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This study examines whether the pacifying effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on territorial disputes between adversarial dyads is conditional upon the dyads' past experience of military cooperation. I built a political economy model and conducted a logistic regression analysis on the newly coded bilateral FDI data between adversarial dyads and the existing dataset by merging the rivalry data established by Thompson [51] and the territorial disputes data collected by Lee and Mitchell [42]. I found that when bilateral FDI flows between adversarial dyads reach a certain level the pacifying effect of FDI is stronger for adversarial dyads with past military cooperation. I also found that while past military cooperation has a pacifying effect in general, past military cooperation that occurred more recently has a stronger pacifying effect than those that occurred a while ago. Moreover, based upon the theoretical model and empirical findings in this paper, I investigated the political implications for Tsai Ing-wen's "New Southbound Policy" and Taiwan's approach to the territorial dispute issues in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC and Taiwan are competing to gain diplomatic recognition from Pacific Islands states, a number of which recognise Taiwan and serve as a barrier to its international isolation. Since much of Oceania is in Australia's sphere of influence, this struggle has often involved Canberra. This paper focuses on the intensifying conflict--with conclusions about the local political economic situations of the countries in Oceania that are most likely to switch recognition, the dilemmas that the issue poses for Australia and its alliance with the US, and the game theory of these auctions of diplomatic recognition. The rental of recognition is analysed as a "sovereignty business" in which some Pacific Islands states engage—similar to the offshore financial centres which are prevalent in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the government and society of the Republic of China's (ROC or Taiwan) have changed markedly in the new millennium, the fundamentals of US policy toward the island remain intact. This study outlines recent developments in Taiwan and shows how they represent challenges to the US. It also discusses American policy toward Taiwan and examines several proposals for change that an American administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the paper explains why the current policy, albeit contradictory and ambiguous, is in the best interest of the United States. There is a strong possibility that any major change in policy would succeed only in undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reexamines American policy toward China, Taiwan, and their ambivalent bilateral relationship, focusing on the period since Washington's shift from strong (but not unconditional) support of Nationalist China to the role of balancer in the early 1970s, particularly on the most recent period under George W. Bush. We analyze the relationship from a strategic triangular perspective. The China-Taiwan-US relationship is triangular in the sense that each actor's relations with the other two depend on its relations with the third. It is strategic in its focus on security. The United States has been the consistent "pivot" of this triangle, having better relations with both "wings" than they have with each other. Washington has retained this structurally advantageous position partly because of its disproportionate strategic weight, and partly because of the inherent difficulties Taipei and Being have had forging a cooperative bilateral relationship. This structure has been quite stable since the Cold War, as Washington has periodically shifted its balance from one wing to the other without altering the triangle's basic configuration. Yet so long as the configuration is maintained, the basic problem on which the triangle is based - the contested independence of Taiwan - cannot be resolved. This creates a sense of national identity frustration that will continue to generate attempts at resolution, either by Taiwan's declaration of independence or China's forced reunification (or both). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]