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In this paper, we model the interactions between Greece and its creditors as a costly signalling game. The main argument is that a costly exchange of information can improve the recipient's incentives to comply with conditionality. If creditors can credibly signal that suspending financial assistance is a viable option, they will be able to extract concessions from the recipient. Conversely, if the feasibility of the outside option is in doubt, threats to withhold financial support will be toothless. Our contribution is to highlight the role of information exchanges during crisis bargaining. Such signalling mechanisms are central to understanding the outcomes of the Greek debt drama, but are absent from existing accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of EU (European Union) Structural Funds (from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, etc.) channelled to Greece and other countries over the last 35 years has been thoroughly evaluated by EU-commissioned impact reports and relevant academic studies. However, several political consequences of development transfers have been largely neglected. Concepts, methods and conclusions reached by studies of North-South development aid can help greatly to understand the medium- and long-term political impact of EU funds. This article is based on interviews with EU and Greek politicians, officials, beneficiaries and various stakeholders. The conclusion is a less positive - but familiar in other parts of the world - story. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does forced migration feature in EU member states' foreign policy and how does it affect their bargaining strategies? While the literature highlights EU‐level policies aiming to manage forced migration flows, we examine how Greece sought to leverage its response to the 2015–16 European migrant crisis. We propose a theoretical framework that explains why the SYRIZA–ANEL government sought to leverage Greece's position as a refugee‐host state via an issue​‐linkage strategy tying the management of forced migration to economic aid over the Third Economic Adjustment Programme. Initially employing a 'blackmailing' strategy focused on threats, Greece shifted to a 'backscratching' strategy of co‐operation after March 2016, once its geopolitical importance and numbers of asylum seekers within its territory were reduced. We provide the first detailed analysis of Greece's foreign policy response to the European migrant crisis, demonstrating the importance of forced displacement in the international politics of EU member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the history of the German–Greek relationship in the context of European integration and demonstrates that West Germany and German–Greek business networks played a crucial role in the shaping of Greece's post‐war growth model. The article challenges the assumption that the relationship between the two countries is overshadowed by the past. In contrast, it shows that post‐war German–Greek relations were forged around European integration with an eye to the future and that it was the two countries' early rapprochement and the mutual accommodation of their respective aims that laid the foundations of their asymmetrical interdependence. In doing so, the article argues that it was the success of Greece's European strategy, rather than its failure, that lies at the heart of its recurring balance‐of‐payments problems: a lingering trade deficit with Germany, the country's major trading partner, proved to be, as I will show, the price for growth and modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2004 few could imagine Greece on the brink of state bankruptcy. Thanks to this law, two major Greek parties alternated in power up until the crisis: the ND, a centre-right christian democratic party, and PASOK, a centre-left social democratic party. Though the essence of the Greek electoral rules (the reinforcement of big parties) remained unchanged from 2009-19, we observed a complete de-alignment of voters that is breaking down the party system and changing the traditions of government formation (Verney, 2014). This initial reaction led during the crisis to a new division, which was also observed in other EU member states (Karremans and Lefkofridi, 2020): the challengers utilized this division by framing populist mainstream parties as systemic (establishment) and themselves as the true expression of the people by positioning themselves against the responsible mainstream and the only real anti-MoU forces, formed by the parties PASOK and ND. [Extracted from the article]

The literature on blame avoidance suggests that politicians seek to avoid the risk of electoral punishment by means of blame‐shifting. Based on a quantitative content analysis of public responsibility attributions, this article explores public blame‐shifting among Greek and Spanish parties in austerity governments during the eurozone crisis. Arguing that blame avoidance behavior in times of austerity is conditioned by party ideology, the findings suggest that incumbent left‐wing parties are more inclined to shift the blame whereas conservative parties also claim credit. The article then explores how the European character of the crisis influenced the patterns of blame‐shifting. The results show firstly, that external blame‐shifting rose significantly in times of incumbency, when foreign actors appeared to be ideal scapegoats; secondly, external blame‐shifting in the crisis was slightly more common among left‐wing parties. The article contributes to assessing the role of party ideology for blame‐shifting and it helps to understand blame‐shifting in European policy fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses differences in the varieties of political rhetoric on structuring and legitimizing argumentation and strategies during periods of economic and political crisis. Driven by developments in theory about blame‐shifting and the exogenization of the causes of crisis as well as employing advanced techniques of analysis, it focuses on the parliamentary bailout debates in Greece during the crisis period (2009–2015). By means of computer‐assisted content analysis it analyses the content of arguments on blame‐shifting. It shows that blame‐shifting is much more complex that just blaming the external enemy and often takes the form of historical blame‐shifting, turning the blame onto previous governments. It reveals that party leaders often use a much more polemic discourse than members of parliament. Finally, it shows that blame‐shifting diminishes once a party comes to power, following arguments on representative versus responsible government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post‐Keynesians have delivered an important advance in providing explanations of the Eurozone crisis, not the least in demonstrating how the formation of the European integration project lacked the means to manage effectively the macroeconomic imbalances between core and peripheral spaces across the region. Through a critical engagement with such descriptions, this article argues that to account more adequately for the formation of the asymmetrical and crisis‐ridden forms of development across the Eurozone it is necessary to focus on the uneven and combined development of Europe's peripheral spaces and their integration into an expanded free trade regime since the 1980s. It is through a focus on the structuring condition of uneven and combined development shaped by capitalist social relations of production and attendant class struggles that we can locate the origins of the present crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information related to the membership of Greece in the European Union and the eurozone governance. Topics discussed include the challenges faced by the eurozone after the Greek drama in 2015 such as slow economic growth and low oil prices, the standoff of the eurozone with Syriza, the economic outlook of the region in 2015, and the factors that drive the tentative economic recovery of the region. Also mentioned are fundamental developments in the monetary policy of the region such as the quantitative easing programme of the European Central Bank (ECB), the single supervisory mechanism (SSM), and the economic policy co-ordination.

The article discusses the three themes of the conundrum within the financial crisis in the European Union (EU) countries in 2015 such as democracy, conditionality and institutional weakness. Topics mentioned include the impact of the initiatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and EU conditionality on debt crisis in Greece, the effort started by Yanis Varoufakis, former Member of the Hellenic Parliament, with euro partners of Greece, and the response of EU Commission vice-president Jyrki Katainen to the election of the SYRIZA government, a left-wing political party in Greece, in Athens.

Within the broader debate on the Greek crisis, the theory of 'populist democracy' postulates that populism is fundamental to the sustenance of the Greek political system and is at the heart of Greece's endemic domestic weaknesses. This article tests this assumption empirically through the use of a sophisticated framing analysis of speeches delivered by the leaders of the five parties in the Greek parliament in the period 2009-11. The findings confirm that populism: (a) is expressed through the narratives of political actors; (b) is observed across the party system; (c) is expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity; and (d) differs depending on position in the party system. The article contributes to the debate by testing and building on the theory of democratic populism, providing a novel way of measuring and operationalizing populism and identifying a new typology that distinguishes between mainstream and fringe populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Europeanization literature has extensively examined the influence of the European employment strategy ( EES) on Member States' employment policies. However, two least-likely cases - Greece and Portugal - have been neglected in the literature. This article focuses on the activation of public employment services ( PES), which has been one of the key elements of the EES. Based on a sample of 44 semi-structured interviews and primary and secondary document research on seven reform episodes during 1995-2009, it finds that the EES altered Greek and Portuguese employment policies by empowering policy entrepreneurs and, when the latter were absent, through European Social Fund financial conditionality. While the literature considers policy learning as the chief EES- Europeanization mechanism, little evidence is found herein to support such an explanation. The findings may be relevant for a number of EU policies based on voluntarism and EU funds, such as the new flagship EU initiative Europe 2020. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses and evaluates the Hungarian Presidency of the European Union (EU) during the first half of 2011. According to the article, economic crisis in Greece prompted the marginalization of the rotating presidency during this period, and the Hungarian presidency should be assessed apart from the European Union as a whole. Topics include the European Commission, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the Lisbon Treaty (LT). Crisis management is emphasized.

The article discusses the history, politics and government of the European Union (EU) during the early 21st century. It describes how optimism about European unification based on the successful adoption of the Euro currency was deflated by the rejection of a proposed European Constitution. The subsequent passage of the Treaty of Lisbon is noted, and the enlargement of the EU by 12 members is discussed. The impact of the global financial crisis is also described, with an emphasis on the financial problems of Greece.

The article discusses the sovereign debt crisis of Greece, and its impact on the broader European economy. The scale of the Greek government's problems is said to have been revealed by the beginning of 2010, when Greece's inability to recover economically without a bailout became clear. After several months of negotiation, European Union (EU) leaders agreed on a €110 billion package of loans, co-financed by the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The impact of this financial crisis on the wider eurozone is discussed, and the political repercussions are analyzed.

The Greek sovereign debt crisis of 2010 exposed the weaknesses of governance of both the 'euro area' and of Greece. Successive governments in Athens had failed to overcome endemic problems of low competitiveness, trade and investment imbalances, and fiscal mismanagement placing the economy in a vulnerable international position. Once the market crisis erupted, the European Union's Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank failed to provide a timely and effective response. The implications are threefold: the constraints on domestic reform proved immutable to EU stimuli; the 'euro' is more vulnerable to crisis than previously acknowledged; and the early discussion on 'euro' governance reform suggests that its underlying philosophy has not shifted significantly towards more effective 'economic governance'. This article explores the antecedents and management of the crisis and assesses the outcome. At the EU level, a paradox was evident in the denial of agency and resources that might limit the obligation of states to rescue an errant peer. Domestically, within Greece, the unprecedented external monitoring and policing of its economy - though matched by some initial successes - raises in the longer term sensitive issues of legitimacy and governability, with uncertain prospects for avoiding further crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EMU was an agenda determined outside Greece and it represents the importation of a radical new policy paradigm. In gaining entry into the ‘euro’ system, EMU has been the stimulus to profound change in Greek macroeconomic policy. However, the developing EU agenda on structural reform highlights the dilemmas of policy-making in Athens: the uncertain political commitment; the domestic vetoes from rent-seeking behaviour; and the imprecise external constraint. Threee central questions are raised here. What were the Greek priorities and expectations at the time of negotiating EMU? How did Greece qualify for entry into the euro system?. And how has Greece responded to the post-Maastricht EU agenda on structural reform? These questions relate to fundamental issues of the contemporary Greek state: the capability to bring about reform; the political and cultural impediments to reform by consensus; and the challenges posed by deeper ‘Europeanization’. For the EU, the Greek case raises issues of relevance to the cohesion of the euro area and the management of the enlargement process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the total income transfers between Greece and the EC, taking into account the budgetary transfers and the direct transfers through trade from consumers in the importing country to producers in the exporting country. The direct transfers resulting from both the discriminatory tariff structure and the discriminatory variable levy system are considered. Ex-post figures for the first four post-accession years are presented and the possible direction of their changes in later years, when Greece will adopt the common customs tariff in full and trade between Greece and the EC will be liberalized, is discussed. Finally, the income transfers that result from the harmonization of the jurisdictional principle of indirect taxes are also commented on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the relationship of the European Economic Community (EEC) with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Response of EEC to the Cyprus crisis of 1974; Effect of EEC decision to accept the Greek application for membership; Major aspects of the Cyprus problem.