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This article discusses a case in which a barrister, diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), was convicted of rape. The defendant argued that he had a reasonable belief in consent, but the court rejected this argument. The article explores the relevance of ASD to the reasonableness of a defendant's belief in consent and the admissibility of expert evidence in such cases. The court determined that while ASD may be relevant in some cases, the specific evidence presented in this case did not support its relevance. The article emphasizes the importance of expert evidence being both relevant and reliable. [Extracted from the article]

A stand-alone strangulation offence was introduced in Queensland, Australia in 2016. One of the elements of the Queensland strangulation offence is that the victim did not consent to the strangulation. This paper reviews the harms and dangers associated with strangulation before overviewing the debates about the use of strangulation during sex. Drawing on focus group discussions conducted with domestic violence support workers and men's behaviour change workers, we discuss four overlapping themes identified in the discussions. These were perceptions that: strangulation during sex is normalised; consent is not informed; it happens in the context of coercive control; and the requirement of consent opens a loophole in the strangulation offence. Considering the issues raised, and the clear risks and harms, we suggest that consideration should be given to whether it is ever possible to consent to strangulation and we consider possible reforms such as following the two-tiered approaches to consent used in the England and Wales law and elsewhere in Australia. We also conclude that law reforms such as these are partial solutions and there is significant need for more community education about the risks and harms of strangulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Furthermore, there was a failure to advise the complainants as to alternative medical treatments and a failure to discuss the diagnosis and treatment of the complainants at MDT meetings. Keywords: Consent; medical procedure; surgery; deception; offences against the person EN Consent medical procedure surgery deception offences against the person 281 286 6 08/09/22 20220801 NES 220801 It has long been established that consent to a medical procedure, including surgical operations, will be valid when that procedure is performed by a medical professional (often referred to as the "medical exemption"). Conclusion The Court of Appeal found P to have deceived the complainants as to the true purpose of the medical procedures undertaken; the consent of the complainants being vitiated as a result. In light of this, it once more appears irrelevant that the complainants' consent was vitiated by the deception of P. Rather, the complainants were simply not sufficiently informed to be able to provide effective consent. [Extracted from the article]

The common law doctrine of mistake of fact or civil law works as denial of offending, but dishonesty works as one of the definitional elements of crimes such as theft and fraud. It is argued in this article that the rulings in R v Barton [2020] 3 WLR 1333 and Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) (trading as Crockfords Club) [2018] AC 391 do not change the doctrine of mistake of fact or civil law but do change the law in respect of mistakes about what is honest. A defendant whose conduct is taken as dishonest according to community standards may well avoid criminal liability if he was genuinely mistaken about a fact or civil law right. It is submitted that since the doctrine of mistake of fact or civil law is already provided for, the law is not expanded greatly by the rulings in Ivey and Barton which merely bring back the objective test of dishonesty that had long been established before the Ghosh test. The decision in Barton is substantively welcome, even though the change in the law arose from a civil law case where dishonesty was not an issue before the court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statistics published by the government in 2021 highlight serious problems in England and Wales with a drop in prosecutions of sexual crimes. Part of this issue is attributed to the complexities around sexual consent and public understanding of it. This article highlights a particular problem in the law around conditional consent. It shows that the law on conditional consent is completely incoherent, complicating efforts to increase public education on the matter. The law is also limited in its protection of sexual autonomy of victims, as well in its protection of victims against pregnancy. Critics of reform warn against overcriminalisation of rape, and against imposing morals on society. However, it is argued that given the current reality of how rape is dealt with in England and Wales, these concerns should not prevent reform to the law of conditional consent. The article ends by arguing that reform should be carried out to make the law on conditional consent more coherent and to take account of pregnancy as a consequence of sexual intercourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last couple of centuries, the English law dealing with sexual conduct has made a decisive shift towards a 'consent-based model' of rape law. But strikingly, deceptive sexual relationships (DSR) have been untouched by this development as lately reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v Jason Lawrence. If rape is defined as sex without consent, then DSR ought to be no exception, because the general proposition of law is that consent induced by deception is no consent at all. In making a case for the criminalisation of DSR, this article (1) arrays the lack of uniformity in court's jurisprudence on DSR and (2) brings along the sexual autonomy theory to support its case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers the recent case of R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971 and the way in which the courts are deciding to interpret the concept of freedom under s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It is argued that the case shines a light upon the lacuna present in the Act with regards to deception and consent, identified by academics when the Act was promulgated. It is suggested that the definition of consent lacks clarity as courts have struggled in its application. The resulting 'so closely connected' test developed in the cases of R (on the application of Monica) v DPP [2018] EWHC 3508 (Admin); [2019] QB 1019 and R v Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971 is not an adequate solution to the problem of deception and consent and potentially muddies the waters further. The article offers a potential solution that might better uphold the ambition of protecting sexual autonomy while adhering to the concept of fair-labelling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: Consent; deception; fertility; non-disclosure; rape; vasectomy EN Consent deception fertility non-disclosure rape vasectomy 622 625 4 12/10/20 20201201 NES 201201 This was an appeal against a rape conviction. It was the prosecution's case that the complainant's consent to sexual intercourse was vitiated by the appellant's deception about having had a vasectomy and that even if he had genuinely believed that she had consented, such a belief was unreasonable. The Court accepted that the jury must have concluded that the complainant had relied on the appellant's deception and that she would not have consented to unprotected sexual intercourse had she thought him to be fertile. [Extracted from the article]

Several high-profile murders of women killed during alleged consensual sex 'gone wrong' have led to widespread calls for reform to prevent the use of what has been termed the 'rough sex defence'. Concerns about the use of this 'defence' are located within broader concerns about the high rates of domestic abuse and fatal violence against women. Lobbyists, campaign groups and members of parliament have drawn attention to the increase in this 'defence' featuring in criminal cases in England and Wales and have consequently proposed two amendments to the Domestic Abuse Bill (2020), namely a statutory prohibition of consent as a defence to actual bodily or more serious harm, including death, and introducing additional scrutiny in charging decisions by requiring the Director of Public Prosecutions to authorise charges of manslaughter (rather than murder) in cases involving rough sex/sadomasochism (SM). This article provides a critical analysis of the use of rough sex/SM in female homicide cases and proposed legal reforms and concludes that the proposed reforms would fail to capture many of the 'rough sex' cases that have come before the courts in recent years and may not have the intended effect. We consider potential alternative approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When women die at the hands of men, a not infrequent defence is that she consented to, or initiated, the beating, strangulation and penetration which contributed to her death. While strangulation has been a typical method of killing in male on female intimate partner homicide 1 for many decades ('thou little recognised), what has changed is men's excuses for their violence. Excuses such as 'She made me lose my self-control in an argument' or 'She was unfaithful to me' are being supplanted by 'She consented to rough sex'. 2 Since the dead cannot speak, nor is there any property in the dead, the defendant's tactic of impugning the deceased's character cannot be easily rebutted, and he, while maligning her in this way, may profit from a lighter sentence. Law reformers, politicians, academics and activists 3 are pressing for legal reform to shut down this misogyny. On 16 June 2020, during the Public Committee stage of the Domestic Abuse Bill, 4 cls 4 and 5 were approved. Clause 4, 'No defence for consent to death', provides '(1) If a person ("A") wounds, assaults or asphyxiates another person ("B") to whom they are personally connected as defined in section 2 of this Act causing death, it is not a defence to a prosecution that B consented to the infliction of injury. (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the death occurred in the course of a sadomasochistic encounter'. Clause 5, 'No defence for consent to injury', provides '(1) If a person ("A") wounds, assaults or asphyxiates another person ("B") to whom they are personally connected as defined in section 2 of this Act causing actual bodily harm or more serious injury, it is not a defence to a prosecution that B consented to the infliction of injury or asphyxiation. (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the actual bodily harm, non-fatal strangulation, or more serious injury occurred in the course of a sadomasochistic encounter'. These two new clauses would prevent the alleged consent of the victim from being used as a defence to a prosecution in intimate partner homicides and non-fatal assault which result in s 47 assault occasioning actual bodily harm, Offences Against the Person Act 1861, or more serious injury. Additional new clauses including, proposing that consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions would be required, in the case of death, to accept a charge to anything less than murder (cl 6); the requirement to consult with the family of the deceased regarding charges (cl 7); the prohibition of reference to sexual history of the deceased in domestic homicide trials (cl 10); anonymity of victims of domestic homicide (cl 11); and anonymity of domestic violence survivors (cl 14); the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk), while sympathetic, said there were difficulties with the clauses in their present form. 5 Of the proposal to make non-fatal strangulation 6 (cl 8) a standalone offence, he considered that 'creating a new offence could limit the circumstances covered, and create additional evidential burdens'. 7 These motions reflect the several debates since October 2019, when MPs, Harriet Harman and Mark Garnier, introduced the 'No defence for consent' amendment to the second reading of the Domestic Abuse Bill. 8 Since men also plead the 'sexual consent defence' on 'first dates', which may fall outside the definition of 'domestic abuse' as set out in the Bill, 9 a loophole also recognised by Alex Chalk at the Public Committee stage, 16 June 2020, this too will be addressed. 10 The murder of Grace Millane, in New Zealand 11 in 2018, murdered on a 'first date' provides such an example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This was accepted by the Court in I Melin i and in doing so made the question of "identity" exclusive of the regulatory environment, or lack thereof, in which these procedures sit. In I Melin i , it appears the Court felt that a broader interpretation of identity could be given without disturbing the authority of I Richardson i . Following this, this issue becomes: has I Melin i extended the scope of I Richardson i (in that it is additional to the older authority) or has I Melin i effectively distinguished I Richardson i (in the sense that it is alternative to I Richardson i ). The Court in I Melin i has left a number of questions unanswered. [Extracted from the article]

Finding the answer to whether consent is present within a sexual encounter has become increasingly difficult for the courts. We argue that this is due to the focus placed on entrenching gender binaries, a conservative sexual ethic and clear offender/victim roles. It should be the case that the court's task is to find the truth of the encounter in coming to a judgment as to the ethical balance, rather than judging the parties' conformity to cisnormative and heteronormative roles. This endeavour is obscured by the court's need to exclude 'sex talk', or otherwise testimony as to the messy reality of the encounter, in favour of asserting gender identity and a procreative understanding of sex. We are, therefore, left in the position where the required information necessary for valid consent is obscured by the courts. We draw on an analysis of cases involving issues relating to consent to sex in order to argue for a judicial approach that is informed by a more flexible understanding of sexual autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A criminal conviction resulting from a guilty plea rather than a full trial is typically justified on the basis that the defendant had the ability to go to trial but instead chose to admit guilt in exchange for a small sentence reduction. In other words, the conviction, and associated waiver of rights, occurred by consent. In this article, I challenge that notion by drawing on psycho-legal research on vulnerability and consent and research on guilty pleas in the USA. I suggest that while plea procedure in England and Wales appears less coercive than the practice of 'plea bargaining' in the United States, aspects of the system are highly problematic and are likely to be leading to non-consensual guilty pleas, through which innocent defendants are pleading guilty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically evaluates the law on bodily modifications and consent in English criminal law. The law on consent to (serious) bodily harm has been looked at on numerous occasions by both academics and the judiciary. The current position is that conduct must fall within one of four broad categories for consent to bodily harm to be effective—surgery, regulated sports, chastisement of children and tattooing and ear-piercing. This article argues that extreme bodily modifications, which involves the infliction of grievous bodily harm, are not permitted when utilising the current category-based rationale favoured by the judiciary. This article posits that extreme bodily modifications are of such social disutility that their criminalisation must be correct. It is submitted that interference with personal autonomy is justified considering the significant inherent risks with such extreme procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The difficulty with accusations of rape when a victim is voluntarily intoxicated has long prevailed in the courtroom. How and where to draw the line of being legally capable to consent has been debated in several cases and by many academics. This article will discuss this dilemma and how it may be solved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written in support of the criminalisation of the dishonest inducement of sexual consent, but existing proposals for criminalisation have been subject to numerous powerful criticisms, including the absurdity of criminalising ‘trivial’ deceptions, the undue impingement on the right to privacy, and accusations of excessive moralism. The aim of this article is to propose a new model for the criminalisation of the dishonest inducement of sexual consent based upon the contract law doctrine of misrepresentation – the Misrepresentation Model for Sexual Consent – that addresses, or at least mitigates the force of, some of the most common and potent criticisms levied against the existing proposals for criminalisation. The strengths of the Misrepresentation Model for Sexual Consent will be shown by comparing the Misrepresentation Model for Sexual Consent against Professor Jonathan Herring's much-debated model. Further, in conceptualising and defending the Misrepresentation Model for Sexual Consent, this article will demonstrate that there is much to be gained for the development of criminal law by drawing lessons from private law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The media has recently given much attention to the ‘stealthing’ trend, undisclosed condom removal during sex and how this may affect consent to sexual activity. This paper seeks to discuss where situations like this sit within the Sexual Offenses Act 2003, and how it may compare to other instances of consent gained in deceitful circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the necessary ingredients for an individual to consent to running the risk of the HIV virus being transmitted through high-risk unprotected sexual intercourse. In order to achieve this aim, an assessment of what should equate to a fully informed consent is evaluated. The article will provide a comparative jurisdictional analysis of the consent requirement in three particularised jurisdictions: England, Canada and the USA. A comparison of relational judicial precepts will follow the discussion of extant law in each country. It will be established that few jurisdictions fully consider the requirements of a fully informed consent. The final part of the article will suggest a bespoke new legislative framework that will account for the circumstances that are necessary for an individual to provide a fully informed consent to the risk of acquiring the virus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to a series of recent successful sexual offence prosecutions brought against transgender and other gender non-conforming people for gender identity fraud, and specifically to Leveson LJ’s judgment in the Court of Appeal decision of R v McNally. The decision is now the leading authority on sexual fraud generally, and gender identity fraud specifically, under English law. The response will take the form of an academic judgment, in this instance a dissenting or counter-judgment. The article will (i) present the facts of the case, (ii) provide some detail regarding the developing jurisprudence of the courts regarding sexual fraud, (iii) preface the counter-judgment with an explanation of why an exercise in academic judgement-writing is valuable, (iv) consider a queer approach to law, and detail some queer principles around which the counter-judgment will be organised and (v) present the counter-judgment, highlighting not only that McNally could have been decided differently, but that it ought to have been decided differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ruling in R v Brown that consent could not be a defence to actual bodily harm or more serious injury unless a recognised exemption applied has been much criticised. When considered exclusively in light of adult sexual activity, such criticisms may appear extremely persuasive. However, the issue of assault within exorcism reveals that there are other contexts in which the arguments appear more complex. This article examines the criminal law relating to consent and exorcism and asks how we should deal with the interplay between the general and the specific when it comes to formulating legal policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the Commission’s 2015 recommendations on the non-fatal offences against the person. Its analysis focuses on three main pillars: (i) it examines whether the current law in this area is in need of modernisation; (ii) it asks whether the ‘ladder’ of non-fatal offences should be reformed in the manner recommended by the Commission; and (iii) it identifies and elaborates on issues which have not been adequately addressed by the Commission in this project, albeit they constitute integral parts of the offences against the person. This paper suggests that the Commission’s recommendations provide a good starting point, but a more comprehensive review of this area is still required. It is submitted that the reluctance of the Commission to deal in more depth with some fundamental issues, such as the codification of the fault requirements, detracts from the overall strength of this project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of consent is a fundamental element within various crimes of different natures. It plays a particularly important role in the crime of rape under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and non-fatal offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. It is within this former Act that consent was given its first statutory definition under ss. 74, 75 and 76, respectively. This article explores the history of consent within sexual offences, the issues surrounding its definition and application, and the lack of consistency in criminal law as a whole. It will be submitted that each of these factors have subsequently led to the consensus that significant clarity has neither been embraced nor achieved by the integration of a statutory definition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consent is one of the most powerful concepts known to the law; in particular, it can provide a defence in the criminal context by converting unlawful conduct to that which is not only lawful but even to be encouraged. Despite this, the task of formulating a general theory of consent in criminal law has not been an easy one, not least because of the different situations in which it operates. Given that consent fundamentally involves the subjective attitude of the person concerned to the conduct in question, this paper sets out to explore the dynamics of consent by considering a number of factors, including the way in which it operates as a defence to different crimes, the problems to which consent gives rise in the criminal context and the emotional factors which can influence someone to grant it. It is argued that the development of the law both from a theoretical and a practical perspective requires a more informed and nuanced concept of consent in terms of the emotional dynamics involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the clock ticked over from 30 April to 1 May 2004 the Sexual Offences Act 20031 came into force and the Sexual Offences Act 19562 was repealed, fundamentally changing the law on sexual offences in England and Wales. Perhaps the most major changes were in respect of consent. This article examines the changes the Act made to three aspects of consent: the provision of a statutory definition, the effect of deception of C on the validity of C’s consent and the role of D’s belief in C’s consent. To this end the article considers the pre-SOA 2003 law on consent, the impetus and proposals for reform, the Act and how it has been implemented by the courts, and finally how the Act could be improved to provide greater clarity substantively and procedurally to achieve the aims which lay behind the reform of consent in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is intended as a final commentary and sequel to two earlier articles in this journal that have examined the arcane and circular wording of s. 37AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and its patent incompatibility with ss 36 and 38 of that Act that define the elements of rape. In particular, this article will revisit many of the essential points raised in the first two articles in order to afford readers with an appropriate backdrop against which the Victorian Court of Appeal's decision in GC v The Queen will be examined. The article concludes with a strenuous recommendation that s. 37AA be repealed or substantially amended in order to comport with ss 36 and 38 as well as the Court of Appeal's decision in NT v The Queen that significantly reshaped the Morgan principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although it is no longer necessary to show that force was used in order to prove that sexual activity was non-consensual, it remains difficult to prove that rape has occurred where the complainant has been threatened with an adverse consequence other than physical injury. Although, in principle, any threat (e.g. that of job loss or revelation of a secret) is sufficient to vitiate consent to sexual activity, in practice it remains difficult to prove that a criminal wrong has occurred in such cases. This article argues that this gap between principle and practice is the result of the vague approach to sexual coercion in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, along with a continuing societal preoccupation with force as a requirement for 'real rape'. In light of these difficulties, it is argued that consideration should be given to introducing a specific offence of obtaining sex by threats to ensure that non-violent sexual coercion is recognised as criminal harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the court case R. v. Gjoni, wherein the appellant applied under section (s.) 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to present evidence of a conversation between him and another man regarding the previous sexual behaviour of a woman who said he raped her. Topics discussed include the appellant's belief that he had the woman's consent to have sex with her and the jury's consideration of who was telling the truth between the appellant and the woman.

The article discusses a court case for deception as to gender vitiates consent. It also mentions that the appellant, a girl, met the complainant, also female through social networking site and appellant pretends to be a boy throughout. They had intercourse and appellant used a strap-on dildo, commentary from court states that it's a case of penetrative act and saying that deception as to gender will not always vitiate consent but may do so depending on the circumstances is also discussed.

The article discusses a court case wherein a man appealed his conviction of seven offences of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of Great Britain. The appellant argued that there had been no deception as to purpose and that the trial judge erred in omitting to define the term "purpose" in his directions to the jury. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales allowed the appeal.

The article discusses a court case handled by the British High Court wherein the complainant claimed that she was raped by her husband. Alison Levitt, principal legal adviser of the defendant, asserted that there was no realistic prospect of conviction. The claimant accused her husband of forcing her to have sexual intercourse with him after she refused to do it because of his aggressive and violent behavior. The court ordered a judicial review of the case based on the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The article discusses a court case involving reasonable belief in consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. A man appealed his conviction of common assault and rape upon his partner and a further minor offence of criminal damage to her house. He complained against the trial judge's direction to the jury that his mental illness was irrelevant to whether he reasonably believed the complainant was consenting to sexual intercourse. The reason behind the dismissal of his appeal is explained.

This article examines the reasons for the introduction of the extreme pornography provisions in s. 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, whether the provisions can be justified, whether they meet their goals and the problems they raise. It is argued that the provisions should be seen as an expression of benign perfectionism, grounded in respect for individuals, rather than repressive paternalism. The impact of the law is assessed with reference to recent cases and the author considers whether the fears expressed at the time the legislation was passed have been borne out in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the findings of a qualitative study which interviewed 14 barristers about the law-in-action reality of rape cases involving alcohol intoxication. The study aimed to identify how a number of provisions introduced by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 were perceived by barristers, worked in practice and their overall impact in terms of improving the law of rape and specifically, alcohol-involved rape. The article focuses on barristers' opinions relating to the definition of consent as contained in s. 74; the 'consent presumptions', with specific emphasis on s. 75(2)(f); the jurors' perceived response to jury directions and definitions; and barristers' opinions on the need for future reforms in this area. It is argued that certain provisions introduced by the 2003 Act are not always utilised in a way that was intended, have been interpreted and applied narrowly and, in a number of instances, fail to assist the jury. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does a person who is voluntarily drunk remain capable of giving valid consent to sex? The Court of Appeal in Bree held that ‘a drunken consent is still (valid) consent’, though it further recognises that the capacity to consent may evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious. This decision is a move in the right direction, yet this article argues that it has not gone far enough, and that s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which governs these scenarios allows—and even requires—a more drastic interpretation: a drunken consent is not consent when the person is very drunk. Based on a distinction between factual and legal consent, the article starts by setting up the legal framework as set out in s. 74, and developed in Bree and H. It then goes on to criticise the current case law and its interpretation of s. 74 for not being restrictive enough, by examining two possible theoretical rationales, mentioned in the judgments. The first, which is based on an analogy with the law relating to intoxicated offenders, is criticised on the grounds of differences between consent and intent. The second, which is based on the general argument that this position recognises the positive aspect of sexual autonomy, is criticised for its failure to distinguish between claims of normative facts and claims of public policy and for giving too much weight to the latter considerations. From the discussion an alternative, more restrictive position, emerges in line with s. 74 of the 2003 Act, according to which a drunken consent is not consent. This position can be adopted by judges, through the provision of better guidance to juries, but failing that a reform of the law might be needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the provisions relating to consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It considers whether the law in this area now possesses a satisfactory level of clarity following a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions, and concludes that there may be a need for further legislative reform in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines a case involving a teen sex offender. The defendant pleaded guilty of raping a minor. Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was 15 year-old when the crime was committed, the court sentenced him to 12-month detention. The defendant appealed to the British House of Lords, arguing that the conviction was a violation of his right to fair trial and privacy. Legal issues settled by the appellate court when it dismissed the appeal are discussed.

The article discusses a German court case wherein three men appealed against their convictions for jointly causing bodily harm by fighting with another group of young people following mutual provocation. The District Court at Stuttgart rejected the defense that participants had all consented to fist-fighting and kicking. The German Federal Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and ruled that the defense is not applicable for bodily harm caused in such fights.