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In order to probe collaborative environmental governance (CEG) in China's "1 + N" policy framework for carbon peak and carbon neutrality, this paper applies the Actor-network theory (ANT) as an analytical framework to explore carbon reduction policy coordination. We then model ANT's relations with an evolutionary game theory (EGT) model to examine the evolutionarily stable strategies in CO 2 emission reduction by various actors including the central government, local governments, commercial banks, and polluting enterprises. Our objective is to examine policy coordination as the key enabler for governing success via an ANT-based mechanism design in China's institutional context. Combining the strength of ANT with a four-party EGT model, we investigate how to improve policy coordination to mobilize the actor-network for promoting CEG. Simulations are conducted to examine the effectiveness of policy coordination involving multiple policy instruments for controlling carbon emissions. The central government fulfills leadership in translating the interests of other actors and shaping the desired collaborative network. Without proper coordination, environmental policies may counteract each other. Government transfers and subsidies have direct impacts, but in the long run enhanced competitiveness and profitability of enterprises represent the intrinsic key to CEG success. From a methodology perspective, policy simulation in an EGT framework represents a novel addition to the research toolbox that expands ANT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the target of carbon neutrality, the need for deep decarbonization in iron and steel industry is increasingly recognized. Existing studies rarely mention the effects of collaboration with its source industries for carbon emission reduction in ISI. Furthermore, the fundamental laws of CO 2 emission reduction capacity with cost change of source substitutions for various steel production routes under market economics are unclear. To avoid the blind substitution of clean sources for meeting the urgent requirements for decarbonization in China's steel industry, which may result in increased carbon emissions and uneconomical carbon reduction from a lifecycle perspective. This paper integrates the production and utilization processes of source resources into the steel production process, establishes coupling models of carbon and value flows for four main types of steel production routes, and aims to quantitatively analyze the specific CO 2 emission reduction potential and costs. Three economic market development scenarios from 2021 to 2060 are set, and the marginal carbon prices of various source substitutions are determined. Subsequently, decarbonization pathways with the goal of minimizing production costs are developed. Finally. The future resource demand and the carbon emission reduction contributions of source industries collaborated are predicted. The results show that (1) about 81.7–89.9 % of CO 2 emissions could be reduced in the scenarios; (2) the demands of electric power and hydrogen energy will reach 54.48–511.90 BkWh and 7.47–10.31 Gt in 2060, respectively; and (3) collaboration with source industries could make 18.3–18.3% of CO 2 emission reduction contributions. All in all, this study could provide scientific support for the low-carbon transformation of China's steel industry. • Carbon and value flows of BF-BOF, Scrap-EAF, DRI-EAF, MOE-EAF routes are analyzed. • CO 2 emission reduction potential with marginal carbon price is determined. • Decarbonization paths during 2021–2060 for China's steel industry are developed. • Quantify the contribution of collaborative carbon reduction with source industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an energy-sharing market coupled with carbon emission trading to quantify peer-to-peer energy-sharing markets' economic and environmental influences. We establish a bi-level peer-to-peer energy sharing market considering the interaction between energy prosumers and the system operator. An interaction algorithm and generalized Nash game are thus applied in this work. With the simulation results, we find that the daily disutility of provincial systems is reduced by about 7 ¥ when time-of-use electricity rates are applied. This pricing strategy can encourage prosumers to participate in energy-sharing transactions. The subsidies of electricity rates, carbon prices, and renewable energy investments can improve the social welfare of the whole system. Considering the development of power generation technology and emission reduction targets, the change of optimization parameters in the next 30 years is analyzed in the example. It can be concluded that the total CO2 emission in 2050 will be reduced to almost half of that in 2020 in the energy-sharing markets. The subsidy of renewable energy generation and stricter CO2 emission constraints may accelerate the reduction of carbon emissions. [Display omitted] • It is the first time to assess the environmental effect of peer-to-peer energy trading with actual data. • We analyze the peer-to-peer energy trading impacts on the carbon emission amount in China. • We compare the market participants' revenue and CO2 emission considering the different scenarios. • We develop a bi-level coupled emission right trading market to verify whether total emission is reduced. • The development of technologies and various energy structures are considered quantitatively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emission trading scheme (ETS) is considered as a tool to reduce emissions at a low cost, which can effectively promote the carbon peak and carbon neutrality. As the main participants in the carbon emission trading (CET) market, the behavior and strategies for governments and different types of enterprises affect the final emission reduction performance. Taking the national carbon market as an example, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity to analyze the possible game situations in the development process of the CET market. The results show that with the development of the CET market, the governments and power generation enterprises will have different game results. In order to achieve the optimal stable equilibrium and maximize carbon emission reduction, governments should improve regulatory efficiency and formulate appropriate incentive strategies for excess emission reduction and punishment strategies for insufficient emission reduction. In addition, the initial willingness will not affect the final strategy choice of the three parties. Reasonable free carbon quota ratio, lower technology emission reduction cost and higher carbon price can stimulate the enthusiasm of governments and enterprises to reduce emissions. The above results provide a reference for coordinating the relationships between governments and power generation enterprises with different emission reduction capacity in the construction of the CET market in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]