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This paper provides an analysis of the cognitive processes implied in the ego defense known as projection. Projection is first placed in the context of the general cognitive processes of attribution and ascription. Then we address defensive projection, and identify its distinctive features. In particular, whereas general projection consists in the ascription of one's own mental attitudes to others, defensive projection implies one's rejection (via denial or repression) of the ascribed mental states, and ascription is a means for supporting this rejection. We try to understand how and why ascription is functional to rejection. Then, we examine a few types of defensive projection, and identify the main components and steps in the projective process. Finally, we draw some general conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes a practical answer to Duhem’s problem within the framework of experimental psychology. First, this problem is briefly discussed; second, two studies in psychology are presented illustrating how theories are tested. Thirdly, based on the foregoing, an approach called the “Empirical Reasoning” (ER) is developed and justified. It is shown that the ER approach can successfully cope with Duhem’s problem. Finally, the ER approach and the Error Statistics approach of Mayo are critically compared with regard to Duhem’s problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That social or group identities, categories by which individuals are classed and described, undergo change is obvious. But how do such categories change? This paper examines processes by which identities, such as national and sexual, transform. The first step is to investigate the nature of social categories. I argue that, unlike natural kinds, categories by which objects are classed in the natural sciences, social categories do not have fixed essences because of the heterogeneity of their constitutive elements. Furthermore, they are not static entities because of an intentional component as well as a recognitional component with identities. Not only do individuals identify or describe themselves in particular ways, such self–descriptions must be recognized by others. I argue that recognition of one’s identity is necessary for one’s sense of self and that the harms of non– and misrecognition are on a par with those caused by other injustices. Hence the importance of identity. However, once forged, we should not assume that the identity of any group is permanent. In reaction to how they are being categorized, members of a group can respond in ways such that the category by which individuals are described, their group identity, may change. Identities are, however, only potentially mutable, for alterations need not be realized nor always desirable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst both philosophers of science and social scientists (including historians) one finds people defending the thesis that explanations of particular facts should refer to proximate causes, or that explanations referring to remote causes are at least less—if they are any—good (e.g. Jon Elster, Paul Veyne, Michael Taylor, etc.). The idea is that any explanatory factor at a temporal remove from the fact to be explained, should be replaced by a factor closer to the fact. This close–grain preference is a matter of favoring explanations that provide the detailed mediating mechanisms in non–interrupted causal chains across time. The claims we want to defend in this paper are: (1) explanations of plain facts (as opposed to explanations of contrasts between facts) that invoke remote causes on top of proximate causes are often better than explanations that invoke only proximate causes; and. (2) explanations of contrasts between facts that invoke only proximate cause are often worthless: one has to invoke a remote cause in order to provide a minimally adequate contrastive explanation. The upshot of this is that the close–grain preference should be replaced with a more differentiated explanatory pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Alfred Schutz is most frequently identified as the main influence on Harold Garfinkel, and the latter on Anthony Giddens in his development of structuration theory, in fact the later Wittgenstein’s insights into meaning and understanding strongly influenced both. This paper attempts to demonstrate Wittgenstein’s influence on ethnomethodology and structuration theory, and show that despite their intentions, and contrary to what is normally thought, Giddens’s and Garfinkel’s work do not express as much of a creative version of social life as they intended, in that each had difficulties regarding the issues of social uniformity (“cultural dopes”) and individual choice. I will argue that these problems are rooted in their interpretations of Wittgenstein’s rule–following considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a position on the pragmatic significance of humor. Setting aside questions of the aesthetic and phenomenal qualities of the experience of humor, I focus on its role in correcting and enforcing adherence to the norms of other social practices. I emphasize that humor can come in two forms, a congenial and a denunciatory one. In the former, we correct and reaffirm the status of other agents within the practice, while in the latter we excoriate others and make no amends. Though this makes even good clean fun sound cruel, I argue that when looked upon in the right light, most forms of humor can be reconciled with our moral and political obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances a theory as to why Vygotsky’s research program has remained at the center of international psychological debates, despite its grounding in Marxist philosophy. An important part of the psychological appeal of Vygotsky derives from the fact that he was describing the mental constructs and rule-governed behavior of human development in their account of social, cultural, and historical reality. There have been a number of attempts to create a Marxist psychology during the 1920s and 1930s. These have been less successful because of misunderstandings of Marxism, and indeed of psychology. If Marxism drew on German Hegelian philosophy, British political economy, and French political socialism, then psychology drew on German materialist physiology, British empiricist philosophy, and French Cartesian dualism. Marx attacked the poverty of philosophy and wrote a Critique of political economy, similarly, Vygotsky wrote Educational psychology and attacked the poverty of psychology in his magnum opus, Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology. Vygotsky argued that we must write our poverty of psychology then lay the foundations for a Marxist psychology. That is to create psychology’s own capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul Lewis has recently engaged Varela and Harre’s discussion of Bashkar’s problem with the reification of social structure. Lewis argues that Varela and Harré are correct in their conclusion that social structure is not an efficient cause—a powerful particular. Nevertheless, he then argues that social structure is an effective cause. In this paper I address this apparent paradox by further developing causal powers theory. I argue that if x-structure is not causally powerful it cannot be causally effective. Any declaration to the contrary renders causal powers theory incoherent. The implication is that any attempt to save the thesis that social structure is an effective cause is problematic if it appeals to an alternative notion of causality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vygotsky’s concept of the zone of proximal development (zpd) has brought wide attention to the role of adults in children’s learning and development. The author proposes that beyond understanding its mechanism, its use is influenced by various factors which the adult needs to be sensitive to. Through integrating related literature on the zpd and on adult-child interactions, this paper aims to shed light on the nature of adult sensitivity in actualizing the zpd. The concept is first analyzed theoretically. Two types of sensitivity will then be discussed: adults’ self-awareness and their awareness of children as active players in the interaction process. Sigel’s concept of distancing is suggested as a means of enhancing one’s sensitivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The longstanding philosophical debate between idealism and materialism has recently entered the ontological terrain of critical realism (CR) and dialectical critical realism (DCR). This has been initiated by Roy Bhaskar’s most recent book, From East to West, which attempts an ambitious synthesis of philosophy, social theory and theology. On the one hand, Bhaskar’s attempt to root his philosophy and social theory in a ‘realist theory of God’ has found an echo within the CR and DCR research camp, some of whose members would urge us to take seriously the possibility of a ‘religious sociology’. On the other hand, Bhaskar’s abrupt ‘idealist turn’ has left many critical realists flabbergasted and horrified, particularly those working at the interface between realist philosophy and Marxist social science, especially since Bhaskar’s new philosophical trajec-tory is radically at odds with the ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism’ outlined in his The Possibility of Naturalism. In response to this ‘split’ within the CR and DCR camp, the spectre of ‘realist agnosticism’ has been raised and defended by Mervyn Hartwig in this journal. Since neither science nor philosophy can settle the issue of what kind of stuff constitutes ‘rock bottom reality’, it is rational to be agnostic on the ‘ultimate question’, to deny positively affirming the claims of either one side or the other. Now this is the move that is resisted in this paper. My argument is that ontolog-ical idealism is disputable on a number of grounds-philosophical, scientific, ethical and political. In particular, I argue that objective idealism is unsupported by rational knowledge, is riddled with conceptual and logical defects, is contrary to the logic of scientific discovery, and is an obstacle to eudaimonia (human emancipation). Further, since realist agnosticism rests its... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent challenge of Dynamical Systems Theory (also known as ComplexityTheory or Chaos Theory) to the social sciences, is based largely on the beliefthat processes in the social arena can be considered as analogous to those of the natural world, and that in consequence general theoretical advances in explaining the latter might with advantage be applied to the former. This paper aims to show that claims for Dynamical Systems Theory with respect to the understanding or measurement of social processes would be premature; the reasons for this lying not only in the unfamiliarity and operational difficulties of Dynamical Systems Theory in itself, but also in the problematic nature and history of our usage of the term 'social process'. Reviewing some examples of such usage from Sociology and Social Psychology, it is concluded that Dynamical Systems Theory might serve as a catalyst for a re-examination of existing orthodoxies and major concepts, but that progress would be retarded by the uncritical application of it's terminology, concepts, and techniques of mathematical modelling, without this prior and demanding first step. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many social scientists and journalists attempt to explain events in recent or distant history by uncovering hidden beliefs and desires held by groups. Such ascriptions are problematic in that beliefs are attributed to groups rather than individuals, and, in that being "hidden," they cannot be attributed using ordinary everyday methods. In this paper, I try to sort out what is sensible and what is muddled in this unusual but very common type of belief ascription. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite differences between them, Gadamer and Habermas both argue that in order to understand the practices and beliefs of other cultures and periods of history fully and critically, researchers should enter into imaginary 'dialogue' with their subjects about the nature of the world. Objectivity of understanding in their view consists not in prior suppression of our contemporary preconceptions and interests but in a process of actively seeking agreement (Verständigung) with others over appropriate world-views and normative beliefs. This paper challenges Gadamer's and Habermas' thesis on three fronts. It argues that, (i) the notion of 'dialogue' with past personages and abstract social totalities is not clear, even when qualified as 'imaginary'; (ii) to derive normative Verständigung from descriptive Verstehen is not conceptually well-founded, nor pertinent to the thematic goals of research; and (iii) however deeply interpreters remain tied to the culture of their upbringing, they are not thereby licensed to incorporate value-judgments into the research process. Rather than providing any methodological norms for research, dialogue ought best be seen as characterising certain moral and political responsibilities of scientists in relation to civil society and the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of emotion developed by William James has been subject to four criticisms. First, it is held that Jamesian emotion is without function, that it plays no role in cognition and behavior. Second, that James ignores the role of experience in emotion. Third, that James overstated the role of physical processes in emotion. Fourth, that James' theory of emotion has been experimentally demonstrated to be false. A fifth point, less an explicit criticism than an assumption, holds that James has nothing to offer a social psychology of emotions. It will be shown in this paper that not one of these criticisms of James' theory of emotion can be sustianed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the physical sciences a realist ontology rests on our ability to demonstrate the actual and real nature of material entities. Realist metaphysics of social entities, most influentially Bhaskar's critical realism, attempt to provide a related philosophical foundation for the social sciences. This paper examines the central issue of what is real about society it concludes that social relations and the organisations they constitute do exist and discusses the conditions of their demonstration. Realist interpretations of Bourdieu's theories are given particular attention in an argument that accepts the necessity of social realism but remains cautious about the development of methodologies able to provide effective demonstration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now commonplace to call persons sick when their wrongdoing becomes entrenched, extensive, and extreme. This mixing of moral and therapeutic categories seems incoherent if we uncritically embrace a morality-therapy dichotomy: Behavioral problems like alcoholism are either moral or therapeutic matters, but not both. This paper dissolves the dichotomy by arguing that chronically abusive drinking is simultaneously a sickness and wrongdoing. Alcoholism is at least partly a self-inflicted impairment of responsible agency that has unhealthy consequences and usually requires therapeutic interventions. Morality and therapy are not inherently opposed. Morality enjoins compassionate helping and nonjudgemental therapy, and therapy is rooted in moral values of caring and respect. The polarized positions of Herbert Fingarette inHeavy Drinkingand George E. Vaillant inThe Natural History of Alcoholismare reconciled by paying close attention to their accounts of the condition, causes, consequences, and cure of alcoholism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One question in moral psychology concerns the role of emotions to motivate moral action. This question has recently become more urgent, because it is now clearer that cognitive developmental theories cannot offer a complete explanation of moral functioning. This paper suggests that emotion, as is typically understood in psychology, cannot be seen as the basis for an acceptable explanation of moral behaviour and motivation. However, it is argued that it is possible to understand emotions as embedded in agentic processes, and regulated by conscious concerns. So understood, emotions acquire an important role in the person's moral life. These conclusions are reached through an extensive review of psychological and philosophical conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a re-examination of Popper's propensity interpretation of probability in respect of its potential methodological value in social science. A long standing problem for the (standard) frequency interpretation of probability is that whilst it is able to treat both aggregate and individual phenomena as having measurable properties, it cannot explain the ontological relationship between such concrete individual cases and aggregates. Popper's interpretation treats single cases as both real, but also as realisations of a propensity to occur. The frequency and propensity interpretations are compared and whilst some common objections raised must be upheld, they do not devalue the importance of the propensity interpretation as at least a metaphysical basis for probabilistic claims in social science. However the value of the approach may also lie in its methodological potential. Here I sugest that single case probabilities must be analysed in terms of the anterior probabilities of prior constituent events. In this I move beyond Popper's own programme, but suggest that such a move is theoretically compatible with recent complexity approaches in social science and goes some way toward meeting anti-naturalist concerns about intentionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the treatment of the individualism-holism problem in sociological research. Explanation of the basic concepts used in the paper; Types of individualisms and holisms; Ontological and epistemological reasons for choosing an individualistic approach in social research; Explanation of particular societal phenomena.

In this piece, I argue against the Cartesian trend of seeing persons, selves and mind as something distinct from the body. It is claimed that Descartes realized the importance of the link between body and mind, but never pursued this connection, and this then becomes the aim of the paper. Another effect of Cartesian modes of thinking is to divorce human knowledge from its material contexts, driving a wedge between mind and matter. Some forms of social constructionism appear to fall into this latter trap and instead I argue for a view of persons as embodied beings whose selves are intimately connected to the body. Using the work of Bourdieu, Elias, Merleau-Ponty, and Ilyenkov, I also suggest that thought cannot be disengaged from a human body active in its world and that knowledge not only partly separates us from the materiality of existence, but connects us to it in deeper ways, as another dimension of human existence. Human beings can then be regarded as bodies of knowledge - active thinkers and persons engaged with the multi-dimensional world around them and capable of producing change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the rich and varied papers that constitute the Special Issues of "The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour."

The article presents abstracts on social behavior which include a dynamic behavior of embodiment that aims to get beyond the absent moving body in embodied social theory, a paper on institutions and social structures, and a report on the Vygotskian tradition in the realist theoretical discussion of the structure-agency problem.

The article presents abstracts of research papers about social psychology. They include "Accounting for one's behavior--What really determines its effectiveness? Its type or its content?," "A New Understanding of Terrorism Using Cognitive Dissonance Principles," "A Multicomponential Model of Shame," "The Habitus Process: A Biopsychosocial Conception" and "The Habitus Process: A Sociological Conception."

Editorial. Comments on the 'Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.' Success of the journal in fostering an open intellectual community; Policy of the journal regarding the criticisms to the papers written by the contributors; Factors that contribute to the decision to publish the papers with a critical response from the readers.

Presents abstracts of research papers which appeared in the December 1998 issue of the 'Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.' Realism, Deconstruction and the Feminist Standpoint,' by Caroline New; Damaging Events: The Perceived Need for Forgiveness,' by E.D. Scobie and G.E.W. Scobie; 'A Human Actor Model for Social Science,' by Joseph M. Whitmeyer.

The article introduces the September 2008 issue of the "Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior," which contains papers and commentaries highlighting the different aspects of the image of psychoanalysis.