Search

The Shapley value—probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games—has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world applications (including social and organisational networks, biological networks and communication networks), its computational properties have not been widely studied. To date, the only practicable approach to compute Shapley value-based centrality has been via Monte Carlo simulations which are computationally expensive and not guaranteed to give an exact answer. Against this background, this paper presents the first study of the computational aspects of the Shapley value for network centralities. Specifically, we develop exact analytical formulae for Shapley value-based centrality in both weighted and unweighted networks and develop efficient (polynomial time) and exact algorithms based on them. We empirically evaluate these algorithms on two real-life examples (an infrastructure network representing the topology of the Western States Power Grid and a collaboration network from the field of astrophysics) and demonstrate that they deliver significant speedups over the Monte Carlo approach. For instance, in the case of unweighted networks our algorithms are able to return the exact solution about 1600 times faster than the Monte Carlo approximation, even if we allow for a generous 10% error margin for the latter method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N, E) and a valuation function v : P(N) → R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to finnd a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components' values. This problem is generally NP-complete; in particular, it is hard for a defined class of valuation functions which are independent of disconnected members--that is, two nodes have no effect on each other's marginal contribution to their vertex separator. Nonetheless, for all such functions we provide bounds on the complexity of coalition structure generation over general and minor{free graphs. Our proof is constructive and yields algorithms for solving corresponding instances of the problem. Furthermore, we derive linear time bounds for graphs of bounded treewidth. However, as we show, the problem remains NP-complete for planar graphs, and hence, for any Kk minor{free graphs where k ≥ 5. Moreover, a 3-SAT problem with m clauses can be represented by a coalition structure generation problem over a planar graph with O (m²)nodes. Importantly, our hardness result holds for a particular subclass of valuation functions, termed edge sum, where the value of each subset of nodes is simply determined by the sum of given weights of the edges in the induced subgraph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present a novel decentralised management technique that allows electricity micro-storage devices, deployed within individual homes as part of a smart electricity grid, to converge to profitable and efficient behaviours. Specifically, we propose the use of software agents, residing on the users' smart meters, to automate and optimise the charging cycle of micro-storage devices in the home to minimise its costs, and we present a study of both the theoretical underpinnings and the implications of a practical solution, of using software agents for such micro-storage management. First, by formalising the strategic choice each agent makes in deciding when to charge its battery, we develop a game-theoretic framework within which we can analyse the competitive equilibria of an electricity grid populated by such agents and hence predict the best consumption profile for that population given their battery properties and individual load profiles. Our framework also allows us to compute theoretical bounds on the amount of storage that will be adopted by the population. Second, to analyse the practical implications of micro-storage deployments in the grid, we present a novel algorithm that each agent can use to optimise its battery storage profile in order to minimise its owner's costs. This algorithm uses a learning strategy that allows it to adapt as the price of electricity changes in real-time, and we show that the adoption of these strategies results in the system converging to the theoretical equilibria. Finally, we empirically evaluate the adoption of our micro-storage management technique within a complex setting, based on the UK electricity market, where agents may have widely varying load profiles, battery types, and learning rates. In this case, our approach yields savings of up to 14% in energy cost for an average consumer using a storage device with a capacity of less than 4.5 kWh and up to a 7% reduction in carbon emissions resulting from electricity generation (with only domestic consumers adopting micro-storage and, commercial and industrial consumers not changing their demand). Moreover, corroborating our theoretical bound, an equilibrium is shown to exist where no more than 48% of households would wish to own storage devices and where social welfare would also be improved (yielding overall annual savings of nearly £1.5B). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions--or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., maximise social utility) and individually rational (i.e., agents prefer to join rather than opt out). However, an important assumption of these mechanisms is that the agents will always successfully complete their allocated tasks. Clearly, this assumption is unrealistic in many real-world applications, where agents can, and often do, fail in their endeavours. Moreover, whether an agent is deemed to have failed may be perceived differently by different agents. Such subjective perceptions about an agent's probability of succeeding at a given task are often captured and reasoned about using the notion of trust. Given this background, in this paper we investigate the design of novel mechanisms that take into account the trust between agents when allocating tasks. Specifically, we develop a new class of mechanisms, called trust-based mechanisms, that can take into account multiple subjective measures of the probability of an agent succeeding at a given task and produce allocations that maximise social utility, whilst ensuring that no agent obtains a negative utility. We then show that such mechanisms pose a challenging new combinatorial optimisation problem (that is NP-complete), devise a novel representation for solving the problem, and develop an effective integer programming solution (that can solve instances with about 2 x 105 possible allocations in 40 seconds). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coalition formation is a fundamental type of interaction that involves the creation of coherent groupings of distinct, autonomous, agents in order to efficiently achieve their individual or collective goals. Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in the field of multi-agent systems. Central to this endeavour is the problem of determining which of the many possible coalitions to form in order to achieve some goal. This usually requires calculating a value for every possible coalition, known as the coalition value, which indicates how beneficial that coalition would be if it was formed. Once these values are calculated, the agents usually need to find a combination of coalitions, in which every agent belongs to exactly one coalition, and by which the overall outcome of the system is maximized. However, this coalition structure generation problem is extremely challenging due to the number of possible solutions that need to be examined, which grows exponentially with the number of agents involved. To date, therefore, many algorithms have been proposed to solve this problem using different techniques--ranging from dynamic programming, to integer programming, to stochastic search -- all of which suffer from major limitations relating to execution time, solution quality, and memory requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if this budget is equal or less than the valuation. Furthermore, for a wide range of valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions if all auctions are identical. Finally, we address markets with both sequential and simultaneous auctions, non-identical auctions, and the allocative efficiency of the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simultaneous procedure in which the issues are discussed simultaneously but independently of each other, and the sequential procedure in which the issues are discussed one after another. Since each of them yields a different outcome, a key problem is to decide which one to use in which circumstances. Specifically, we consider this question for a model in which the agents have time constraints (in the form of both deadlines and discount factors) and information uncertainty (in that the agents do not know the opponent's utility function). For this model, we consider issues that are both independent and those that are interdependent and determine equilibria for each case for each procedure. In so doing, we show that the package deal is in fact the optimal procedure for each party. We then go on to show that, although the package deal may be computationally more complex than the other two procedures, it generates Pareto optimal outcomes (unlike the other two), it has similar earliest and latest possible times of agreement to the simultaneous procedure (which is better than the sequential procedure), and that it (like the other two procedures) generates a unique outcome only under certain conditions (which we define). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effective coordination of agents' actions in partially-observable domains is a major challenge of multi-agent systems research. To address this, many researchers have developed techniques that allow the agents to make decisions based on estimates of the states and actions of other agents that are typically learnt using some form of machine learning algorithm. Nevertheless, many of these approaches fail to provide an actual means by which the necessary information is made available so that the estimates can be learnt. To this end, we argue that cooperative communication of state information between agents is one such mechanism. However, in a dynamically changing environment, the accuracy and timeliness of this communicated information determine the fidelity of the learned estimates and the usefulness of the actions taken based on these. Given this, we propose a novel information-sharing protocol, post-task-completion sharing, for the distribution of state information. We then show, through a formal analysis, the improvement in the quality of estimates produced using our strategy over the widely used protocol of sharing information between nearest neighbours. Moreover, communication heuristics designed around our information-sharing principle are subjected to empirical evaluation along with other benchmark strategies (including Littman's Q-routing and Stone's TPOT-RL) in a simulated call-routing application. These studies, conducted across a range of environmental settings, show that, compared to the different benchmarks used, our strategy generates an improvement of up So 60% in the call connection rate; of more than 1000% in the ability to connect long-distance calls; and incurs as low as 0.25 of the message overhead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]