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This paper aims to discern, clarify, criticise, and advocate some uses of phenomenology in sociological research. Phenomenology is increasingly evoked or implicitly employed in sociological endeavours. Little attention, however, is paid to what is entailed in taking a phenomenological approach, and whether it is employed to advance empirical or theoretical knowledge. I build an analytic typology of different empirical and theoretical uses of phenomenology, criticise a range of these uses, and argue that other uses bear significant potential for the advancement of theoretical and empirical knowledge. The paper's main contribution lies in comparing and contrasting the many invocations of phenomenology in contemporary social scientific research to discern their benefits and shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major paradigms in sociology and social sciences usually embrace either individualism or anti‐individualism as fundamental worldview. This paper explores a third way between individualism and anti‐individualism developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann in his systems theory. Luhmann treats actors or individuals as psychic systems and he distinguishes them from social systems. In a nutshell, social systems produce communication, whereas psychic systems produce consciousness. In line with anti‐individualism, Luhmann therefore argues that social systems are irreducible to psychic systems and their actions. On the other hand, Luhmann joins ranks with individualism to assert that psychic systems are not rigorously constrained by social systems. Ultimately, Luhmann explains that social systems and psychic systems are part of each other's environment and that each type of systems provides the ecological conditions that the other type depends on to emerge and grow. To discuss this third way between individualism and anti‐individualism, the paper examines more specifically two central points in Luhmann's theory: (1) how social systems and psychic systems are separated from each other, and (2) how social systems and psychic systems are coevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Connecting the critical realist morphogenetic model to insights made by Nicholas Rescher, this paper argues that our predictions are always subject to chance and contingency but nevertheless ineluctably useful for both practical and scientific inquiry. Contingency results from the causal openness of the world, including the causal openness of our own decision‐making. On the other hand, as Rescher notes, human interaction would fail without a degree of stability, which makes the predictions of morphostatic relations if not lawlike at least predictable in a practical sense. Nor is it just habit that makes for morphostasis. Human agents strive reflectively to produce in morphostatic ways the human goods they have created by their interaction. And beyond individual actors, there is, from the critical realist point of view, the combined effects of structure and culture inclining at least in the short‐term to reliably predictable if not lawlike outcomes. With that background, the paper reflects on the dual role of coincidence in social theory, on the one hand signalling contingency and the other on what, according to the active causal mechanisms, generally co‐occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social and human sciences have demonstrated again and again how commensality—the practice of eating together—has substantial implications, across time and place, for how social life is configured. Closely related phenomena have also been explored in biologically oriented sciences focused on human behavior. Yet, there is still little dialogue between these and the mainstream social science analysis of food and eating, despite their shared interests in the role played by food and eating in the organization of social life. The paper strengthens this dialogue and proposes that eating together be analyzed as a social tool: an innovation for the organization of complex behavior. More precisely, the proposition is that the habitual, routinized, and ritualized communal eating we see today developed into a social tool for exercising a diverse set of biologically evolved social traits. Through in‐depth analyses of food sharing, meal sharing, and feasting, I propose three distinct propositions of commensality as a social tool: social coordination of needs (mainly nutritional); social order and complex interaction (primarily conversations); and the symbolic display of stratified social relations. Understanding communal eating as a social tool thus opens up for a unified theory to explain seemingly disparate social phenomena, such as the underlying sociality displayed through different meal arrangements. For a thorough understanding of this, intensified conversations across the borders of scientific paradigms are required. Commensality is a social tool that satisfies both the social and biological appetites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists often treat the commodity form and commodity fetishism as concepts that reduce meaning to an economic base. The paper claims that this view is misguided and, furthermore, that these concepts enable us to formulate a dynamic approach to meaning in economic life. Building on recent discussions of commodity fetishism, I outline this dynamic approach to meaning and the commodity form. This approach demands attention to three issues: (1) the distinction between interpretations‐in exchange and interpretations‐of exchange; (2) how interpretations‐of exchange relate to interpretations‐in exchange; and (3) how status hierarchies can mediate this dynamic of meaning associated with the commodity form. In explaining these issues, I draw on a range of examples that illustrate their relevance to the organization of the capitalist world. The purpose is to illustrate that we can discuss meaning and the commodity form in a non‐reductive manner, and in so doing draw distinct strands of social scientific investigation into conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emergence is central to critical realism, but there has been little attempt to develop a systematic account of this concept within the tradition. Two notable exceptions are seen in the work of Dave Elder‐Vass and Tony Lawson. However, both face problems in responding to reductionist claims and accounting for downward causation. This paper proposes contextual emergence as a robust alternative that overcomes these issues and provides a better justification for critical realism's stratified worldview. Contextual emergence explains that while properties at a lower 'level' offer necessary conditions, for emergence to obtain, there must also be contingent conditions at a higher 'level'. This approach maintains many of critical realism's intuitions about emergence, providing a robust account of ontological stratification and downward causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Choices made under risk appear to differ depending on whether the decision problem is presented as an explicit description or experienced by subjects through a series of choices and outcomes. The difference, labeled the description‐experience gap (DEG), has attracted a fair amount of attention and generated a substantial body of research. Alongside important insights gained, noticeably (and puzzlingly) absent from this literature are emotions – a feature more pertinent to actual experience than to mere description of events, thus potentially a source of difference in decisions observed in these two conditions. Even though emotions are considered a hallmark of experience, existing studies concerned with various aspects of DEG do not seem to address this facet of the question. This paper suggests the possibility that emotions comprise an important factor contributing to DEG. Theoretical considerations and relevant empirical evidence of decision‐making guided by emotions are reviewed to support the proposed hypothesis. General perspective, directions for future research, and possible caveats are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the nature of bank money on two complementary levels. The first level deals with theoretical considerations. Here, the departure point is Social Positioning Theory, which provides a framework to investigate the nature of money. Within the theory, the paper situates bank money in credit‐debt relations, that are themselves integral part of a wider productive‐consumptive nexus of the economy. In this perspective, bank money is the relation, accounting economic positions of participating members, resulting from their economic activities realized within the context of the overall society. The second level uses the methods of Oral History and Memory Studies and, through semi‐structured interviews, provides empirical material illustrating ideas about the nature of money in a specific historical form. The article thus explores the contrasting experiences of banking in the context of a centrally planned economy and banking in the transformation to a market economy. These two contrasting episodes are illustrative because of the significant change in the form of bank money, which brings to light various aspects of its nature. Moreover, the article utilizes interviews that present the lived experience of bankers with years of involvement in the sector, enriching the perspective on the issue under study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the gradual evolution of the French Régulation school (FR) for the study of capitalism through the lens of structure and agency. The analysis first segments the school into two epochs, the early Régulation, led by authors Aglietta and Lipietz, and the later Régulation, which saw the rise of Boyer. We find that the gradual progression that occurred within the FR school is linked to its authors' implicit ontic engagement with structure and agency, which, in turn, provides natural linkages to Critical Realism. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate how the comparison between Morphogenetic Régulation and French Régulation (FR) can facilitate a much deeper reading of the structure‐agency debate pertaining to the transformation of capitalism. In so doing, it discusses the value addedness of Morphogenetic Régulation through three specific concepts by stressing their relevance for contemporary studies in international political economy. These concepts are: stratified emergence; causality and the problématique of hierarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re‐examines a key feature of Emile Durkheim's sociology of knowledge from a critical realist perspective. It is argued that Durkheim's attempt to establish a social basis for the categories in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life should be understood along ontological rather than epistemological lines. This brings to light new problems with the argument which, however, can be brought fruitfully into contact with the more recent social psychological literature on collective intentionality. This yields insights into future lines of inquiry into social cognition and theories of human conceptualizing capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand social issues and practices such as those related to climate change and technological change that are clearly future‐oriented – collectively experienced events that are "not yet" – and co‐constructed by different actors, we need nuanced conceptualizations of how people think about, negotiate and co‐create futures that allow us to understand not only what people (can) think and do about future‐related issues but also how that happens, what for and with which implications. However, so far, one of the key theoretical approaches that has conceptualised how people make meaning in situations of change and uncertainty – the socio‐psychological social representations theory (SRT) – has not often engaged with the future or with different forms of temporality. By contrast, the French pragmatic sociology of engagements and critique (PS) has engaged with these notions, conceptualising them in relation to materiality and a plurality of moral orientations – two dimensions often seen as key to how collective futures are made and imagined. To offer a more nuanced and systematic conceptualization of how people represent the future and with what consequences, this paper will present, compare and synthesise SRT and PS, as a first step towards an interdisciplinary research agenda on social change and representations of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intersection between Critical realism, complex system thinking and Luhmannian autopoiesis has been subject to various debates. By showing how a complex system necessitates a trans‐immanent philosophical foundation, Knio proposed in a previous article a problématique of calibration which seeks to bring back to the fore the importance of considering a complex causality generated by environments onto boundaries and systems in an iterative, recursive, and emergentist way. The next step is to understand the motivation behind the actions of a trans‐immanent system. This paper contributes to this discussion by operationalizing the motivation behind action in terms of the Spinozian conatus. In so doing, this research shows how trans‐immanent systems such as people and society not only objectify (socially construct) but objectivate (create) objects behind desire. Finally, the forgoing shows how systemic persistence is not a simple matter of inertia or imitation but it is a matter of empowering reflexivity or, perseverance. This is shown through a thorough overview of the different interpretations of the conatus, followed by their application to several case studies within pre‐existing and prominent theories of institutional change within capitalism. As a result, the conatus as based on a trans‐immanent system offers great potential in institutional analysis; exemplified in the Critical Realist model of social change: Morphogenetic Régulation. This research contributes not only to political, economic, social, and cultural analyses of institutional change but analyses of complex and open systems as a whole, and thus understandings of human empowerment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]