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This study investigates the impact of macroeconomic shocks to firm investment opportunities on firm debt contracting policy. We find that adverse shocks to investment opportunities lead to a significant reduction in the use of debt covenants in syndicated bank loans. Consistent with incomplete contract theory, we show that firms mitigate debt–equity conflicts arising out of investment opportunities by employing accounting‐based financial covenants rather than non‐accounting‐based prepayment covenants. Adverse shocks to investment opportunities also lead to a concomitant decrease in the cost of borrowing. We find consistent evidence for corporate bond covenants and bond market borrowing costs as well. Overall, this study resolves prior mixed evidence concerning the impact of investment opportunities on debt contracting and connects macroeconomic theory with the accounting literature on debt contracting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A sample of firms where employee stock options and other long-term incentives are absent but an annual bonus is required is examined. A positive relation is found between firm equity value and stock bonus but not cash bonus. The positive relation is stronger when the firm has greater investment opportunities. Additionally, the relation is shown to be nonlinear in the sense that the marginal effect of stock bonus on equity value is positive but decreasing (negative) when the stock bonus is below (above) the breakpoint. Overall, the annual stock bonus is valued positively by investors even though it is linked to the firm's contemporaneous but not future performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]