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In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent increasing socioeconomic and political interactions between mainland China and Taiwan have resulted in a significant number of marriages between the two societies. Why do people cross the Strait to look for a marriage partner? What are the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of such marriages? And what impact do these marriages have on society as well as on the individuals involved? These are the issues we explore in this paper. Analyzing a survey on cross-Strait marriages conducted by the authors, this paper concludes that inter-regime marriages between these two societies predominately involve older Taiwanese males and younger mainland females. The general pattern in these marriages represents an exchange between the intrinsic attributes (age, appearance) of the mainland women and the extrinsic attributes (financial status) of the Taiwanese men. In addition, inter-regime marriages provide a means for mainland women to attain geographic and eventually social mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-à-vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China are of great importance to the development of China and peace in East Asia. However, this subject has not been sufficiently dealt with in a theoretical manner. This paper takes stock of the analytical approaches in the field in an effort to present to the academic world the existing intellectual instruments that interested researchers can take advantage of in cross-Strait studies. Nine approaches are identified. They are: the divided-nation model, integration theory, the power asymmetry model, the vote-maximizing model, the developmental state paradigm, strategic triangle theory, systems theory, political psychology theory, and the cognitive approach. The intellectual roots of these approaches are traced and their applicability to cross-Strait relations examined. Their strengths and weaknesses are also compared. Finally, a synthetic analytical framework is proposed. It is believed that a literature review of this kind is a prerequisite to a theoretical understanding of the cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper 'unofficial' agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of 'One China' by Beijing; and the opening of 'small links' between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the 'One China' principle remain major obstacles to cross-Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross-Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the 'One China' principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross-Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes several of the major challenges that the Taiwanese government will confront during President Chen Shui-bian's second term of office. These include serious strains in relations with the US, a continued deterioration in ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and increased political polarization, ethnic division and gridlock at home. The author suggests that, while these problems are certainly formidable, they should not he exaggerated. Nor should they be attributed solely to one politician or political camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream Opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the motives behind the making of the current status-quo and risk-averse Chinese foreign policy. It identifies a three-P incentive structure that is based on the political preservation of the CCP regime, China's economic prosperity, and Beijing's pursuit of power and prestige. These three motives are stable and overlapping, featuring Taiwan and the relationship with the United States as the key issues. Beijing is expected to be motivated by these peculiar motives over the next two decades; but new internal and external developments may greatly change these motives and generate new impetus for China's foreign policy. Although the official line in Beijing is still the mild ‘peaceful development’, after a fling with the more majestic idea of ‘peaceful rise’, the rise of nationalist emotions and demands in the PRC continues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes mode ration and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China `s prevailing `good neighbor' policy approach-backed by improvement in US-China relations-provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. it clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder-line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China `s recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China `s policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan `s leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan `s advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross-Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan `s future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan `s future as an entity independent of PRC control Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan `s remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China `s good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan `s long range prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most notable feature of the public 'dialogue of the deaf' taking place across the Strait separating Taiwan and China is its zero-sum logic. This logic of one-upmanship in political and security matters dictates that whatever benefits Taipei is detrimental to Beijing and vice versa. Commercial interaction between Taiwan and China, particularly in the broadly defined sector of information technology (IT), is arguably the more powerful driver of cross-Strait interaction today. Two characteristics of this accelerating dynamic of commercial interaction across the Taiwan Strait are paramount: (1) its tight integration into a global IT supply chain; and (2) the extent of symbiosis by which all participants in this global supply chain depend on the worldwide vitality of this economic ecosystem. In interpreting what cross-Strait economic integration in IT portends, political logic may be leading Taipei and Beijing along opposite paths to the same end-point: the presumption that economic integration is undermining, and destabilizing, the cross-Strait economic and political status quo. As a dominant player in global IT, the US has its own stake in a clear understanding of this globalization dynamic and in astutely maintaining its interests as the global IT supply chain continues to extend across the political fault-line of the Taiwan Strait. Non-partisan analysis of the logic of globalization suggests a different outcome for the cross-Strait commercial dynamic than either Taipei or Beijing has publicly credited: its potential to mutually enhance economic prosperity and contribute long-term to stabilizing cross-Strait political interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is a mildly divided society--divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Taiwan, as well as the US, have failed to adapt new practices in response to the paradigmatic changes in the sources and nature of the China­Taiwan conflict. Reflecting the tremendous political and social changes in Taiwan, China, and the world that have occurred during the past 10–15 years, the most prominent source of the China­Taiwan conflict has shifted from power to identity. This article discusses the change of social identity in Taiwan and the re-emergence of nativistic nationalism in the PRC identity. The authors suggest that policymakers on all three sides could begin to re-think the Taiwan issue by taking advantage of the ideas and methods pioneered by experts in the rapidly growing field of conflict analysis and resolution. In this article, the authors apply concepts related to identity used by practitioners in the field of conflict resolution to look at the deeper cultural issues of identity and suggest some more appropriate methods for intervention and resolution of this deeply rooted conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chen Shui-bian has been lauded for his moderation in handling cross-Strait relations but reviled for his vacillation. The most evident case of Chen's unsteadiness is the President's position on the issue of 'one China'. He has been running the gamut from future China' to the latest 'accepting one China is equivalent to the end of the ROC'. This lack of consistency can be explained by factional politicking within the DPP. Since the DPP was created in 1986, it has been quite evident that the party has been polarized into two major factions, the Formosa faction and the New Tide faction. The radical wing got the upper-hand as the overseas independence advocates started to flow back at the beginning of the 1990s. A few years later, the party started to change on its stand on Taiwan independence. The humiliating defeat of the DPP candidate Peng Ming-min in the 1996 presidential election prompted further transition. In the meantime, the weakening of the moderate wing in the DPP put Chen in a very difficult position. The party's leadership on the left had constantly warned their followers of self-destruction should the principle of 'one China' be accepted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July–21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999–18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March–20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June–present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino–American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino–American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US–PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington–Beijing relations to the breaking point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contends that the principle of separation of politics and economics is the policy that Southeast Asian countries pursue in developing their relations with China and Taiwan. Information on the issue on China's missile tests in Taiwan Strait; Three theoretical arguments on the issue; Analysis of the three theoretical arguments.

Examines the policy possibilities and directions for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China in handling its relations with Taiwan. Information on Beijing's and Taipei's policy directives; Possible policy directives appropriate for the HKSAR; Conclusion.

Analyses the effects of the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China in 1997, on the participation of Hong Kong and Taiwan in international organizations. Conditions under which China tolerates co-existence with Taiwan as member of the eleven governmental organizations of 1996; Details on China's influence on Hong Kong.

Looks at the impact which domestic political factors had on Taiwan's bargaining position, at the April 1993 talks between political representatives from China and Taiwan in Singapore. Changes which occurred in Taiwan's political system; Examination of how this domestic political change impacted on Taiwan's policy towards China; Reciprocal influence which the results of that policy had on Taiwan's political transition.

Looks at the origins of the conflict across the Taiwan Strait, by giving an assessment of the differences in perceptions by scholars, officials and the populations on the two sides, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Overview of the tension which mounted in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996; Five areas where disparate views are noticeable and divisive; Possible scenarios relating to the consequences of a breakdown of relations between the two sides.

Focuses on the relations between Taiwan and mainland China. Analysis of growing economic interdependence; Examination of the political divergence; Explanation for the emerging pattern of separated economic and political relations.

Looks at Taiwan's relations with mainland China, focusing on the duality of the cross-strait interaction between the two countries. Identification of the duality which exists; Taiwan's policy towards China as a manifestation and catalyst of the two contradictory processes; Factors which have influenced Taiwan's policy towards China; Speculation concerning the impact of the March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis on the two countries.

Presents an article which focuses on the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and how it affected China. How China's nationalism has affected Taiwan's autonomy; Efforts of Taiwan to deal with China's chauvinism; How Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits feel about the allegation that `Taiwan is Not Part of China.'