Search

This paper proposes a novel hybrid BSC-DEA framework for performance evaluation in sustainable supply chains. The proposed DEA model is capable of dealing with both qualitative and quantitative indicators while accounting for desirable and undesirable indicators. A tailored network DEA model involving a set of comprehensive sustainability indicators is applied to rank different supply chains from sustainability viewpoint to find the efficient and benchmarked units at each echelon. Then, sustainability indicators are classified into four groups according to BSC perspectives to help policy makers and top managers to have a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of the sustainability with respect to the long- and short term strategies. Finally, a number of sensitivity analyses are performed to identify the effective factors and strengths and weaknesses of each supply chain are identified based on BSC perspectives. To demonstrate the capabilities of the proposed approach, this framework is implemented for performance evaluation of plastic recycling companies in Mazandaran and Golestan provinces of Iran and some helpful managerial insights are derived from the numerical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the growing level of public environmental consciousness, sustainability has become an important issue in the area of supply chain management. This paper focuses on a channel coordination problem in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain involving one socially responsible manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer. Constructing mathematical models to characterize the problem, four particular contracts are developed to investigate the environmental performance and channel profit under the framework of two non-cooperative contracts: wholesale price and two-part tariff, and two cooperative contracts: Nash bargaining and Rubinstein bargaining. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the wholesale price contract performs worse than the other three in terms of the carbon emission per unit product and channel profit. In addition, the two-part tariff contract can partially coordinate the supply chain, whereas both bargaining contracts can achieve perfect coordination to provide outcomes of the centralized decision. Comparing with the fair-neutral scenarios, we find that the fairness behavior promotes the retailer's profit, but reduces the manufacturer's profit under different contracts. Sensitivity analysis reveals that with intensified fairness concerns, the sustainability level and channel profit diminish under non-cooperative contracts, but remain the same under cooperative contracts. The Nash bargaining and Rubinstein bargaining contracts are robust to the degree of the retailer's fairness behavior and could be the best choice for the socially responsible manufacturer. • A channel coordination issue in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain is studied. • Four contracts are developed to examine the impact of retailer's fairness behavior. • Fairness behavior worsens wholesale price contract compared to two-part tariff one. • Nash and Rubinstein bargaining contracts are robust to levels of fairness concerns. • Both bargaining contracts achieve perfect coordination in reducing carbon emission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]