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In this paper the author considers Descartes' place in current thinking about the mind-body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes' paramount question was 'How do we determine certainty?' and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher 'split' mind from body and refer to 'Descartes' error'. This paper puts forward that Descartes' detractors fail to recognise Descartes' contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes' correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine feeling-toned complexes from a developmental psychological perspective. From this perspective feeling-toned complexes emerge when basic needs are not met. A very similar theory is put forward by Jeffery Young in his Schema Therapy (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar 2005). His basic needs concept, developed on the basis of empirical research, covers four basic needs which are: attachment, autonomy, and self-worth, as well as play and spontaneity. My proposition is to deal with this conceptual view from a Jungian perspective insofar as we can integrate the four basic needs, however adding a fifth: the basic need for meaning in the theory of feeling-toned complexes. Emotional schemas and feeling-toned complexes are then comparable patterns. The strengths and weaknesses of Analytic Psychology compared to Jeffrey Young's schema therapy are further discussed. The foundation of the feeling-toned complexes on unmet basic needs lends itself to including a further reference, namely Jaak Panksepp's neuroscientific findings. Panksepp formulates seven basic affective systems which I discuss first, then I focus on what could be gained from the basic needs concept and finally I turn to the feeling-complex in an attempt to integrate neuroscientific findings into complex theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses two key controversial questions to do with the concept of archetypes - do they operate autonomously without connection to an individual's personal life experience? Does their biological base mean they are genetically determined, innate and thus a priori inherited psychic structures? These questions are addressed through the case of a person who began life as an unwanted pregnancy, was adopted at birth and as an adult, experienced profound waking visions. An emergent/developmental model of archetype is outlined which stresses developmental start-points through this infant's engagement via response and reaction to the affective and material world of the infant/birth mother matrix and from which emergence later occurs by way of participation in a socio-cultural and material context. The emergentism aspect of this model rescues it from being reductionist since it allows for cultural and socialisation inputs. The model's explanatory power is vastly enlarged by combining this with the developmental component. Critically, once developmentally produced mind/brain (image schema) structures are in place, they have the capacity to generate psychological life. Imagery can then appear as if it is innately derived when that is not the case. The contemporary neuroscience which supports this model is both outlined and related back to the case example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper aims to highlight four major points: first: a ‘Jungian attitude’ understood as a viewpoint which enables work with interconnectedness through various fields of knowledge. Second, that complexes are dynamic, as is memory, and that both are transformed by experience and develop hand in hand with each other i.e., the transformation of the complex occurs through the transformation of memory as embodied in internal working models, and vice versa. Third, complexes and archetypes are linked to each other in matrices of one form or another and lead to the complexity of the psyche, which is a developing system. Fourth, the analytical process provides an arena that enables and consolidates interconnections that foster a better intrapsychic transition. The analytic meeting promotes profound changes, redesigning our neural architecture as well as our psychic landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds upon Britton's recent writing on 'models in the mind', in which he gives an account of preverbal metaphoric structures based on object relations (Britton 2015). These correspond with Jung's theory of innate unconscious structures. These innate models are considered alongside current linguistic theory following Chomsky and post-Chomskyan views about language acquisition. Neuroscience evidence linking language and abstract thinking with structures involved in tool use are presented. The implications of these findings, and our understanding of the relational context within which language, metaphor and abstract thought are acquired, will be discussed along with the failures of symbolization and verbal communication common amongst those with severe narcissistic disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to demonstrate that the protagonist of Carlo Collodi's The Adventures of Pinocchio illustrates numerous autistic phenomena such as communication difficulties, sensory and perceptual distortions and mindblindness. While Pinocchio is viewed as a literary construct with contraindications of autism, it will be argued that his autistic traits are sufficient to suggest the possibility that Collodi had a partial intuition of the syndrome 60 years before it was identified by Leo Kanner. Approaching Collodi's text in this manner is taken as an opportunity to survey and reflect upon the psychoanalytic literature on autism and to position it in relation to contemporary theories from cognitive neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I discuss the nature and role of dream and the dreaming process in Jungian clinical practice in the light of neuroscience. Insights from contemporary neuroscience support rather than contest Jung's view that emotional truth, not censorship or disguise, underpins the dreaming process. I use clinical material to illustrate how work with dreams within the total interactive experience of the analytic dyad enables the development of the emotional scaffolding necessary for the development of ‘mind’. Large scale evidence-based research reveals that dreaming is caused by brain activity during sleep that is both biochemically and regionally different from that of waking states. Recent imaging studies confirm that dreams are the mind's vehicle for the processing of emotional states of being, particularly the fear, anxiety, anger or elation that often figure prominently. Dream sleep is understood as also being the guardian of memory, playing a part in forgetting, encoding and affective organization of memory. In the clinical section of the paper I let a series of dreams speak for themselves, revealing the emotionally salient concerns of the dreamer, weaving past and present, transference and reality together in a way that demonstrates the healthy attempt of the brain-mind to come to terms with difficult emotional experience from the past. The dreams become dreamable as part of the meaning-making process of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses insights from contemporary neuroscience and attachment theory to explore the profound dissociative defences associated with trauma. I discuss the effects of trauma on the emotional, intellectual and imaginative life of the individual and on the development of the self. Based on work with three patients with very different experiences of trauma, the paper offers clinical illustration of 'right brain to right brain' Jungian analysis. I argue that through repeated transference and countertransference experiences dissociative defences may be undone and change brought about. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based in contemporary neuroscience, Jean Knox's 2004 JAP paper 'From archetypes to reflective function' honed her position on image schemas, thereby introducing a model for archetypes which sees them as 'reliably repeated early developmental achievements' and not as genetically inherited, innate psychic structures. The image schema model is used to illustrate how the analyst worked with a patient who began life as an unwanted pregnancy, was adopted at birth and as an adult experienced profound synchronicities, paranormal/telepathic phenomena and visions. The classical approach to such phenomena would see the intense affectivity arising out of a ruptured symbiotic mother-infant relationship constellating certain archetypes which set up the patient's visions. This view is contrasted with Knox's model which sees the archetype an sich as a developmentally produced image schema underpinning the emergence of later imagery. The patient's visions can then be understood to arise from his psychoid body memory related to his traumatic conception and birth. The contemporary neuroscience which supports this view is outlined and a subsequent image schema explanation is presented. Clinically, the case material suggests that a pre-birth perspective needs to be explored in all analytic work. Other implications of Knox's image schema model are summarized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the complex case of a male patient who started life as an unwanted pregnancy and adoptee in an era of socio-cultural shame and blame. When able to contact his birth mother later in life, he experienced a number of confronting synchronicities as well as visions which he felt were related to failed abortion attempts and to other pre- and post-natal events. The case material lends weight not only to Freud's, Ehrenwald's and FitzHerbert's assertions that the earliest form of mother-infant communications is telepathic in nature but that this mode of communication can be retained if emotional trauma inhibits normal developmental processes. Contemporary neuroscience research is presented supporting the hypothesis that emotional memory can become imbedded in the psyche/soma of the foetus. Such memory traces can later emerge into imagery and/or words if the traumatic impingement has been substantial enough and if other defensive strategies are in place. Clinical implications are then suggested regarding analysts' attention to the emotional conditions underpinning their patients' conceptions and foetal development; the connection to projective identification components of the countertransference as being aspects of the earliest telepathic mother/infant communication channel and the need for reductive analyses in analyst training programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses research by Beatrice Beebe, Bessel van der Kolk and others, exploring the interpersonal processes that underpin early relational trauma and how this contributes to adult psychopathology. An essential feature of early relational trauma, the infant's experience of being unable to evoke an empathic response from the caregiver and the feelings of shame this gives rise to, is discussed and its implications for psychotherapy are considered. The neuroscience that underpins two forms of empathy in the therapeutic relationship, of 'feeling for' and 'feeling with' the patient is discussed and explored in relation to the concordant and complementary countertransference. I argue that when therapists respond to the projection on to them of the abuser by an increasingly determined adherence to analytic technique, this may become a complementary countertransference identification with the abuser and an enactment of the abusive relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the mind–brain relationship, using insights from contemporary neuroscience. It seeks to investigate how our brains become who we are, how subjective experience arises. In order to do this some explanation is given of the basic concepts of how the brain produces our subjective mental life. Current neuropsychological and neurobiological understanding of early brain development, memory, emotion and consciousness are explored. There is also an attempt at mapping the mind–brain-self relationship from a uniquely Jungian perspective. Clinical material is included in order to show the relevance of these insights to our work in the consulting room, arguing the value of the affect-regulating, relational aspects of the analytic dyad that forge new neural pathways through emotional connection. Such experience forms the emotional scaffolding necessary for the emergence of reflective function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]