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Abstract This paper investigates the issue of remanufacturing in a dual-channel supply chain. The manufacturer can produce/remanufacture the products and sell them at the same price through his own direct channel or a retail channel. Based on the cap-and-trade regulation, we construct two models with and without remanufacturing to obtain the optimal levels of carbon emission reduction and pricing strategies. The results indicate that remanufacturing can effectively improve the level of carbon emission reduction, and it is profitable to the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, with remanufacturing, we investigate the effect of product promotion where the manufacturer can promote via direct channel (manufacturer's promotion), and the retailer can promote via retail channel (retailer's promotion). With the manufacturer's promotion, the results show that both the level of carbon emission reduction and profit of the manufacturer increase, but the retailer's profit decreases. On the other hand, the retailer's promotion can improve the profits of the retailer and the manufacturer when more consumers prefer the retail channel. Finally, we provide more managerial insights in the sensitivity analysis and extension parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores choice of technology for sustainable operations in a port supply chain that consists of one port and one shipping company under a cap-and-trade scheme. To control emissions, the port supply chain can implement either shore power (SP) or low sulfur fuel oil (LSFO). The performances of the port supply chain when either SP or LSFO is adopted are compared in this paper. More specifically, according to relative bargaining power between the port and the shipping company, three different game models are constructed to analyze the effects of channel power on equilibrium results when either SP or LSFO is implemented. Results show that both profits and carbon emissions of supply chain using SP are lower than those using LSFO when carbon price is low, but are higher when carbon price is high. However, from the perspective of the social welfare, when both the carbon price and environmental concern are low, or both the carbon price and environmental concern are high, LSFO should be adopted. Otherwise, SP may be more attractive. Compared with the two Stackelberg games, the Nash game leads to higher profits and less emissions. The Nash game also leads to higher social welfare when environmental concern is small, but lower social welfare when environmental concern is large. These findings can provide insights for governments in formulating emission reduction strategies in port supply chain under different scenarios. • Two specific carbon-reduction technologies are considered in a port supply chain. • The power structure of a port supply chain affects total emissions. • Carbon price and environmental concern significantly affect technology choice. • Nash game leads to higher profits and less emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]