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This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether the pacifying effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on territorial disputes between adversarial dyads is conditional upon the dyads' past experience of military cooperation. I built a political economy model and conducted a logistic regression analysis on the newly coded bilateral FDI data between adversarial dyads and the existing dataset by merging the rivalry data established by Thompson [51] and the territorial disputes data collected by Lee and Mitchell [42]. I found that when bilateral FDI flows between adversarial dyads reach a certain level the pacifying effect of FDI is stronger for adversarial dyads with past military cooperation. I also found that while past military cooperation has a pacifying effect in general, past military cooperation that occurred more recently has a stronger pacifying effect than those that occurred a while ago. Moreover, based upon the theoretical model and empirical findings in this paper, I investigated the political implications for Tsai Ing-wen's "New Southbound Policy" and Taiwan's approach to the territorial dispute issues in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor's stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some countries more effectively respond to crises than others? This paper compares China's relatively effective response to the 2002-3 SARS outbreak with Taiwan's relatively ineffective response, focusing on three variables that constitute China's 'authoritarian advantage' - centralized decision making powers; public support; and, relations with the mass media. The paper rejects a fourth explanatory variable specific to the Taiwan case - membership in international organizations. Drawing heavily on the Taiwan example, the paper concludes by suggesting options for overcoming the authoritarian advantage in pandemic response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei's post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei's restriction on trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan's economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems of the security externalities or promoting the island's economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After noting the rise of geoeconomics in the post-Cold War era, the paper ascertains how the age of geoeconomics re-defines power and the rules of the balance of power game. Of particular significance is that a nation’s economic security eclipses its military security (or traditional national defense). In this context, I examine the meanings of the rise of a re-ascendant China for world politics in general and for Taiwan’s future in particular. Considering Taiwan’s heavy dependence on imported natural resources and its isolation and exclusion from vital international economic groupings, such as FTA’s. ASEAN, ASEM, and the 16-nation Asian super economic bloc in the marking. Finally, I take a prospective look at the prospect of a future cross-Strait integration between Taiwan and mainland China under the impact of the dictate of geoeconomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC and Taiwan are competing to gain diplomatic recognition from Pacific Islands states, a number of which recognise Taiwan and serve as a barrier to its international isolation. Since much of Oceania is in Australia's sphere of influence, this struggle has often involved Canberra. This paper focuses on the intensifying conflict--with conclusions about the local political economic situations of the countries in Oceania that are most likely to switch recognition, the dilemmas that the issue poses for Australia and its alliance with the US, and the game theory of these auctions of diplomatic recognition. The rental of recognition is analysed as a "sovereignty business" in which some Pacific Islands states engage—similar to the offshore financial centres which are prevalent in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the government and society of the Republic of China's (ROC or Taiwan) have changed markedly in the new millennium, the fundamentals of US policy toward the island remain intact. This study outlines recent developments in Taiwan and shows how they represent challenges to the US. It also discusses American policy toward Taiwan and examines several proposals for change that an American administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the paper explains why the current policy, albeit contradictory and ambiguous, is in the best interest of the United States. There is a strong possibility that any major change in policy would succeed only in undermining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reexamines American policy toward China, Taiwan, and their ambivalent bilateral relationship, focusing on the period since Washington's shift from strong (but not unconditional) support of Nationalist China to the role of balancer in the early 1970s, particularly on the most recent period under George W. Bush. We analyze the relationship from a strategic triangular perspective. The China-Taiwan-US relationship is triangular in the sense that each actor's relations with the other two depend on its relations with the third. It is strategic in its focus on security. The United States has been the consistent "pivot" of this triangle, having better relations with both "wings" than they have with each other. Washington has retained this structurally advantageous position partly because of its disproportionate strategic weight, and partly because of the inherent difficulties Taipei and Being have had forging a cooperative bilateral relationship. This structure has been quite stable since the Cold War, as Washington has periodically shifted its balance from one wing to the other without altering the triangle's basic configuration. Yet so long as the configuration is maintained, the basic problem on which the triangle is based - the contested independence of Taiwan - cannot be resolved. This creates a sense of national identity frustration that will continue to generate attempts at resolution, either by Taiwan's declaration of independence or China's forced reunification (or both). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]