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Carbon trading market is a central policy tool for promoting cleaner enterprises' energy consumption and investment behaviors. It is crucial for enterprises to establish a green and low-carbon development model by clarifying carbon trading impact mechanism on enterprise behaviors and the interactive relationship between entities in the carbon market. China's contract-based carbon market is still in the development stage, the impact of the mainstream allowance mechanism and government regulation on enterprises' energy behaviors has yet to be determined. In view of this, this paper describes mathematical mechanisms of the influence of carbon prices and carbon quotas on enterprises' energy consumption and investment, and the evolutionary game model of government-enterprise behaviors is constructed, the evolution process and appropriate strategies of enterprises' energy behaviors in the development of the carbon market are discussed. This paper uses real data of China carbon market to simulate the model, it is found that strategies such as relaxation of carbon quotas and carbon subsidies dynamization are needed during the initial development of the market. In the mature stage of the carbon market, strategies are needed to increase the proportion of government carbon revenue and reduce its regulatory cost. The higher the initial willingness of government-enterprise, the better the effect of strategies and the constraints of public willingness. The model and results have theoretical implications for enterprises' energy transformation and government regulation, and provide a reference for the development of China's carbon market. • Constructed benefit-cost analytical framework for enterprises' energy behaviors. • Described mechanisms of carbon trading affecting enterprises' energy behaviors. • Constructed government-enterprise behaviors model by the evolutionary game theory. • Found new conclusions of enterprises' energy behaviors under the carbon market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to probe collaborative environmental governance (CEG) in China's "1 + N" policy framework for carbon peak and carbon neutrality, this paper applies the Actor-network theory (ANT) as an analytical framework to explore carbon reduction policy coordination. We then model ANT's relations with an evolutionary game theory (EGT) model to examine the evolutionarily stable strategies in CO 2 emission reduction by various actors including the central government, local governments, commercial banks, and polluting enterprises. Our objective is to examine policy coordination as the key enabler for governing success via an ANT-based mechanism design in China's institutional context. Combining the strength of ANT with a four-party EGT model, we investigate how to improve policy coordination to mobilize the actor-network for promoting CEG. Simulations are conducted to examine the effectiveness of policy coordination involving multiple policy instruments for controlling carbon emissions. The central government fulfills leadership in translating the interests of other actors and shaping the desired collaborative network. Without proper coordination, environmental policies may counteract each other. Government transfers and subsidies have direct impacts, but in the long run enhanced competitiveness and profitability of enterprises represent the intrinsic key to CEG success. From a methodology perspective, policy simulation in an EGT framework represents a novel addition to the research toolbox that expands ANT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the background that China will achieve the goal of carbon neutrality by 2060, analyzing the impact of carbon neutral target constraints on the welfare of urban and rural residents is an important part of the design of a carbon emission reduction policy mechanism, in this paper, the dynamic recursive CGE(Computable general equilibrium) model is used to simulate the changes in welfare level, income consumption, and CO2 emissions of residents and their urban-rural heterogeneity under the policy of imposing a carbon tax on the fossil energy industry from 2022 to 2060. The results show that: compared with the BAU scenario, by 2060, first the income and consumption of residents will decrease slightly. Second, the target constraint of carbon neutrality makes the equivalent variation and compensate variation of urban and rural residents' welfare decrease slightly, and the equivalent variation and compensate variation of urban residents decrease more than those of rural residents. The following conclusions are drawn: first, the carbon-neutral target constraint makes the welfare of urban and rural residents decline slightly, but it will not have a strong impact on residents' income and consumption. Second, this constraint has a greater impact on the income, consumption and savings of urban residents than those of rural residents. [Display omitted] • A five-layer nested dynamic recursive CGE model is established to analyze residents' welfare. • Carbon taxes are incorporated into production decisions as a policy cost for energy companies. • The heterogeneity of the impact of carbon tax policy constraints on the welfare of urban and rural residents was analyzed. • The government needs to improve the intensive and diversified energy supply in rural areas to reduce the urban-rural gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]