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This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self‐Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self‐determination theorists have advanced a form of self‐regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self‐determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic‐phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility‐laden contexts of everyday practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of subjectivity has been treated peripherally by philosophy. It has appeared in philosophy not as a specific human phenomenon, but attached to other concepts without specifying its ontological definition, such as intersubjectivity, the place of the Other in the emergence of the self, consciousness and so forth. This paper reconstructs some of the overlooked moments and ideas of several classical philosophers, such as Marx, Dewey, Merleau Ponty, Cassirer and Foucault, in order to identify in their works important antecedents to advance a different concept of subjectivity. The concepts and questions which are raised by those philosophers and which are revived in this paper have remained overlooked both by philosophy and psychology because of the lack of any representation of subjectivity capable of making them more visible. The ontological monopoly of language and discourse in explaining all human phenomena, taken together with the critique of theoretical systems and of epistemology, has found in social constructionism its strongest expression in psychology. The value of theoretical systems in generating intelligibility about complex and configurational phenomena is recovered, along with the need to develop new epistemologies capable of generating intelligibility on such systems. Finally, I argue that a new theoretical and epistemological avenue is opened up for the development of psychological thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ultimate values can be defined as abstract rules or goals transcending specific contexts and defining the utmost purposes of existence. Although the literature about human values is vast, several fundamental questions about ultimate values remain open. What are the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate values? What is the impact of inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively? Regarding learning, what is the role of society? Empirical evidence shows dramatic variability in ultimate values pursued by different people. Why? These open questions suggest that a precise picture of ultimate values is lacking. This paper offers a computational theory of ultimate values. The key idea is that our brain represents values along a hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon experiences with inherent affective nature (basic values). Based on these representations, the proposal is that the brain infers the rules that foster basic values in a variety of contexts. These would become ultimate values and drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing context. We discuss how the theory can contribute to understanding a variety of aspects of human values, including morality, to what degree values are innate or culturally determined, and how values shape and are shaped by society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The passing of Nelson Mandela and other figures of (diverse) contemporary importance may prompt the interesting question of how we might or should understand the psychological, social and moral function of lamentation in human life. This paper aims to show that such responses are not just of emotional and interpersonal significance, but also of serious moral import. To this end, the paper proceeds via exploration of conceptually and morally suggestive correspondences or resonances between the logical grammar of lamentation-which, to be sure, has received almost no latter day analytical attention-and that of gratitude or thankfulness in which there has been an enormous explosion of academic interest in recent years. The paper argues that there is no less case for a moral virtue of lamentation, than for a virtue of gratitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dualism of emic and etic plays a crucial role in the emergence of three culturally informed approaches of psychology: cross-cultural psychology ( CCP), cultural psychology ( CP) and indigenous psychologies ( IPs), a distinction largely accepted nowadays. Similarities and/or differences between these positions are usually discussed either on the level of phenomena (data) or theory. In this paper, however, the discussion takes place on a meta-theoretical or epistemological level, which is also emerging elsewhere. In following several earlier papers of the author, first, four perspectives are distinguished that underlie present day psychology. Second, these are used as a framework for linking them to the three 'camps'. This analysis will show that these perspectives are characterized by different underlying worldviews, interests as well as methodical preferences. Third, it is claimed that this level of discussion is quite fruitful for the ongoing discourse on the three camps, but also helps one to understand, why the duality between emic and etic approaches is-implicitly or explicitly-at the core of these discussions, because their relevance turns out to differ in the three camps. In that sense, the emic/etic duality is used here as a 'litmus test' to exemplify these deeper differences between the camps, thereby highlighting them. Fourth, in order to overcome not only the dilemma between the unique and general in psychology, but also to clarify the relation between the individual and culture it is proposed that psychology should take human action as its unit of analysis, thereby connecting historically to the early beginnings of psychology at the end of the 19th century. It will be argued that a culture inclusive action theory may overcome this tension and may help to integrate western and other indigenous psychologies, and hence it could be advantageous to integrate CP and IPs as well. This is possible because the proposed theory hopefully provides a universal framework for psychological concepts, yet allows for their culture specific expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently Hampton (2004) has argued that natural selection could have equipped the human mind with a set of adaptations for nothing in particular. In this way Hampton challenges the current orthodoxy of Evolutionary Psychology, which claims the mind is a collection of domain-specific cognitive mechanisms. This paper outlines the core of Hampton's thesis as well as the key commitments of Evolutionary Psychology. This is followed by a discussion of the principal levers of Hampton's argument, which are the problems of uncertain futures and of social novelty. Both of these problems pertain to flexibility in the face of new inputs, and Hampton claims that our ability to deal with such situations is indicative of an underdetermined, yet evolved, cognitive architecture. This paper rejects these problems on the grounds that they are misconstrued; a system that can process an input can only do so if it is prepared to do so, therefore true novelty would defeat an organism. This rejection is more formally expressed in terms of information theory, and the various consequences of this conception are drawn out. The paper concludes with some comments about the appropriate grain of analysis for evolutionary theory within the behavioural sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an ecological approach to the perception and interpretation of signs. The theory draws upon the ecological approach of James Gibson (1966; 1979). It is proposed that cultural and natural perception can both be explained in terms of the direct pick-up of structured information and the Gibsonian concept of affordances (Gibson, 1979) without having to invoke a sharp distinction between direct and indirect perception. The application of the theory is exemplified through attention to language and to the visual and audio arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite increased interest in "intuition" within cognitive psychology, the conceptual framework of this notion remains problematic. This paper argues that conceptual shortcomings stem from a tendency to ignore the philosophical heritage of intuition or to dismiss the relevance of this heritage to contemporary theory. The paper outlines major understandings of intuition within psychology and prominent philosophical traditions, highlighting important points of inconsistency in these and examining consequences of the inconsistency. It also considers psychological conceptions of intuition that more readily overlap with philosophical accounts and offers some suggestions toward a more philosophically informed notion of intuition relevant to contemporary psychological theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accepting Cole's the premise that, 'cultural-inclusive psychology has been ... an elusive goal' (1996, pp. 7-8) but one worth striving to attain, I first set out to identify my domain of interest and competence as an intellectual. Deciding it to be social interaction between individuals, I then searched out theoretical approaches to this domain that encompassed as many approaches to this trans-historical concern that have emerged from cultural traditions bequeathing us their legacies. Doing this search comprehensively required me to move outside my Judeo- Christian, Greco- Roman, Renaissance heritage and its international diffusion via the European Empires since the 1500's, embodied most recently the American dominance of intellectual discourse since the Second World War. In my case, this journey has taken me in to Chinese culture and psychology where I have worked towards integrating the Chinese worldview and its psychological measures into the discipline of social psychology. Striving for a more inclusive culture-view, I am now using multi-cultural data bases to transcend this two-cultural focus and incorporate wider measures of cultural variation into our theorizing and empirical validation of universal models for social interaction. This paper describes my current procedures for such culture-mapping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents abstracts of social behavior research. They include "Theories of Embodied Knowledge: New Directions for Cultural and Cognitive Sociology?," by Gabriel Ignatow, "Radical Interactionism: Going Beyond Mead," by Lonnie Athens, "Towards a Dynamic Model of the Psychological Contract," by René Schalk and Robert E. Roe.

Brain processes and social processes are not as separated as many of our Social Psychology and Neuroscience departments. This paper discusses the potential contribution of social neuroscience to the development of a multi-level, dynamic, and context-sensitive approach to prejudice. Specifically, the authors review research on event related potentials during social bias, stereotypes, and social attitudes measurements, showing that electrophysiological methods are powerful tools for analyzing the temporal fine-dynamics of psychological processes involved in implicit and explicit prejudice. Meta-theoretical implications are drawn regarding the social psychological modeling of social attitudes, and for the integration of social neuroscience into a multi-level account of cultural behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues the Wittgensteinian point that we can undo the psychologizing of psychology by conceiving of mental life as lived in the space of reasons. It is argued that mental life -- human action, feeling and thinking -- is constituted by normative connections and necessities rather than causal ones. The consequence is that mental life is irreducibly moral, and if the sciences of mental life are to become adequate to deal with their subject matter, they should construe themselves as what was once referred to as moral sciences. It is argued that the source of the normativity of mental life is found in historically evolved social practices, although not all normativity is conventional or historically contingent. Finally, some objections to the idea that mental life is normative are discussed; first, that this idea represents an intellectualist or rationalist fallacy, and second that it violates our conception of mental illness as something mental, yet outside the space of reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of articles on social psychology, published in the "Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour." "What is Emotionally Authenticity," by Mikko Salmela; "Perspectival Selves in Interaction With Others: Re-reading G.H. Mead's Social Psychology," by Jack Martin; "A Critical Epistemology of Analytical Statistics: Addressing the Sceptical Realist," by Wendy Olsen and Jamie Morgan; "Emotion and Social Structures: Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach," by Christian vom Scheve and Rolf von Laede.

This paper has its roots in qualitative analysis of accounts produced by an Italian serial killer. Theoretical references are related to symbolic interactionism and its developments in the field of psychology and criminology. The whole contribution is aimed to twofold purposes: A) to provide a set of criteria specifically addressed to study deviant action as system of meanings into two related contexts: the single action itself and the whole life history. According this point, paper introduces the concept of“deviant career” and it explains its development and steps; it also provides some psychological social points of views and contributions that scientific works offers. B) to think about potentialities of accounting interviews as powerful tools in clinical practice and empirical research too. Specifically, we discuss narrative about behaviour and life story as a resource in order to take suggestions about meanings, goals and rules of action. It also suggests something about functions that crime discharges in the whole pathway of one's life. Juridical case analysis, run by means of the software ATLAS.ti, is aimed to demonstrate theoretical reasoning proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All relevant sources agree that weeping is a human universal. There is disagreement, though, as to whether tears experienced during episodes of happiness or joy derive from the experience of joy itself, or whether such tears result merely from incidental physical constriction of the lacrimal gland (]) or from a“sadness rebound” induced by anticipated loss of the source of joy (];]). It is argued here that adult weeping does not exclusively express suffering but rather is an emotional and physical register of changes in self, both positive and negative. In outlining the argument concerning weeping the paper also presents an account of the registration and consolidation of changes in self-identity and self-feelings, and therefore provides an account of the internal process of transformation of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines methodological issues associated with the theory of planned behaviour and explains that an alternative account of data used to support this theory can be provided by positioning theory. A case is presented that shows tests of the theory of planned behaviour fail to eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations for co-variation in its data. An agency or person-centered alternative shows how a causal interpretation can be reinterpreted as evidence of the actions of a person. Unlike the conceptualisation of the individual as behaving in keeping with postulated underlying cognitive laws or rules we assume that the person has, through socialisation, acquired the skills necessary to initiate and manage their own actions. Unlike the interest in TPB data as a causal explanation of action we draw attention to the interpretation of patterns in these data as an aggregate of each person using a common mode of explanation to justify and explain their intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two most common names to invoke for a perceptualist aesthetics are Rudolf Arnheim and E. H. Gombrich. But the similaritied and differences between them have never been explicitly drawn. This paper undertakes such an analysis based on the three categories of representation, expression and historical objectivity. Arnheim's less stringent solutions to the problems of representation and expression are applauded but Gombrich's unique attempt to ground both of these categories in a form amenable to non-historicist approach to history are also praised. Gombrich's anti-historicism derives from Karl Popper and Arnheim is fleshed out with the theories of Maurice Mandelbaum. The parallel comparison of Popper-Mandelbaum helps to underscore differences and show an alternative to Gombrich and Popper's nominalism. Ian Verstegen , Arnheim and Gombrich in Social Scientific Perspective, pp. 000–000 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advances a theory as to why Vygotsky’s research program has remained at the center of international psychological debates, despite its grounding in Marxist philosophy. An important part of the psychological appeal of Vygotsky derives from the fact that he was describing the mental constructs and rule-governed behavior of human development in their account of social, cultural, and historical reality. There have been a number of attempts to create a Marxist psychology during the 1920s and 1930s. These have been less successful because of misunderstandings of Marxism, and indeed of psychology. If Marxism drew on German Hegelian philosophy, British political economy, and French political socialism, then psychology drew on German materialist physiology, British empiricist philosophy, and French Cartesian dualism. Marx attacked the poverty of philosophy and wrote a Critique of political economy, similarly, Vygotsky wrote Educational psychology and attacked the poverty of psychology in his magnum opus, Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology. Vygotsky argued that we must write our poverty of psychology then lay the foundations for a Marxist psychology. That is to create psychology’s own capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One question in moral psychology concerns the role of emotions to motivate moral action. This question has recently become more urgent, because it is now clearer that cognitive developmental theories cannot offer a complete explanation of moral functioning. This paper suggests that emotion, as is typically understood in psychology, cannot be seen as the basis for an acceptable explanation of moral behaviour and motivation. However, it is argued that it is possible to understand emotions as embedded in agentic processes, and regulated by conscious concerns. So understood, emotions acquire an important role in the person's moral life. These conclusions are reached through an extensive review of psychological and philosophical conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vast majority of empirical hypotheses in psychology, or in the social sciences more generally, are directional whereas in other sciences, such as the physical sciences, there are more point or narrow‐interval empirical hypotheses. Characteristics of theories and auxiliary assumptions play a role in the difference. Given that psychology research strongly features directional predictions, it is important to question the extent to which these provide convincing tests of theories that they are designed to test. The present work aims to provide a nuanced view that considers the complex interaction between the obviousness of directional predictions, the obviousness of the theory from which they derive, and the quality of the auxiliary assumptions that push towards directional predictions. Then, too, there is the related issue of vulnerability of directional predictions to alternative explanations and how to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In following Marxist and psychoanalytic theory, we can understand ideologies as social processes that obscure the contradictions (i.e., how an object is not at one with itself) inherent to individual subjectivity and social structures. Despite claiming to be non‐ideological, mainstream psychology has, throughout its history, served the ideological interests of elite classes (e.g., by pathologizing political resistance). Working within the liberation psychology paradigm, I attempt in this article to elaborate on the notion of de‐ideologization (i.e., the politically committed retrieval of people's experiences beyond the ideological reference points of elite classes) through a consideration of contradiction. To do this, I explore how de‐ideologization can connect with contradiction through processes of re‐symbolization, solidarity‐making, and mobilizing progressive ideologies. Considered together, these three processes allow us to use contradiction to understand interlocking currents of oppression, divergent visions of emancipation, the development of insurgent subjectivities, and the building of an intersectional socialist politics. In conclusion, I consider some of the directions that theoretical and praxis‐oriented work on de‐ideologization may take, as well as some paths it may wish to avoid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its emergence in the 19th century, academic psychology has striven to become accepted as a scientific discipline. This emphasis on "science" has led to many unprecedented advancements in the understanding of human behavior. However, the view that psychology must be approached as a science has become ingrained in the field over time, and critically discussing the implications of this notion has turned into a taboo. In this article, I examine the benefits and limitations of applying the scientific paradigm to psychology, and I propose when it is not optimal to approach psychology as a science if the field is to maximize its potential. Importantly, I do not imply that practicing psychology as a "non‐science" means practicing it as a pseudoscience. Quite to the contrary, I argue that not always enforcing the scientific viewpoint can prevent pseudoscientific practices and make the field more scientific in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of several studies on social behavior. "Weeping and Transformation of Self," by Jack Barbalet; "Taking a Position: A Reinterpretation of the Theory of Planned Behaviour," by Andrew J. Cook, Kevin Moore and Gary D. Steel; "Deviant Action and Self-Narration: A Qualitative Survey Through ATLAS.ti," by Patrizia Patrizi.

The article presents abstracts on topics related to social behaviour which include the existence of social objects, the difference in interpretation in psychology and interpretation in natural science, and behavioral realism.

Presents abstracts of several studies on psychology and philosophy. 'John Dewey and American Psychology,' by Peter T. Manicas; 'Problems About Young Children's Knowledge of the Theory of Mind and of Intentionality,' by Lawrence D. Roberts and Changsin Lee; 'Who Makes the Rules? Using Wittgenstein in Social Theory,' by Sarah J. Bailyn.

To understand themselves as playing a social role, individuals must understand themselves to be contributing to a cooperative endeavor. Psychologically, the form of cooperation required is a specific type that only humans may possess, namely, one in which individuals form a joint or collective agency to pursue a common end. This begins ontogenetically not with the societal level but rather with more local collaboration between individuals. Participating in collaborative endeavors of this type leads young children, cognitively, to think in terms of different perspectives on a joint focus of attention ‐ including ultimately an objective perspective ‐ and to organize their experience in terms of a relational‐thematic‐narrative dimension. Socially, such participation leads young children to an understanding of self‐other equivalence with mutual respect among collaborative partners and, ultimately, to a normative (i.e. moral) stance toward "we" in the community within which one is forming a moral role or identity. The dual‐level structure of shared endeavors/realities with individual roles/perspectives is responsible for many aspects of the human species' most distinctive psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of articles on psychology. `Emotions and Moral Motivation'; `Splitting Difference: Psychoanalysis, Hatred and Exclusion'; `Direct Perception and Symbolic Forming in Positioning'; `The Concept of consciousness: The General State of Meaning.'

Literary analysis of the blush in Austen's novels identifies three themes, namely the potential ambiguity of a blush, its association with modesty, and its erotic and gendered nature, issues that scarcely figure in current psychological explanations of the phenomenon. I examine these themes and compare them with current psychological accounts which assign a central place to embarrassment and, more specifically, emphasise either unwanted social attention, exposure of the self, or the blush's signalling function. Analysis of Austen's work suggests that greater attention should be paid to self-consciousness as it relates to threats to reputation, to the erotic dimension of the blush, and to potential gender differences. It should encourage researchers to be aware of limitations of psychological accounts and to expand their range of sources of information in order to enhance understanding of this elusive phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In view of the fact that culture-inclusive psychology has been eluded or relatively ignored by mainstream psychology, the movement of indigenous psychology is destined to develop a new model of man that incorporates both causal psychology and intentional psychology as suggested by Vygotsky (1927). Following the principle of cultural psychology: 'one mind, many mentalities' (Shweder et al., 1998), the Mandala Model of Self (Hwang, 2011a,b) and Face and Favor Model (Hwang, 1987, 2012) were constructed to represent the universal mechanisms of self and social interaction that can be applied to any culture; both models can be used as conceptual frameworks for analyzing mentalities of people in any given culture. Taking research works from Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relation as exemplars (Hwang, 2012), this article illustrates how to construct culture-inclusive theories of Confucianism by multiple philosophical paradigms. The mechanism of culture-inclusive theory can be applied to explain qualitative research findings on lifeworld events of people in a particular society. It can also be utilized to predict results of quantitative research conducted to verify theoretical propositions in the scientific microworld by empirical methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we revisit two different temporal phases related to the publication of Serge Moscovici's book La Psychanalyse, son image et son public, and we examine two key concepts of the theory: cognitive polyphasia and anchoring. The first phase, initiated by the Durkheimian circle, gives us an opportunity to retrieve traces of the intellectual debate about collective psychology and reconsider this debate in today's light. The second, more recent phase, is inspired by classical and modern research in the field of social representation, and it serves us as a basis for a new hypothesis about anchoring. We suggest that the traditional concept of familiarisation attributed to anchoring can also have an opposite significance: it can transmit and guarantee the non-familiar and so establish strangeness. Finally, we argue that social representations are more than a simple theory, just like the symbol is always more than what it symbolizes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social representations research has tended to focus upon the representations that groups have in relation to some object. The present article elaborates the concept of social representations by pointing to the existence of “alternative representations” as sub-components within social representations. Alternative representations are the ideas and images the group has about how other groups represent the given object. Alternative representations are thus representations of other people's representations. The present article uses data from Moscovici's (1976/2008 ) analysis of the diffusion of psychoanalysis to examine how people engage with alternative representations. It is demonstrated that there can be more or less dialogical relations with alternative representations. The analysis concludes by considering seven “semiotic barriers” which work to neutralise the dialogical potential of alternative representations, thus on the one hand enabling groups to talk about the views of others, while, on the other hand, remaining unchallenged by those views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What political, economic, religious, and emotional factors are involved in a person's decision to kill civilians and military personnel through the sacrifice of his or her own life? Data for this research were secondary analyses of interviews with Islamic martyrs, as well as their leaders’ speeches. This investigation into the cultural-psychological explanations for Islamic martyrdom leads to a model explaining a person's decision to carry out the mission as resulting from a combination of four factors: the historical-cultural context, group processes, immediate and anticipated rewards, and mechanisms to eradicate possible doubts and guilt regarding this decision. Compared to existing models, this model is more integrative and focused on the psychological processes involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I criticize Carpendale and Lewis's (2004 ) attempt to produce a Wittgensteinian theory, as an alternative to work in the “theory of mind” (TOM) tradition, not because I disagree with it as theory, but because Wittgenstein would be critical of any attempt to make such a use of his work. Theories are concerned with discovering rules, principles, of lawful regularities hidden behind appearances. Wittgenstein's whole latter philosophy is inimical to such an aim. His concern is not with theories but with descriptions—which can be explanatory, but in a relational or orientational rather than a causal fashion. Below, I give some initial examples to show what Wittgensteinian investigations in developmental psychology might look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors explicate investigative research as a formal research method for knowledge generation. The impetus comes from two recent developments that have reexamined the nature of knowledge generation: paradigmatic shift from methodological individualism to methodological relationalism, and the rise of indigenous psychology. We identify three germane intellectual attitudes: examining the evidence, vigilance against deceptive appearance, and recognition of ignorance. Investigative research has the advantage of bringing the investigator to observe closely and directly phenomena of interest, relying on disciplined, naturalistic, and in-depth observations over time in diverse contexts. It is particularly suitable for uncovering, understanding, and reporting social phenomena that may be hidden from or not easily accessible to observers. Investigative research can function as a guardian of social conscience through (a) maintaining vigilance against institutional corruptions or threats to civic virtues; and (b) reexaminations of published [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution presents an integrative and interdisciplinary approach to emotions and social structures. Combining theoretical accounts from the neurosciences, psychology, and sociology, the role of emotion in the micro-macro link is investigated and the social components of emotion on different levels of analysis are examined. Micro-level analysis explores societal influences on the interaction of cognition and emotion, emphasizing the role of appraisals and of emotion circuits on the brain level. Analysis of the meso-level investigates how emotions are elicited and expressed in social interactions and macro-level investigation scrutinizes how instances of social structural configurations affect the processing and regulation of emotion. The authors conclude with a conceptualization of emotions as a bidirectional mediator between large-scale social structures and individual behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cosmides, and other "evolutionary psychologists," take Wason selection task results as paradigmatic evidence that to model human reasoning as systematic formal semantic reasoning is mistaken (Cosmides 1985, 1989). Indeed, these results are also supposed to exhibit domain and content specific modules selected for over our Pleistocene hunter-gatherer tribal existence. Such selectionist evolutionary explanations are to provide the true and proper foundation for all the cognitive/social sciences. To the contrary, twenty years before Cosmides took note of it in 1985, Professor Wason and other researchers identified this task as a most remarkable deviation from what they have established as normal human reasoning competence and its more typical performances, and they have a plausible formal explanation of what causes the problem in this formally unusual case (in effect, dealing with double negation). Cosmides's proposed social exchange or "cheaterdetector" module is not a module nor is it content-specific in the relevant sense. Evolutionary psychologists have merely taken up a perspective characteristic of social anthropology, which has been nativist and Darwinian for most of its history as a discipline. But at its best anthropology, at least as a speculative historical discipline bears something like the same relationship to cognitive science as cosmology bears to physics and chemistry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the present study is to evaluate the postmodern belief that selves are narrative constructions. Four theories, varying in degree of anti-realism, are presented and discussed. It is concluded that an attractive feature of the narrative approach is that it explains how we achieve a sense of unity. But the main idea, that selves are constituted or created by stories is problematic, like identifying footprints on the beach with the feet that made them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the psychological literature, love is often seen as a construct inseparable from that of close, interpersonal relationships. As a result, it has been often assumed that the same motivational factors underlie both phenomena. This often leads researchers to propose that love does not exist in itself—that it is an emotion which stems solely from a need for attachment, fulfillment of reproductive aims, or for social exchange. The popular cultural imagination, however, perceives love as a unique, mysterious, altruistic, ever-lasting bond between two people—a vision of love which is at odds with its supposed psychological origins. We propose that an ideal of love and its enactment in our culture is a result of two intertwining factors. Within the last few centuries, interpersonal relationships and love have replaced religion as islands of existential comfort. Toward this end, lovers project illusory meaning on their partners. The laborious and turbulent process of withdrawing these projections can lead to what many thinkers think “love” is: bestowal of value on another, and consequent respect for, and care for that person, unmotivated by one's own needs, within the context of a real relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An element of the contemporary dispute amongst evolution minded psychologists and social scientists hinges on the conception of mind as being adapted as opposed to adaptive. This dispute is not trivial. The possibility that human minds are both adapted and adaptive courtesy of selection pressures that were social in nature is of particular interest to a putative evolutionary social psychology. I suggest that the notion of an evolved psychological adaptation in social psychology can be retained only if it is accepted that this adaptation is for social interaction and has no rigidly fixed function and cannot be described in terms of algorithmic decision rules or fixed inferential procedures. What is held to be the reason for encephalisation in the Homo lineage and some of best atested ideas in social psychology offers license for such an approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kristján Kristjánsson, On the Very Idea of “Negative Emotions”, pp. 351–364 As attention has shifted towards the emotions in general, the notion of so-called negative emotions has come in for renewed interest. The author explores this notion and argues that its invocation cannot be done without cost to our understanding since it obscures all sorts of relevant complexities. There are thus no emotions around to which we can helpfully refer collectively as “negative,” although there are of course painful emotions, emotions that negatively evaluate states of affairs, emotions that are negatively morally evaluated, and so forth. Furthermore, while attempts are under way to reappraise various (commonly) negatively evaluated emotions, those attempts involve different kinds of argument which cannot and should not be collected together as “defenses of negative emotions.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Account giving is regarded as both a determinant of normcontradictive behaviour and a means of coping with the social and individual side effects of normviolation. Based on the taxonomy proposed by Scott & Lyman (1968), Schönbach (1980) argues that there are four major account giving strategies, namely refusals, justifications, excuses and concessions. This typology is criticized here, both with regard to its poor applicability for the analysis of specific social normative behaviour, and for its lack of a clearly defined middle category between excuses and justifications. In order to redefine and expand the fourfold typology, the ways model of account giving is introduced, containing referentializations as a fifth meta–category of account giving. Here, an actor who is internally or externally accused of a normviolation connects the questioned behaviour with exonerating context information. This information is intended to ameliorate the actor’s culpability by making reference to other norms, to other behaviours committed by the actor or to the behaviours of other persons; the actor acknowledges, however, that a norm has been violated. Determinants and impacts of referentialization are discussed with regard to the analysis of norm compliance, intrapersonal dynamics and interpersonal conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The turn to discourse in psychology restores to the discipline an interest in human life as it is lived by human beings, thus fulfilling an interpretative role that in the past was met by depth psychology. However, social constructionist criticisms of the Freudian unconscious tend to overlook the function of the concept in the theoretical description of the experiential realm, misconstruing the “problematic” of depth psychology as that of body/mind dualism. Depth psychology is disregarded, in part, due to its divergent praxis and as a legacy of behaviourist criticisms. Yet the impasse of social constructionism, as identified here, invites a restatement of the original problematic of depth psychology. In particular, Bakhtin’s and Mead’s philosophies of the act, which converge with Jung’s concept of “psychological value”, could indicate a direction in which issues of embodiment could be taken forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the relation between virtue and positive psychology. Dimensions in the definition of virtue drawn from moral philosophy and moral psychology; Postmodern approaches to psychology; Challenges offered by postmodernism to a positive psychology of virtue.

Speculates on a privileged state of cognitive dissonance. Development of religious cognition; Discussion on the recorded power of religious belief; Prevalence of religious belief; Elements of cognitive dissonance; Discussion on behavior and faith.

Harreà's positioning theory posits discourse as the concrete context within which selves are produced, but accentuates the dissociation between the physical engagement in a conversation and 'location' in a conceptual interpersonal space. The thesis that positioning involves selective attention, and that selected positions express ongoing transformations in the hearer's experiential realm is expanded here initially by reference to Gibson's direct-perception theory. The concepts of indexical and symbolic affordances are introduced to describe the function of utterances in setting parameters for hearer's behavioural and social-relational engagement, respectively. This implicates a construct of 'psychological value' (i.e., the affective intensity and valence of elements of experience), as proposed by C. G. Jung. The essay draws attention to the idea of symbol forming as a process whereby abstract self/world relations are articulated in one's actions and thoughts, and in which context the 'reception' of others' actions and utterances as having positioning implications may be understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Talks about the role of shame in a person's self-consciousness. Framework for analyzing shame and the roles of self and other; Concept of self-consciousness; Correspondence between judgments made by self and other; Analysis of fictional episodes of shame.

Presents several abstracts of studies on psychology and social behavior. 'The Power of Unsilencing: Between Silence and Negotiation in Heterosexual Relationships,' by Orly Benjamin; 'Solitude: An Exploration of Benefits of Being Alone,' by Christopher R. Long; 'Experimental Psychology and Dunhem's Problem,' by Sam S. Rakover.

Explores the possibilities of building on the complementaries of practice discourse as a way of developing accounts of classroom experience of children. Application of the community of practice and discursive positioning theories; Accounts based on interpretation of classroom practice; Development of conceptual resources of interaction.