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The article talks about the French security policy towards the government of president Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the late 1970s. Topics discussed include an attack on the Shaba Province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978 by Katangan Gendarmes rebels, the provision of crucial military support by France to Mobutu, and why french policymakers assisted a former Belgian colony.

The article discusses German Reunification, France and Soviet Union. Topics discussed include meeting between French president Francois Mitterrand and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, opening of Berlin Wall and Cold War. Other topics such as foreign policies of France, Soviet and Germany are also discussed.

The article explores the history of relations between France and China during the Cold War in the early 1960s. Emphasis is given to Sino-French rapprochement and negotiations between the governments of French President Charles de Gaulle and Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong to recognize each other. Other topics include Sino-French agreement on the conflict in Vietnam, diplomatic visits, and the global status of the People's Republic of China.

A literary criticism of the book "Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958 to 1969," edited by Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher and Garret Martin is presented. It examines the book's claim that French President Charles de Gaulle's had the foreign policy goal of reshaping the bipolar international order of the Cold War.

The article presents an exploration into the political motivation of France under President Charles de Gaulle to formally recognize the People's Republic of China in January of 1964. The author highlights the event as a significant international move and discusses various reactions of other Western nations to the maneuver and its effect on French interests.

The concluding segment of this two-part article explores two key episodes in French foreign policy under President Charles de Gaulle: (1) France's veto of British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), and (2) de Gaulle's decision to provoke and the resolve the "empty chair" crisis of 1965-1966. These two cases, like the two examined in Part 1 of this article, demonstrate the fundamental importance of economic considerations in de Gaulle's policy toward the EEC. De Gaulle was a democratic politician first and a geopolitical visionary second. His experience tells us a great deal about the limits imposed by modern democratic politics on any leader who might hope to make statecraft serve an idiosyncratic political vision. The article concludes with an analysis of possible counterarguments and a discussion of the proper use of historical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reponses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the other commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reponses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the other commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reponses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the other commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reponses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the other commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moravcsik's reply to the six commentaries deals with sources omitted from the original article, the use of evidence in his analysis of the Fouchet Plan and the "empty chair" crisis, and broader critiques of (and proposed alternatives to) the commercial interpretation of French policy on European integration during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Moravcsik concedes some of the points raised by the critics and offers a more qualified and nuanced restatement of his argument, but he sticks to his basic contention that "commercial interests were a dominant and sufficient motivation for French policy in Europe." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reponses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the other commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thousands of books and articles on President Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration all accord primary explanatory importance to his distinctive geopolitical ideology. These analyses place secondary significance, if any at all, on commercial considerations. This two-part article seeks to revise that historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration taken by France during de Gaulle's presidency: to remain in the Common Market and promote the Common Agricultural Policy, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the European Economic Community, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965-1966. The first two decisions are discussed here, and the other two are covered in Part 2. For each case, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence confirms that the interests pursued by de Gaulle were more commercial than geopolitical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review is presented of four articles within this issue by Irwin Wall, Edward A. Kolodziej, Marc Trachtenberg and Andrew Moravcsik concerning the book "Globalizing de Gaulle," which was written by the authors of this article.

The reponses to Andrew Moravcsik's article discuss the main substantive and methodological points raised in it. Although most of the respondents agree that Moravcsik has properly highlighted the importance of commercial concerns for de Gaulle's policy on European integration, they question the validity of his sharp separation between de Gaulle's political and economic goals for France. Several commentators argue that political and commercial concerns (including agricultural concerns) were closely intertwined in de Gaulle's vision of French grandeur. John Keeler brings up another crucial question: was French agriculture really an obstacle to France's position in Europe? He argues that de Gaulle successfully supported and modernized French agriculture because he was convinced that this would contribute to France's geopolitical position in Europe and the Western world. In two longer commentaries, Jeffrey Vanke and Marc Trachtenberg raise questions about Moravcsik's methodology and use of sources. Both agree that Moravcsik draws on an impressive array of available materials concerning de Gaulle. But they both wonder whether a definitive account of de Gaulle's policies can be written when the documentary record is still incomplete, a point raised by the other commentators as well. Moreover, both Vanke and Trachtenberg point out that, in using the available material, Moravcsik sometimes omits crucial evidence that contradicts his thesis. Vanke brings up the question of determinism in Moravcsik's view of the influence of commercial interests on de Gaulle's policies, and Trachtenberg concludes with reflections on the nature and limits of historical understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces a series of articles about the Cold War. Role of France in the Cold War; French President Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy; European integration.