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In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainstream views in China tend to believe that lower popular support for the DPP shown in the 2008 presidential election indicates parallel declining support for the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). However, this study shows that during the DPP administration of 2000–2008, popular support for the DPP and the TIM has become divergent: at the aggregate level, popular support for the DPP has generally declined since 2000, but that for the TIM has actually increased and then remained stable; at the individual level, Taiwanese people's dissatisfaction with the DPP administration significantly reduced their support for the DPP in 2008, but had no independent effect on their nationalist sentiment. Further analysis of the TIM's support base shows that the supposedly pro-status-quo pan-blue camp actually provided an increasing number of Taiwanese nationalists, which stabilized popular Taiwanese nationalism and weakened the DPP's monopoly of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations across the Taiwan Strait have experienced several cycles over the last 60 years. Tension and crisis seem to come and go, followed by periods of peace and stability. What explains the cyclical pattern of change and stability? How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship? This article examines the last 60 years of cross-Strait relations in light of an interpretative framework of ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Cross-Strait relations are complex, consisting of actors at the domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. With a high degree of economic interaction, the cross-Strait relationship can be characterized as economic integration cum political impasse. This article analyzes the cyclical changes through three causal factors: (a) the role of issue cycles in cross-Strait relations; (b) the impulsive drivers for change; and (c) the structural constraints dampening change. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate 'international space'. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the 'one China' principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that how President Chen Shui-bian's provocative initiatives have impacted cross-strait stability since 2003 generates crucial lessons, not available in the past, for understanding the propelling and constraining dynamics of a cross-strait military conflict in the long run. The lessons are grounded in three interrelated sets of interactive logic: between the Chen Administration and the Taiwan electorate; between Taiwan people's aspiration for an exclusive national identity and their risk-averse proclivity in the face of China's military threat; and between Washington's and Beijing's acts of signaling toward Taipei. Specifically, this article demonstrates that Taiwan's voters at first backed the Chen Administration's provocative initiatives in order to seek a national identity instead of de jure independence, and that such popular support receded dramatically once such initiatives came to be perceived, amidst domestic and international developments, by the voters as drifting away from the identity quest and toward evoking their choice between the status quo and independence. The risk-averse voters turned away from the altered character of the initiatives and thus restrained the reckless politicians, largely because of both Washington's signaling which highlighted the change and the ensuing risk of war, and Beijing's refraining from saber rattling toward Taiwan. The voters' decisions foiled the 2004 and 2008 referenda, and forestalled the DPP in 2004 from acquiring a parliamentary majority necessary for legislating its provocative initiatives such as renaming the country and creating a new constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]