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This paper examines the contribution of Rose Laub Coser to sociological theory in the structural tradition. Laub Coser was one of the most successful women sociologists of her generation. She was born in Berlin in 1916 but left with her family in 1924 for Antwerp in Belgium, and went into exile in 1939 in New York. Thus, Laub Coser was familiar with many cultural worlds and languages. Although she primarily lived in the United States, the transnational influence of the metropolis of Berlin is manifest in her sociological work in several ways. Conceptually, this is relevant for Laub Coser's reception of Georg Simmel's Soziologie. In particular, her theory of the complexity of social roles as a seedbed of individual autonomy is founded on Simmel's theory of the importance of conflict and ambivalence for individualization. Her multiple experiences of emigration and exile influenced Laub Coser's work, including Women of Courage, an analysis of the social lives of Eastern European and Italian migrants in the metropolis of New York, and her internationally comparative studies on the family and women's rise in the labor market. Laub Coser investigated the social consequences of having multiple group affiliations and the conditions for such individuals in the cultural and social structure of modernity. In her transnationally comparative work of migrant cultures, she demonstrated the scope of her theory of role complexity. Contrary to images of migration bare of gender and culture, Laub Coser interprets the individuals she studied in Women of Courage as active agents of migration and provides insights on the influence that cultural definitions of situations have had toward creating the social structure of modern society. Starting from Robert K. Merton's role-set theory and integrating Simmel's analysis of forms of social differentiation, Laub Coser analyzed the conditions and consequences of multiple group affiliations, their observability, and the ambivalences in "cross-cutting social circles" (Simmel), which create conditions for developing individuality and individualism. The cultural mandate for women to be socialized toward the "greedy institution" of the family offers only restricted role-sets and opportunities for articulating social roles, constraining their social competencies as autonomous individuals. Despite the alienating and anomic consequences of role complexity, Laub Coser valued its liberating potential. Possibly this theoretical orientation was also influenced by her own experience as an immigrant, sociologist, and political activist in the socialist women's movement. The posthumously published study Women of Courage is based on a research project that began in the 1980s, comprising hundreds of qualitative interviews with women who had migrated to New York in the early 1920s, and who were at least 13 years old when they immigrated. The histories of these women demonstrate their role in enabling the social mobility of their families in the receiving society. They provided insights into how cultures change and how women migrants understood their lives in the New World. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces 'existence theory' as a new approach to sociological theory and research. Existence theory starts from the assumption that people organise their lives around a limited set of existential milestones. Cultural expectations are such that without the accomplishment of those milestones, individuals may experience their lives as incomplete. Examples of milestones can include the attainment of formal education, a lasting partnership and the creation of a family, but in general the milestones which are important to individuals and their precise articulation will depend on a variety of cultural and structural factors. The achievement of existential milestones often depends on that of other existential milestones, thereby producing what we call an 'existential ladder'. The article also elaborates on the significance of 'existential urgency' in that, due to a variety of factors (some biological, some cultural and structural), there are time limits on when certain existential milestones ought to be achieved by. In contemporary society, we note that individuals seem to have more choice about which milestones are important to them and when they can be achieved, although we emphasise that this flexibility is unevenly distributed. This then provides a steppingstone towards an elaboration of the power dynamics and inequalities underlying both the experience and the achievement of existential milestones. Finally, this paper shows how existence theory helps to reflect on a variety of social phenomena of contemporary significance: populism in politics, forced migration, and the coronavirus pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the work of Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt mainly in the perspective of the author’s specific encounters with his work, in the course of which Eisenstadt’s work is compared with that of Talcott Parsons. There are several aspects of this programme. First, brief attention is given to the biographies of Eisenstadt and Parsons; second, their styles and approaches to sociological analysis are compared and contrasted; third, the subject of their somewhat different approaches to what I will call globality is raised, against the background of Eisenstadt’s great reliance on the later work of Karl Jaspers and the somewhat problematic issue of civilization(s). The discussion of Eisenstadt’s deployment of Jaspers’ insights is explored with particular reference to the former’s Japanese Civilization. Often regarded as the graveyard of comparative sociology, Eisenstadt’s attempt to place Japan in a comparative context is, in a number of respects, the consummation of his life’s work, though he had many years yet to live. The paper concludes with a question concerning whether global consciousness has superseded, or transcended, the contrast between differential modernization and global civilization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The main purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of citizenship in complex societies. To this end, the paper is divided into six sections. The first section elucidates the main reasons for the renaissance of the concept of citizenship in the contemporary social sciences. The second section argues that a comprehensive sociological theory of citizenship needs to account for the importance of four dimensions: the content, the type, the conditions, and the arrangements of citizenship. The third section suggests that in order to understand the sociological significance of T.H. Marshall’s account of legal, political, and social rights we need to explore the particular historical contexts in which citizenship rights became ideologically and institutionally relevant. The fourth section offers some critical reflections on the main shortcomings of the Marshallian approach to citizenship. The fifth section draws an analogy between the transformation of social movements and the transformation of citizenship. The sixth section sheds light on the fact that contemporary citizenship studies are confronted with a curious paradox: the differentiation of citizenship has led to both the relativistic impoverishment and the pluralistic enrichment of contemporary accounts of ‘the social’ and ‘the political’. The paper concludes by arguing that, under conditions of late modernity, the state’s capacity to gain political legitimacy increasingly depends on its ability to confront the normative challenges posed by the ubiquity of societal complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper revisits the classical sociological hypothesis of conservatism, specifically the 'Mannheim Hypothesis,' and its bearing on liberty or liberal modernity. The original formulation of the Mannheim Hypothesis posits that conservatism tends to oppose the 'principle of liberty' and, hence, liberal modernity or liberalism, defined as its immediate antagonist. This paper presents the Mannheim Hypothesis of conservatism and liberty, as well as its initial general solution by Mannheim and other classical sociologists. Then it attempts to solve this hypothesis by presenting relevant theoretical arguments and supporting empirical evidence. Overall this essay reaffirms the classical sociological solution of the Mannheim Hypothesis of conservatism and liberty in contemporary society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Weber's critique of modernity centred on how it shaped the habitus – life-conduct and motivations – of the modern individual. I explicate six habitus-types that appear in Weber's work: the early-modern Puritan Berufsmensch, the modern specialist, the modern industrial worker, the politician, the civil servant and the citizen voter. In doing so, I identify the main characteristics of each type and the causal mechanisms through which Western modernity's core features – capitalism and bureaucracy – brought them into being. Further, I discuss two habitus-related problems that concerned Weber: the general failure of the modern habitus to achieve 'personality'; and the mismatch between habitus and occupational role in the Wilhelmine political sphere. I then explain the practical reforms through which Weber hoped to address these problems. Finally, I show how this analysis helps resolve two apparent contradictions which have long perplexed Weber scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Durkheim’s theory of the sacred, which posits the distinction between sacred and profane as the keystone of human understanding, grounds not only his approach to religion and epistemology but also his theory of modernity. This distinction between traditional and modern social forms is essential to Durkheim’s position. In traditional society, social facts are produced through consensus. Durkheim’s theory of modernity, however, focuses on the role of constitutive practices in the creation of modern social facts in situations lacking consensus. A tendency to consider the sacred only in traditional consensus-oriented (religious and symbolic) terms leads to the impression that modern society has entered a crisis period in which the sacred and the social facts the sacred/profane distinction make possible are in short supply. While Durkheim acknowledged a crisis in the transition to modernity, he maintained that new forms of constitutive practice would develop to replace the religious and cultural commonalities of the past, making it possible for modern society to produce strong collective solidarity, mutual intelligibility, and a new moral grounding in freedom and justice. The sacred essentially relocates, shedding its “institutional” character and becoming situated, “ordinary,” and self-organizing. In this article, we take three modern social facts and the constitutive practices they depend on, examining the moral and contractual relationships they enact, the reciprocities they require, and the distribution of participation they facilitate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introductory article to the special issue 'Classical Sociology from the Metropolis' provides a comprehensive exploration of the profound influence of metropolises, particularly Berlin, on the development and discourse of classical sociology. Emphasizing the metropolis as a social space and promoter of sociological thought, it delves into the lives and works of key figures such as Georg Simmel, Robert E. Park, W.E.B. Du Bois, Frieda Wunderlich and Rose Laub Coser. Their interactions, perspectives and transnational exchanges, particularly between Berlin and other urban centres such as Chicago and New York, are highlighted, illustrating the global interconnectedness of sociological discourse. While acknowledging established sociological icons, the article also highlights the often overlooked contributions of women and scholars of colour, challenging and expanding the traditional understanding of the 'classical' in sociological thought. The narrative travels from the early urban sociological and feminist theories that emerged in the metropolis of the 1920s to the complexities of Marxist sociology in a divided Berlin after the Second World War. Through a curated selection of articles in the special issue, the work underlines the central role of the metropolis in shaping foundational sociological concepts and the thinkers who championed them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sociological importance attributed to ‘the sacred’ has varied historically as theorists have sought to explain the relationship between religion and early capitalism, the rise of twentieth-century secularization processes, the profusion of nationalism in post-Soviet societies, and the recent global upsurge in religious movements. Paradoxically, however, sociology’s concern with the social significance of the sacred has not been accompanied by commensurate interest in those contrasting and varied sacrificial processes implicated in creating the sacred. This paper suggests that this imbalance limits our understanding of the relationship between the sacred, religion and society, and makes it difficult to assess the contemporary relevance of classical writings on the subject. Specifically, it hinders our knowledge of why certain phenomena become sacred, and in so doing limits our appreciation of how societies develop cultural priorities, of how they stimulate individuals to become certain types of social subjects, and of the risks and opportunities that arise in milieux characterized by shrinking or expanding prospects for creating sacred phenomena. This is because sacrifice (sacer facere), ‘the making of sacred things’, constitutes a crucial mediator of these phenomena; illuminating the nature and consequences of specific modalities of sacred rituals, actions and objects, and revealing much about their location within or dislocation from particular social milieux, identities and religions. Our argument progresses by viewing sacrifice as an example of what Mauss refers to as a ‘total social fact’, and by engaging with the writings of Bataille, Girard and Simmel; three figures to have made important, sociologically underexplored, contributions to the subject. In so doing, we aim to lay the foundations for a sociology of the contemporary nature and function of sacrifice, suggesting it should be a core issue for twenty-first-century sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Nietzsche rarely features in discussions of money, he offered important insights into such matters as the relationship between the money economy and the permanent decadence of modernity, money’s impact on social hierarchy and individualism and the moral economy of debt. His remarks on these themes are closely connected to two of his best known, but controversial, ideas: the eternal return and the Übermensch. In this paper, I explore how Nietzsche’s arguments, and these two concepts in particular, have been taken up by three thinkers who have made distinctive and original contributions to the sociological and philosophical understanding of money, credit and debt: Georg Simmel in The Philosophy of Money (1907), Walter Benjamin in ‘Capitalism as Religion’ (1921), and Norman Brown in Life Against Death (1959). Nietzsche’s ideas fulfil a pivotal role in each of these treatments of money: in particular, he informs Simmel’s exploration of the relationship between money, individualism and socialism; Benjamin’s examination of the ‘guilt history’ of modern capitalism and its moral economy of debt; and, finally, Brown’s explorations of the roots and consequences of our neurotic money complex. Each of these thinkers puts a different complexion on Nietzsche’s own thoughts regarding money, as well as his broader philosophy. Nevertheless, he provides all three thinkers with a sharply critical perspective on the idea that money’s expansion in the modern world reflects the individual’s liberation from traditional social ties and ancient moral bonds. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An important and innovative conception of constitutive practices plays a key role in Durkheim’s theory of modernity as outlined in De la Division du Travail Sociale (1893), his first book. The idea of self-organizing constitutive practices presents a vision of a modern differentiated society that can be flexible, strong, and egalitarian; supporting individual freedom and equality between individuals; while at the same time facilitating coherence and social solidarity without exerting authority or constraint. In 1902 Durkheim added a second preface to underscore and clarify the essential role played by constitutive practices in differentiated modern contexts of work and occupations. In spite of the importance he placed on constitutive practices, however, and the foundational role he argued they would play in modernity, the point has been largely overlooked. Instead, Durkheim has been interpreted as a conservative thinker, lacking an adequate approach to modernity. The oversight has left sociology without an explanation for how social facts could be effectively shared in modern contexts. The consequences have been serious both for the appreciation of Durkheim and for the development of sociology. This paper offers a reassessment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For Durkheim, sociology, as a new kind of science, is part and parcel of the constitutional process of modern societies. This conception of sociology rests on two fundamental theses. First, society, as a normative realm made up of ideas, and especially of ideals, is an ontological novelty: it shows itself in the constitution of individuals, since human beings are persons able to think and act only as long as they are social individuals. Second, modern society is an historical novelty, constituted by an ideal of the person which asks and enables each social individual to become a fully autonomous being. The aim of this paper is to clarify these two basic foundations of Durkheimian sociology. Part I focuses on the first thesis: Durkheim’s reconstruction of the sociological tradition as a conceptual struggle toward the idea of society, conceived as a new order of reality. It examines the social philosophy Durkheim developed in order to account for the relation between society and the individual; the conceptualization of the human individual as social in The Division of Social Labor, its later development in the framework of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Part II, to be published in a second volume, will focus on the second thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Highlighting the lack of critical attention directed to the tragic as a distinct concept in Simmel’s thought, this paper seeks to elucidate the tragic as a specific dialectical process and to draw attention to the grounding of this concept in the German philosophical tradition that Peter Szondi has identified as ‘the philosophy of the tragic’. In the course of the argument care is taken to illuminate Simmel’s understanding through reference to tragic drama itself, thus emphasizing the properly aesthetic context of the tragic as a distinct philosophical idea relevant to socio-cultural life. In recovering Simmel’s definition of the tragic, the author seeks to counter the common conflation of Simmel’s use of the tragic concept in his understanding of socio-cultural life with a normative position akin to ‘cultural pessimism’, and to elucidate the way in which the tragic ultimately indicates a form of affirmation, albeit one replete with nihilistic implications. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper highlights the key position and polysemy of the idea of transcendence in Eisenstadt’s comparative historical sociology. Eisenstadt’s deployment of the idea of transcendence as a tool of systematic comparative analysis applicable to both past and present civilizations stands in clear continuity with directions of inquiry opened up by Weber and later inflected by conceptions of the ‘Axial Age’ as first developed by Jaspers and others. But it was also nourished by his time of study with Buber, self-critical revision of his early affinities with structural-functionalism, and dialogical absorption of competing theoretical influences. Transcendence, in the process, develops into a polysemic idea of flexible analytical scope, which can combine with but does not overlap with those of the search for salvation, charisma, or the sacred. The result is a comparative hermeneutics of civilizations that strives to decipher the manifold and contradictory expressions of transcendence in the history of human conceptions and institutions. It is also a cultural hermeneutics that posits the paradoxical operation of generative cultural structures able to both close and open, encode or dissolve, as well as construct and reconstruct collective boundaries and arenas of trust and commitment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper different interpretations of the sociological concept of the sacred are analysed and put in relation with the idea of solidarity. In the first section a particular understanding of the Durkheimian conception of the sacred is shown to express both the sociological and the philosophical meaning of the idea of normativity. In the second part Habermas's thought on religion is analysed and shown to develop in four stages. Here the point is that one can understand the emancipatory profile of modernity - which Habermas analysed in terms of communicative reason - as the core of a collective representation that, once idealized, can be understood as a secular form of the sacred. Finally, a third section is dedicated to a self-reflective defence of the nexus between solidarity and the sacred, a self-reflective defence that implies a criticism of the trivial secularized self-understanding of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to articles published within the issue is presented, including one by Edward A. Tiryakian on sociologist Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt's comparative analysis of modernity, another by Luis Roniger on transnational forces in the construction of collective identities and one by Willfried Spohn on Eisenstadt's elaboration of what may be described as a global historical sociology.

This essay is part of a symposium on Modernity and the Jews in Western Social Thought (University of Chicago Press, 2017) and responds to comments on the book by Angel Adams Parham, Joseph Gerteis, Peter Kivisto, and Fuyuki Kurasawa. As all these commentators recognize, the history of social theory at its best involves more than conserving, inculcating, and consecrating the sociological canon or even remaking the canon through the addition of previously neglected authors. The history of social theory also allows scholars to address fundamental questions in the sociology of knowledge, the comparative investigation of different kinds of alterity, and the study of social solidarity and belonging. This essay reflects on how best to address these questions and suggests ways that new research in the history of social thought can build upon and extend existing scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article pursues the question of the origin of the left-Hegelian concept of immanent transcendence that emerged in the nineteenth century. Whereas some contemporary critical theorists apparently understand the concept as deriving from a religious origin, evolutionary and historical considerations would seem to indicate that more might be involved. Evolutionarily, the origin of the concept can be traced to the civilisation-founding cognitive achievement that marks the emergence of the current version of the human species and the concomitant cultural explosion during the Palaeolithic period. In this context, the cultural consolidation of the newly acquired metarepresentational capacity by language and visual symbolisation or art preceded religion by a considerable elapse of time. As one among a number of sociocultural practices, it could only have made a partial contribution to the conditions for the emergence of the concept. Historically, the thought of the key nineteenth-century left-Hegelians Marx and Peirce was fundamentally shaped, not by religion, but rather by the core modern innovation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – the new mathematical-scientific-philosophical understanding of infinity as real – which gained primacy by significantly impacting on relevant late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual developments, including laying down the parameters of classical social thought in general and left-Hegelianism in particular. Since the competing religious understanding of infinity, despite having left traces on modern validity concepts such as truth, justice and truthfulness, remained shrouded in indefinite incomprehensibility, it could at best continue to play only the role of an identity-securing, identity-cultivating and motivational source for some, not all. As such, it did not contribute to the nineteenth-century left-Hegelian concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a framework for thinking about how the question of the future of capitalism might be addressed. One of the problems resides in the very definition of capitalism and of what its defining features consist of and whether we should be talking about 'capitalist society' or the 'capitalist economy' or some kind of post-capitalist condition. Following Polanyi, Castoriadis and Habermas, it is argued that capitalism and democracy together constitute the defining dynamics of modernity and that the resulting tensions will provide momentum for the main circuits of potential change. Five scenarios for looking at the future are discussed. These will form the main substance of the article: varieties of capitalism, systemic crises of capitalism, catastrophic collapse, low growth capitalism and post-capitalism. In conclusion, it is argued that there are various possibilities that can be understood in terms of transitions, breakdown or transformation, but a likely future trend will be less the end of capitalism than the harnessing of 'super-capitalism' and that there are limits to the accumulation of capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moving beyond Beck’s explicit opposition to Marx’s understanding of society, this article proposes to explore some of the deeper commonalities between Marxism and Beck’s theory of risk society. Rather than remaining at the level of propositional claims about society, at which Marx and Beck are opposed in several important ways, this article proposes to analyze these theories in terms of their key commonalities in the problem situations they address. In particular, this article identifies how both of these theories explore the implications of the development of productive forces and the resulting humanisation of nature in the context of widespread social estrangement. This article then identifies key commonalities in the structure of the theoretical solutions that each theory employs to address their commonly held problem situation. In this way, this article rethinks the relationship between Beck and Marx, as well as suggesting alternative ways of re-appropriating classical social theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of multiple modernities as developed by Eisenstadt has become increasingly influential in debates about modernity and the historical formation of societies in comparative perspective. On closer inspection, the theoretical framework is less than straightforward when it comes to specific applications. This article considers Brazil from the perspective of a revised theory of multiple modernities. There has been virtually no application to specific case studies within the countries of the South. Brazil could be considered an important case study of modernity that deserves attention in its own right. The article shows that the theoretical framework of multiple modernities offers insights into the Brazilian trajectory of modernity, a consideration of which also challenges some of the assumptions of Eisenstadt’s approach. Despite the limits of the framework, the notion of multiple modernities offers a good basis for a global analysis of modernity. Greater attention needs to be given to civilizational encounters and to sources of conflict and plurality within modernity and which cannot be accounted for in terms of the principles of axiality postulated by Eisenstadt. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

David Frisby’s work was a career-long engagement with modernity, informed by a tradition of classical social theory whose neglect in Anglo-American sociology David did much to remedy through his translations as well as his writings: the ‘sociological impressionism’ that seeks to grasp totalities through ‘snapshots’ and ‘fragments’ whose representatives included Georg Simmel, Siegfried Kracauer, and Walter Benjamin. Conceived as a homage to David’s legacy (and his personal influence on my own intellectual development) rather than a commentary on his work, this essay is a Benjaminian dérive through twentieth-century Prague, which complements and counterpoints David’s beloved Vienna and Berlin. Prague’s modern history, I argue, gives Baudelaire’s celebrated definition of modernity as ‘le transitoire, le fugitif, le contingent’ surreally new dimensions. Indeed, the city might well be regarded as a ‘capital of the twentieth century’ in whose ‘ruins’ we can begin to excavate the ‘prehistory of postmodernity.’ [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Written as a small tribute to David Frisby’s inspiring, pioneering work on Critical Theory and the modern cityscape, this essay explores a number of feuilletons and other textual fragments in which the cultural theorist Siegfried Kracauer expresses his enduring fascination with the French port of Marseilles. It is suggested that this city has a two-fold significance for him: firstly, in the vibrancy of its street-life, Marseilles is an exemplary, indeed inspirational, instance of the cinematic qualities of modern urban environments. It is to Marseilles that Kracauer’s 1960 Theory of Film is indebted not only for its first formulation but also for its central motif of the quotidian ‘flow of life’ to which the film camera must attend. Secondly, this seedy city constitutes the preeminent site of ‘promiscuous modernity’, understood here in two senses: not only as an environment of explicit sexuality and sexual activity/exchange, but also one that is ‘for mixing’ – that is to say, open and inviting to the most eclectic and outré elements. This notion of promiscuity as the continuous co-presence and curious contiguity of heterogeneous populations and incongruous objects also has its filmic aspect – as Kracauer observes elsewhere, such surreal juxtapositions are also to be found off-set in the costumes and props of the film studio. In its fusion of everyday urban energies and extraordinary eccentricities, the cinematic city of Marseilles takes on a dreamlike quality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The primary goal of this article is to uncover the deep-seated conceptual affinities between Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias. The second goal is to demonstrate that, in part because of their diverging sensitivities, when taken together the two authors’ highly compatible approaches yield a vision more fertile than either of their sociological perspectives considered separately. Tracing the intellectual roots of the two author’s three core concepts – habitus, field/figuration, and power/capital – we show how they selectively appropriated from their predecessors. We then outline how each of the two authors used their overlapping triadic approaches to interrogate a range of empirical phenomena. Attempting to make the authors’ unexploited complementarity more tangible, we reflect on a simultaneously Elias- and Bourdieu-inspired approach to the body-centred world of sport. The conclusion argues that looking back at Elias and Bourdieu’s theoretical contributions together can revitalize our conceptualizing and investigating of human societies in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the contribution Tocqueville’s work can make to recent scholarly debates on political friendship in modernity. Tocqueville, unlike most modern classical social theorists, does not treat friendship as a private bond devoid of political significance. For him, political friendship contributes to the success of democracy and is so crucial that its absence leads to despotism. The reason Tocqueville is attuned to the political significance of personal bonds when most modern theorists are not is his interpretation of ‘the social.’ This article investigates Tocqueville’s account of political friendship relative to his analysis of the new social basis of modern democracies. I argue that, in linking friendship to the social, Tocqueville provides an account of political friendship apposite to a modern society of strangers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay proposes that the comparative research of Eisenstadt made room for ‘tradition’ as a creative feature of modernity, rather than as dysfunctional, as in either the liberal or leftist model. He recognized that conflict — often a conflict of generations—is a feature of modernity, and that trust is also a problematic aspect of change. An ultimate concern of Eisenstadt was to build on classical themes of sociology and theories of social change to develop, with colleagues, an adequate sociological understanding of an evolving civilization of modernity. Eisenstadt based his writings on comparative historical research, his far-flung travels, as well as continuous observations of the dynamics of his own Israeli society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the work of die French social philosopher and feminist Jenny P. d'Héricourt, who, in the mid-nineteenth century, debated the writings of contemporary 'master-thinkers' such as Auguste Comte, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Jules Michelet. Usually ranged exclusively as a contribution to feminist thought, d'Héricourt's writing has also to be understood as a contribution to the conceptual outlines and defining questions of emerging sociology. The stated objective of her main work, La femme affranchie, was not to explain society but to claim equality for women. However, it was precisely her critique of contemporary theories of sexual difference and gender inequality that led d'Héricourt into the territory of sociological thinking — the very same territory her opponents had left by devoting themselves to the creation of a dualistic and asymmetrical concept of gender relations which relied upon women's supposed adversity towards modernity. In her effort to render women's role as agents of modernization visible, d'Héricourt developed, albeit in fragments, a theorem of social integration in modern society that anticipates Émile Durkheim's concept of organic solidarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I offer a discussion of Simmel's Philosophy of Money in comparison with the analyses of money in the writings of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. Based on this analysis, I argue that Simmel's ambiguous status as a classic can be accounted for by some of the characteristics of his approach as well as the historical (non-)reception of his work. Simmel's relative neglect in sociology for the better part of the century as well as his recent revival with the rise of the new cultural studies and the postmodern paradigm shift hint at an important interdependence between the history and systematics of sociological theory. The theme of money has not managed to be accepted as an undisputed topic of sociological reflection because of its non-independent status in most social theories (apart from Simmel's) as well as the factual resistance to totalizing accounts (like Simmel's) in the history of sociology. Recent transformations in social theory, however, indicate that money may, and to some extent already has, become a more autonomous topic of inquiry. In conclusion, I argue that Simmel's work does lend itself to be taken up in postmodern perspectives and that the sociological study of money can likewise be appropriated by the new cultural studies. However, these new perspectives will have to come to terms with the modernist resistance of Simmel and the other sociological classics' remaining influence in contemporary sociological theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current evaluations of Simmel's theoretical writings on men, women and modernity have read these too generously, relying on a curate's egg motif culling the good parts from the bad parts. The good parts are judged insightful and prescient, revealing the workings of a sociological imagination and even anticipating elements of contemporary feminist epistemology. The bad parts reveal the unfortunate incursion of ideological baggage or blinkered romanticism that periodically surface and impede the productive workings of the sociological imagination. A more astute reading is proposed here: one which recuperates the bad parts as symptomatic of the workings of Simmel's philosophical imagination where he crafts a deep ontology of gender, in the form of an a priori, absolute duality of incommensurate modes of male and female being. This deep ontology of gender fatefully consigns woman to the wastelands of his philosophical imagination, whilst releasing man, and man alone, into the more fertile and productive workings of his sociological imagination. Hence, Simmel constructs a masculine ontology of the social. This is induced by Simmel's ontological grounding of the objective in the male and by the 'radical dualism' he recommends as a more women-friendly alternative to 'relative dualism'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]