat rooms and personal conversations made possible by the Internet in this psychological process is revealed. Examining Vygotsky's ideas about the influence of a collective identity on the development of individual identities by psychological symbiosis in the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) sheds new light on the positioning of terrorist recruits. Incorporating Wittgenstein's concept of hinges into understanding the groundings of individual positions explains how the jihadist form of life turns on the unexamined grounding of beliefs about the non-believers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The challenge of intercultural relations has become an important issue in many societies. In spite of the claimed value of intercultural diversity, successful outcomes as predicted by the contact hypothesis are but one possibility; on occasions intercultural contact leads to intolerance and hostility. Research has documented that one key mediator of contact is perspective taking. Differences in perspective are significant in shaping perceptions of contact and reactions to it. The ability to take the perspective of the other and to understand it in its own terms is a necessary condition for successful intergroup outcomes. This paper sheds light on the processes involved in intercultural perspective taking by elaborating the notion of the point of view based on social representations theory. The point of view provides a theory of social positioning that can analyse cultural encounters between social actors, and identify the conditions for positive relations. Insights are drawn from a study of public views on the relative merits of science and religion, following a documentary by Richard Dawkins in which it was suggested that religion is a source of evil. The findings demonstrate that the point of view may be categorised according to a three-way taxonomy according to the extent to which it is open to another perspective. A point of view may be monological—closed to another's perspective entirely, dialogical—open to the possibility of another perspective while maintaining some percepts as unchallengeable, or metalogical—open to another's perspective based on the other's frame of reference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In moral psychology, it has long been argued that empathy is a necessary capacity of both properly developing moral agents and developed moral agency ( Blair, 2008 ; Hume et al., 1978 ). This view stands in tension with the belief that some individuals diagnosed with autism—which is typically characterized as a deficiency in social reciprocity (including empathy)—are moral agents. In this paper we propose to explore this tension and perhaps trouble how we commonly see those with autism. To make this task manageable, we will consider whether high functioning individuals diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder are capable of empathetic responses. If they are, then they possess a capacity that, on the view above, is required for moral agency. If they are not so capable, and yet sometimes engage in moral behaviour, this casts some doubt on the claim that empathy is required for moral agency. This second possibility will necessitate an exploration of the capacity of some individuals with autism to engage in moral behaviour, giving us further grounds to re-see these individuals as moral agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a realist argument for the existence of “social objects”. Social objects, I argue, are the outcome states of a contingent causal process and in turn posses causal properties. This argument has consequences for what we can mean by realism and consequences for the development of a realist methodology. Realism should abandon the notion of natural necessity in favour of a view that the “real” nature of the social world is contingent and necessity is only revealed in outcome states. This, I argue, has both theoretical and methodological implications and I develop my argument through two case studies, of homelessness and ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brain processes and social processes are not as separated as many of our Social Psychology and Neuroscience departments. This paper discusses the potential contribution of social neuroscience to the development of a multi-level, dynamic, and context-sensitive approach to prejudice. Specifically, the authors review research on event related potentials during social bias, stereotypes, and social attitudes measurements, showing that electrophysiological methods are powerful tools for analyzing the temporal fine-dynamics of psychological processes involved in implicit and explicit prejudice. Meta-theoretical implications are drawn regarding the social psychological modeling of social attitudes, and for the integration of social neuroscience into a multi-level account of cultural behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the “real” physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent sociology that in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study “ Psychoanalysis—its image and its public” intimates that common sense is increasingly informed by science. But common sense asserts its autonomy and, in turn, may affect the trajectory of science. This is a process that leads to many differentiations—in common sense, in scientific innovation and in political and regulatory structures. Bauer and Gaskell's toblerone model of triangles of mediation provided a distillation of their reading of “La Psychanalyse.” Here it was argued that representations are multi-modal phenomena necessitating the use of multiple methodologies (comparative and longitudinal; qualitative and quantitative). In this paper we briefly summarise these arguments and elaborate ways in which social representation theory can be considered a progressive research programme. “Progressive” because as the theory has developed it has extended the range and depth of its conceptual basis; it provides a new synthesis for the social scientific understanding of the phenomena of common sense and of representation; it acts as an antidote to the reductionism of public opinion and, finally, it is a stimulus to depart from disciplinary silos. However, there remain unresolved issues: how to segment the relevant social milieus and how to close the feedback loop from common sense to science? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Psychoanalysis, its image and its public (PIP) Moscovici introduced the theory of social representations and took further the project of rehabilitating common sense. In this paper I examine this project through a consideration of the problem of cognitive polyphasia, and the continuity and discontinuity between different systems of knowing. Focusing on the relations between science and common sense. I ask why, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the scientific imagination tends to deny its relation to common sense and believe that can displace it. I argue that the psychosocial dynamic between common sense and science is revealing of how heavily they are entangled in, and indeed indebted to each other. Even more, this dynamic allows for a full appreciation of what the theory of social representations calls states of cognitive polyphasia. Different systems of thinking and knowing do not displace each other but live side by side, co-existing in a variety of ways, fulfilling different functions and answering different needs in social life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper clarifies the terms “institutions” and “social structures” and related terms “rules”, “conventions”, “norms”, “values” and “customs”. Part one explores the similarities between institutions and social structures whilst the second and third parts explore differences. Part two considers institutions, rules, habits or habitus and habituation, whilst part three critically reflects on three common conceptions of social structures. The conclusion comments upon reflexive deliberation via the internal conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new approach to the demarcation of social emotions, based on their dependence on social appraisals that are designed to assess events bearing on social concerns. Previous theoretical attempts to characterize social emotions are compared, and their inconsistencies highlighted. Evidence for the present formulation is derived from theory and research into links between appraisals and emotions. Emotions identified as social using our criteria are also shown to bring more consistent consequences for social behavior than nonsocial emotions. We conclude by considering ways of validating and refining our classification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we present a modern version of the classic theory of “ultimate psychological hedonism” (UPH). As does the UPH, our two-dimensional model of metatelic orientations also postulates a fundamentally hedonistic motivation for any human action. However, it makes a distinction between “telic” or content-based goals of actions and “metatelic” or emotional reasons for actions. In our view, only the emotional reasons for action, but not the goals of action, conform to the UPH. After outlining our model, we will elucidate the similarities and differences between our model and classic UPH. In this context we will clarify several basic misconceptions regarding classic UPH. In a next step, two major criticisms of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism will be discussed, that is (1) the statement that the hedonistic principle has no motivating effect at all and (2) the argument that the hedonistic motivation is only one of many motivations of human actions. We believe that both of these arguments can be refuted. Finally, we will discuss the compatibility of our model with evolutionary theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Akrasia is a philosophical concept meaning the possibility to perform actions against one's best judgement. This contribution aims to clarify this phenomenon in terms of a social construction, stating it as a narrative configuration generated by an observer. The latter finds himself engaged in justifying a “problematic” line of action with regard to specific cultural beliefs referring to the self, the others and the behaviour. This paper intends to make explicit the assumptions underlying the traditional definitions of akrasia when, paradoxically, an agent performs an action not in accordance with his/her best judgement. In the transition from modern to post-modern psychology, we here propose an interpretation of the phenomenon in psychological terms, envisaging akrasia as a narrative form functional to the identity processes and to the social dynamics of the structures of contemporary societies. Implications in the psychological practice will be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this paper I shall concentrate on the last one—the question of responsibility of the amoralists, but the discussion will have an indirect bearing on the other two themes as well. My main reason for holding psychopaths morally responsible breaks down into two claims: the assumption that most ordinary people are morally responsible for their intentional actions (i.e., the rejection of hard determinism) and the denial that the psychopaths are qualitatively different from the non-psychopaths. This thesis is further defended against two objections. First, I am arguing that the genetically based emotive deficiency of the psychopaths cannot be seen the factor condemning them to amoral existence, and thus cannot be cited as an exempting condition. Secondly, my position is defended against the claim that psychopaths are partly responsible for their actions. It is argued that the notion of partial responsibility is either incoherent or else rests on a false empirical premise. My conclusion is in agreement with, and provides a theoretical justification for, the position of most classifications of the persons with antisocial personality disorder in the DSM IV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By focusing on the unique velocity and over-stimulation of metropolitan life, Georg Simmel pioneered an interpretation of cultural boredom that has had a significant impact on contemporary social theory by viewing it through the modern experience of time-pressure and social acceleration. This paper explores Simmel's account of boredom by showing how—in the frenzy of modern life—it has become increasingly difficult to qualitatively distinguish which choices and commitments actually matter to us. Furthermore, this emotional indifference invariably pushes us towards more excessive and risky behavior, towards, what I call, “extreme aeshesia.” Insofar as novel experiences quickly become routine in the technological age, it appears that only extreme sensations and experiences can break the spell of boredom, allowing us to momentarily feel strongly for something. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I critically examine Stephen Turner's (1994) critique of practice theory in light of recent neurophysiological discoveries regarding the “mirror neuron system” in the pre-frontal mo-tor cortex of humans and other primates. I argue that two of Turner's strongest objections against the sociological version of the practice-theoretical account, the problem of transmission and the problem of sameness, are substantially undermined when examined from the perspective of re-cently systematized accounts of embodied learning and intersubjective action understanding in-spired by these developments. In addition, I show that the practice-theoretical framework out-lined by Pierre Bourdieu in the Logic of Practice and other works is, in contrast to Turner's por-trayal of a confused hodgepodge of logical errors and empirical impossibilities, largely consistent with the latest neurophysiological evidence and as such fundamentally foreshadowed more recent understandings of the neurocognitive foundations of the perception, understanding and structure of the motor schemes productive of action in the world. Also in line with these newer neurosci-entific developments, the practice-theoretical focus on the body as the central matrix generative of tacit understandings and analogical operations responsible for “higher order” systems of classi-fication emerges as the key to solving some of the thorniest problems in the theory of action: eliminating to need to resort to unwarranted “collective object” explanations for the origins of shared presuppositional frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociological propositions about the workings of cognition are rarely specified or tested, but are of central relevance to studies of culture, social judgment, and social movements. This paper draws out lessons of recent work from sociological theory, cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience on the embodied nature of knowledge and thought, and develops implications of these lessons for cultural and cognitive sociology. Knowledge ought to be conceived of as fundamentally embodied, because sensory information is a fundamental component of experience as it is stored in long-term memory, and because bodily responses and intuitions often precede reflexive or strategic thought. I argue that the challenge of embodied knowledge for cultural sociology is threefold: to develop cultural theories of motivation; to specify the ways in which the body structures discourses endogenously; and to specify how embodied motivations and embodied discourses interact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

George Herbert Mead argues that human society is comprised of six basic institutions—language, family, economics, religion, polity, and science. I do not believe that he can be criticized for making institutions the cornerstones of a society, but he can definitely be criticized for his explanation of how our basic institutions originate, how these institutions operate in society after their inception, and how they later change, modifying society in the process. The problem with Mead's explanation of these three critical matters is that he based them on his principle of “sociality” rather than on the principle of “domination.” If Mead's principle of sociality is replaced by the principle of domination and his notion of the “generalized other” is replaced by the notion of the “phantom community,” then most of these problems can be largely solved. Thus, in this paper, I will not only point out the key problems in Mead's theory of society, but I will also offer solutions to them based on the notions of domination and the “phantom community.” The end product is a “radical interactionism” that surpasses Mead's original interactionism in identifying the part that both domination and the composite “other” play in every known human society—big and small, and past and present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a dynamic perspective in which the psychological contract is treated as a structured set of beliefs that are held by individual employees about the mutual obligations of the organization as employer and themselves as employees. This set of beliefs is assumed to produce a state of commitment to the organization in which the employee is willing to accept work roles and tasks offered by the organization, and to carry them out in accordance with certain standards. The dynamic model that is presented can help to explain why the commitment of employees remains relatively stable over time, and why it may suddenly decrease or increase under circumstances that are perceived as critical by the employee. The model assumes that the employee's evaluation of the organization's behavior changes over time, but that the structure of the psychological contract and the associated commitment change only when certain limits are overstepped. This perspective on changes in the psychological contract transforms the concept into a powerful construct that may lead to fruitful research on the dynamics of organization-employee relationships. Implications for future research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to Dave Elder-Vass's generally sympathetic critique of Margaret Archer's position on structure and emergence. Elder-Vass does helpfully emphasize the synchronic effects of structure. Yet, it is argued here, in his treatment of structure, Elder-Vass tends to concede too much to methodological individualism and to overemphasize social rules at the expense of social relations. Finally, a question is raised about how both Archer and Elder-Vass and Critical Realism in general speak of emergence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about rational and irrational uses of deontological words, such as “should”, “ought”, and “must”, referred to as “the shoulds”. Rationality is taken as a mutual relationship between conceptual schemes and human agency. These are expressed in what Bakhtin referred to as authoritative discourse and internally persuasive discourse respectively. When the conceptual scheme is in place and its authority transparent, and there is interplay between authoritative discourse and internally persuasive discourse, then the shoulds are perceived as rational. When the interplay is disrupted or suppressed the shoulds are seen as irrational. Breakdown occurs in two main ways. First, when the effective conceptual schemes are hidden, and the origin of the shoulds obscured. We describe some instances of the latter, from philosophy, psychotherapy, and experimental studies of rationality. Second, in technology and science the mutual relationship sometimes breaks down because authoritative discourse is too powerful, and inhibits the interplay in order to maintain itself. After describing these pathologies, we turn to William James, who drew attention to a repair kit for rationality in his detection of the psychologist's fallacy. Describing the work of Dewey and Husserl as elaborations of this, we distinguished two essential aspects of rationality, disciplinary expressed in authoritative discourse, and emancipatory expressed in internally persuasive discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses and evaluates the uses of the concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition, which is based on Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of science. The concept of causal power that appears in the early works of Rom Harré and his associates is compared to Bhaskar's account of this concept and its uses in the critical realist social ontology. It is argued that the concept of emergence should be incorporated to any adequate notion of causal power. The concept of emergence used in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works is shown to be ambiguous. It is also pointed out that the concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti-essentialist way. Ontological and methodological problems that vitiate Bhaskar's transcendental account of the concept of causal power are examined. Moreover, it is argued that the applications of the concept of causal power to mental powers, reasons, and social structures in the critical realist social ontology are problematic. The paper shows how these problems might be avoided without giving up the concept of causal power and the notion of structural social causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of social structure and its relationship to human agency remains one of the central problems of social theory. One of the most promising attempts to provide a solution has been Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach, which invokes emergence to justify treating social structure as causally effective. Archer's argument, however, has been criticised by a number of authors who suggest that the examples she cites can be explained in reductionist terms and thus that they fail to sustain her claim for the independent causal effectiveness of social structure. This paper offers an alternative argument to support the emergentist claim for the causal effectiveness of social structure, and shows how this argument refutes a representative critique of social emergence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation and change of social knowledge in Modern Turkish Republic has begun with the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Whilst the transformation of knowledge took place in daily knowledge, the change that took place in the political structures had a broad influence in the language, religion and tradition. The appearance of a new form of daily knowledge created a new common sense and this has opened the road towards the possibility of investigating social representations of various phenomena. Among these the social representations of madness in daily knowledge have already existed in common sense knowledge for a long time. With this in mind, the main goal of this paper is to explore contemporary urban Turkish social representations of madness. This study has shown that both scientific and common sense knowledge exist at present in citizens’ daily knowledge and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper compares John Dewey's pragmatism and cultural-historical activity theory as epistemologies and theories of transformative material activity. For both of the theories, the concept of activity, the prototype of which is work, constitutes a basis for understanding the nature of knowledge and reality. This concept also implies for both theories a methodological approach of studying human behavior in which social experimentation and intervention play a central role. They also suggest that reflection and thought, mediated by language and semiotic artifacts, serve the reorientation of activity and is vital in the development of new, alternative ways of action. That is why Dewyan pragmatism and activity theory supply means of understanding organizational behavior and change in human activities better than the concepts of practice based on rule following, routines or embodied skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural relativism is supposed to be a bold and provocative thesis. In this paper we challenge the idea that it is an empirical thesis, i.e., one that is supported through anthropological and historical examples. We focus on mathematical relativism, the view that a mathematics from another culture or time might be so radically divergent from our mathematics that "theirs" would stand in direct conflict with "ours" (and in that sense constitute an alternative mathematics). We question in what sense the examples given to support the general thesis are relativistic about mathematics and argue that on close inspection they are not, and certainly not in any radical sense. We do not contest the fact that there can be great mathematical diversity between cultures, but wonder whether it makes sense to talk of "the same" mathematical forms in heterogeneous mathematical environments. Finally, while relativists see the later Wittgenstein as providing support for their own thesis, we claim that Wittgenstein argues against both realism and relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent cognitive science frameworks depicting cognitive processing as "distributed" across persons and environments require new ways of conceptualizing representation. That is, if representation is to be retained as an explanatory concept, accounts must foreground the interactive participation of persons and of different representational formats, rather than cast it as an internal or external phenomenon. This paper is directed towards such an account. It draws upon findings in a wide-scale, multi-year study investigating cognitive practices of research scientists in two university research laboratories. The research is guided by the assumption that cognitive practices generally and science practices specifically comprise a complex system of persons, devices, artifacts, instruments, texts, and traditions. We use an interdisciplinary methodological approach that combines ethnographic observations and analyses with cognitive-historical analysis. Here we present two interrelated interpretive notions emerging from our analysis that have particular relevance to the project of providing an account of representation compatible with the assumption that cognitive processing is distributed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a critical overview of the controversy between the Radical approach to Discursive Psychology (RDP) and the Social Representations Theory (SRT). After having analyzed several positions, the first part of the article aims to show what is potentially complementary and contradictory in Discursive Psychology (DP) and the Social Representations Theory, when and why they are incompatible. In the second part of the article, we examine some of the main pillars of the RDP's antagonistic dispute and confutations and describe how the radicalism of the socio-constructionist thesis upheld by Radical Discourse Analysis can give rise to several hard-to-solve problems, which may then be translated into a boomerang effect: a) making relativism relative; b) reflecting on reflexivity; c) reducing the subject's role in a radical "contingentism" perspective; d) affirming the "totalising" and "reifying" role of discourse-action; e) assuming a "tautological" model of the binomium communication and representations, rejecting the concept and metaphor of communication. The paper concludes by arguing for a "dialogical" perspective not only in the terms peculiar to the SRT, but also for a "cross-fertilization" between the researchers inspired by the less radical approach to discursive psychology and those inspired by Social Representation Theory, highlighting the effect of the methodological implication that this would entail if researchers with various "school" memberships would instead of speaking and writing for their own academic circles would also learn to listen and read each other with respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues the Wittgensteinian point that we can undo the psychologizing of psychology by conceiving of mental life as lived in the space of reasons. It is argued that mental life -- human action, feeling and thinking -- is constituted by normative connections and necessities rather than causal ones. The consequence is that mental life is irreducibly moral, and if the sciences of mental life are to become adequate to deal with their subject matter, they should construe themselves as what was once referred to as moral sciences. It is argued that the source of the normativity of mental life is found in historically evolved social practices, although not all normativity is conventional or historically contingent. Finally, some objections to the idea that mental life is normative are discussed; first, that this idea represents an intellectualist or rationalist fallacy, and second that it violates our conception of mental illness as something mental, yet outside the space of reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All relevant sources agree that weeping is a human universal. There is disagreement, though, as to whether tears experienced during episodes of happiness or joy derive from the experience of joy itself, or whether such tears result merely from incidental physical constriction of the lacrimal gland (]) or from a“sadness rebound” induced by anticipated loss of the source of joy (];]). It is argued here that adult weeping does not exclusively express suffering but rather is an emotional and physical register of changes in self, both positive and negative. In outlining the argument concerning weeping the paper also presents an account of the registration and consolidation of changes in self-identity and self-feelings, and therefore provides an account of the internal process of transformation of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines methodological issues associated with the theory of planned behaviour and explains that an alternative account of data used to support this theory can be provided by positioning theory. A case is presented that shows tests of the theory of planned behaviour fail to eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations for co-variation in its data. An agency or person-centered alternative shows how a causal interpretation can be reinterpreted as evidence of the actions of a person. Unlike the conceptualisation of the individual as behaving in keeping with postulated underlying cognitive laws or rules we assume that the person has, through socialisation, acquired the skills necessary to initiate and manage their own actions. Unlike the interest in TPB data as a causal explanation of action we draw attention to the interpretation of patterns in these data as an aggregate of each person using a common mode of explanation to justify and explain their intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT:The main aim of this paper is to examine how the recent themata developments in Social Representations Theory can be linked with the classical process involved in the construction of social representations—anchoring—, as well as with the communicative modalities that are part of the theory since its inception. This was done through a study of the representation of GMOs in the Portuguese press, taken as an opportunity for addressing the issues related to the role played by old categories in rendering new meanings and in establishing new categories.A further objective of the study, more applied in nature, was to explore whether the central characteristics of the representations of biotechnology in European countries were also present in Portugal.All articles that included the expressions Genetically Modified/Genetic Modification/Manipulation or Transgenics, were collected, in five Portuguese newspapers, during the years of 1999, 2000 and 2001. Content analysis of the 239 articles collected showed that their thematical organisation re-constitutes the Red/Green dichotomy found in most European countries. The Red/health discussion is structured around such themata as health/disease, risk/safety, benefits/problems, and anchors in categories like science and progress. The nature/culture opposition emerges, in turn, in the Green/food discussion, which anchors on categories like ideology and employs Propaganda as a communicative modality—a set of indicators configuring a more polemic debate. The conclusions discuss the relevance of linking themata with anchoring and the importance of devising more fine-grained tools for the analysis of Diffusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT:In order to delimit the realm of social phenomena, sociologists refer implicitly or explicitly to a distinction between living human beings and other entities, that is, sociologists equate the social world with the world of living humans. This consensus has been questioned by only a few authors, such as Luckmann, and some scholars of science studies. According to these approaches, it would be ethnocentric to treat as self-evident the premise that only living human beings can be social actors. The methodological consequence of such critique is a radical deanthropologization of sociological research. It must be considered an open question whether or not only living human can be social actors. The paper starts with a discussion of the methodological problems posed by such an analysis of the borders of the social world, and presents the results of an empirical analysis of these borders in the fields of intensive care and neurological rehabilitation. Within these fields it must be determined whether a body is a living human body or a symbol using human body. The analysis of these elementary border phenomena challenges basic sociological concepts. The relevant contemporary sociological theories refer to a dyadic constellation as the systematic starting point of their concept of sociality. The complex relationship between at least two entities is understood as the basis of the development of a novel order that functions as a mediating structure between the involved parties. Based upon empirical data, I argue that it is necessary to change this foundational assumption. Not the dyad but the triad must be understood as the foundational constellation. This implies a new understanding of the third actor, which is distinct from the concepts developed by Simmel and Berger and Luckmann. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus in this paper is on deliberate human action. The central questions addressed are: whether purely rational choice is possible; whether choices may be induced by chance alone; or whether there is always a mixture of rationality and chance, as well as other factors such as habit, emotion, imitation and irrationality. The approach is a factualist one, upholding the view that, although human action can be explained by its antecedents, this is not incompatible with the notion of "free choice". It is the actual choosing process that determines the final choice of action. Whatever the sources of the elements involved in the choosing process, the choice of action is a specific outcome created by the acting agent. It is in this choosing process and decision making that both rationality and chance enter. The conclusion is that rationality is the element which links intentionality with goal seeking and attainment, but that the actual choice is determined by a complex interactive process in which both logic and chance play a part. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to balance the conceptual reception of Bourdieu's sociology in the United States through a conceptual re-examination of the concept of Habitus. I retrace the intellectual lineage of the Habitus idea, showing it to have roots in Claude Levi-Strauss structural anthropology and in the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget, especially the latter's generalization of the idea of operations from mathematics to the study of practical, bodily-mediated cognition. One important payoff of this exercise is that the common misinterpretation of the Habitus as an objectivist and reductionist element in Bourdieu's thought is dispelled. The Habitus is shown to be instead a useful and flexible way to concep-tualize agency and the ability to transform social structure. Thus ultimately one of Bourdieu's major contributions to social theory consists of his development of a new radical form of cognitive sociology, along with an innovative variety of multilevel sociological explanation in which the interplay of different structural orders is highlighted. In keeping with the usual view, the goal of sociology is to uncover the most deeply buried structures of the different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the "mechanisms" that tend to ensure their reproduction or transformation. Merging with psychology, though with a kind of psychology undoubtedly quite different from the most widely accepted image of this science, such an exploration of the cognitive structures that agents bring to bear in their practical knowledge of the social worlds thus structured. Indeed there exists a correspondence between social structures and mental structures, between the objective divisions of the social world . . . and the principles of vision and division that agents apply to them (Bourdieu, 1996b[1989], p. 1). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question discussed in the present paper is whether actions that are free can be thought of as rational. According to one view, no free action could be rational. According to another, all free actions must be rational. I argue that both these positions are false and that there is no necessary connection between freedom and rationality. Some free actions are rational, others are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to self-categorization theory (SCT), incidents of crowd violence can be understood as discrete forms of social action, limited by the crowd's social identity. Through an analysis of the riot at Woodstock 1999, this paper explores the uses and limitations of SCT in order to reach a more complex psychology of crowd behavior, particularly those instances that appear unmotivated, irrational, and destructive. Psychological and sociological literature are synthesized to explore the role of communication in establishing social norms within the crowd. Several modifications to current crowd psychology are proposed, including a false consensus effect of motivation and the mediation of personal and social identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an ecological approach to the perception and interpretation of signs. The theory draws upon the ecological approach of James Gibson (1966; 1979). It is proposed that cultural and natural perception can both be explained in terms of the direct pick-up of structured information and the Gibsonian concept of affordances (Gibson, 1979) without having to invoke a sharp distinction between direct and indirect perception. The application of the theory is exemplified through attention to language and to the visual and audio arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two most common names to invoke for a perceptualist aesthetics are Rudolf Arnheim and E. H. Gombrich. But the similaritied and differences between them have never been explicitly drawn. This paper undertakes such an analysis based on the three categories of representation, expression and historical objectivity. Arnheim's less stringent solutions to the problems of representation and expression are applauded but Gombrich's unique attempt to ground both of these categories in a form amenable to non-historicist approach to history are also praised. Gombrich's anti-historicism derives from Karl Popper and Arnheim is fleshed out with the theories of Maurice Mandelbaum. The parallel comparison of Popper-Mandelbaum helps to underscore differences and show an alternative to Gombrich and Popper's nominalism. Ian Verstegen , Arnheim and Gombrich in Social Scientific Perspective, pp. 000–000 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the concept of the reified and consensual universes in the theory of social representations, and the relationship between them. Having examined the different ways in which Moscovici discusses this concept, and the different ways in which these discussions have been interpreted, I will suggest that many of the criticisms levelled at this facet of social representations theory appear somewhat misplaced. However, it does seem that some aspects of the concept of the consensual and the reified universes are rather under-developed within the theory as a whole. It will be suggested that the recent addition of the notion of the representational project to the theory of social representations goes some way towards addressing some of these emergent issues, most notably with regards to the relationship between knowledges from different spheres. As an example, the area of representations of health and illness will be considered: drawing on work that takes the perspective of the sociology of scientific knowledge, it will be suggested that the theory of social representations needs to make the possibility of a bi-directional relationship between knowledge from the fields of scientific and common sense understanding more explicit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]