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Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the presence of new presidents in Taiwan and the US, the basic dynamics of the US–China–Taiwan triangle and the dilemmas faced by leaders on all three sides have remained largely intact. This paper looks at how Chen Shui-bian and George W. Bush have tried to change the policies and practices they inherited from their predecessors. Chen has shown himself to be a less provocative president, and Bush has adopted more supportive and sympathetic policies toward Taiwan. Despite their personal inclinations, they have been able to make only marginal changes in their relations with the other, and with China. Domestic political conflicts and competing strategic interests prevent a fundamental change in relations between the US, China, and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the PLA elite perceptions of the United States have fluctuated over time, there has been some regularity in the evolution of their perceptions. Comparing the dominant perceptions of the United States among different generations of Chinese military elites in the PRC, we find that the PLA elite perceptions of US intentions have been foremost influenced by China's strategic interest in a certain period, rather than the level and intensity of bilateral exchanges at the time. Using the case of US arms sales to Taiwan and the case of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, we try to assess how consistent and persistent PLA elite perceptions of the US have been in recent years. While we agree that these outspoken military men cannot be taken on the surface as indicative of China's national policies, we will also point out several important dimensions that are likely to allow the PLA to play a more influential role in setting the agenda for China's strategic interest in the era of Xi Jinping. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate 'international space'. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the 'one China' principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the advocacy of overseas Taiwanese, particularly those in the United States, and their influence on US foreign policy and subsequently upon democratization in Taiwan. It concentrates particularly on the work of a Taiwanese non-governmental, non-profit advocacy group in the US—the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA). This article first composes an organizational history of FAPA by investigating the questions and processes of why and how FAPA was formed at the local level in the US. Further, it analyzes how the organization mobilized its relatively modest local resources in the US through grassroots diplomacy to promote Taiwan's visibility in the US, to influence the US government on Taiwan-related issues, and to attempt to impact upon Taiwan's democratization. Through the presentation of FAPA's organizational history, this article ultimately tries to answer the question of whether a non-governmental organization such as FAPA and its grassroots diplomacy has had an impact on US foreign policy and Taiwan's democratization. Besides adding to the existing scholarly literature on the causes of Taiwan's democratization, this study on the formation and effectiveness of FAPA seeks to contribute to studies on NGOs' or non-state actors' grassroots diplomacy and lobbying efforts on governmental policies. Because FAPA functioned as an important diplomatic channel for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party in the post-World War II era, before it matured into a fully-developed national opposition party in the 1990s and consequently unseated the Kuomintang (KMT) in 2000, this article is also an examination of an opposition movement's informal diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the motives behind the making of the current status-quo and risk-averse Chinese foreign policy. It identifies a three-P incentive structure that is based on the political preservation of the CCP regime, China's economic prosperity, and Beijing's pursuit of power and prestige. These three motives are stable and overlapping, featuring Taiwan and the relationship with the United States as the key issues. Beijing is expected to be motivated by these peculiar motives over the next two decades; but new internal and external developments may greatly change these motives and generate new impetus for China's foreign policy. Although the official line in Beijing is still the mild ‘peaceful development’, after a fling with the more majestic idea of ‘peaceful rise’, the rise of nationalist emotions and demands in the PRC continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes mode ration and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China `s prevailing `good neighbor' policy approach-backed by improvement in US-China relations-provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. it clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder-line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China `s recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China `s policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan `s leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan `s advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross-Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan `s future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan `s future as an entity independent of PRC control Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan `s remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China `s good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan `s long range prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A policy of strategic ambiguity is the fundamental policy of the US toward cross-Strait relations. The US takes very ambiguous positions on its commitment to Taiwan's security, arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan's future status, which are hoped to facilitate peace keeping and stability maintenance in the Taiwan Strait. However, a policy of strategic ambiguity cannot avoid three main troubles in dealing with the Taiwan issue: the dilemma of deterrence; a cross-Strait arms race; and possible military involvement in potential cross-Strait conflict. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis has demonstrated the bankruptcy of this ambiguous strategy. US policy regarding the Taiwan question has been forced to a crossroads. It is high time the US abandoned its strategic ambiguity policy. Clarifying Taiwan policy should be the Bush Administration's top, if not the first, priority. But neither clear commitment to Taiwan's defense, either conditional or unconditional, nor letting Taiwan defend itself are correct directions for US policy clarification. Only supporting peaceful reunification of both sides across the Taiwan Strait is the best alternative, which would serve America's national interest in the Asia-Pacific region better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino–American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino–American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US–PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington–Beijing relations to the breaking point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US has maintained a keen interest in Taiwan's military security for decades, and US arms transfer to Taiwan has become an especially important issue for both China and Taiwan since the normalization of US-China relations. This study attempts to examine US arms transfer policy toward Taiwan since the late 1970s. What factors have been involved in the formulation and implementation of US arms transfer policy? How have structural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, affected the policy? Since the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 allowed continued sales for Taiwan's security and the US-PRC Joint Communique on 17 August 1982 agreed to decrease arms sales to Taiwan, how has the US resolved the contradiction between the two sets of policies? Finally, what is the effect of US arms transfer on Taiwan's national security and defense industry? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 and its implication for United States (US) security policy. Information on US policy for the security of Taiwan; Background information on the crisis; Conclusion.