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Voting in China’s grassroots elections is more of a ritual than a right. For most citizens especially in the urban areas, the results of the local elections have little effect on their lives. Indeed, despite the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) campaigns to get the vote out in local elections, voter turnout is relatively low especially among younger voters. Beyond local political campaigns to remind citizens of their duty to vote is the community pressure and engagement. How does community interaction influence voter turnout in authoritarian grassroots elections? That is, are more socially engaged citizens more likely to vote in ritual elections? Moreover, does community engagement mitigate the age gap in voter turnout in grassroots elections in China? Scant literature exits on the relationship between community interaction and ritual voting in authoritarian regimes. Using the 2013 Chinese General Social Survey, this paper finds that community interaction plays a significant role in voter turnout. In addition, young people, who interact with neighbors, are just as likely to vote as the more socially connected older residents. The results have important implications for political behavior as well as for the grassroots elections in China.

Evidence suggests that the quality of grassroots political reform varies throughout rural China from fair elections to electoral manipulation. This reflects an uneven supply of reforms. However, top-down implementation is not a complete measure of success when it comes to the introduction of grassroots reform. Rural folks are good judges of institutional qualities, such as procedural fairness. It is their attitudes that are associated with the support for democracy. This is called the supply and support model. I modify and apply this model to rural China, and show that support for democratic institutions and ideals can develop within an authoritarian regime such as the People’s Republic of China.

Previous studies on village elections have focused on the election process, but few have examined post-election outcomes related to local land management systems. Land is the most important resource in Chinese villages, but land management and reallocation are the chief responsibility for elected village leaders. Previous studies show that villager attitudes toward the “fairness” of land reallocations and the type of village elections vary across villages. Some villages have an open election/nomination process while other villages have “closed” or unfair elections. We found that openly elected leaders are more accountable to villagers and that their land management decisions do reflect villager preferences for “fair” land reallocation. Our findings are based on a 2000–2001 survey of 34 villages in rural Shaanxi province.