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The ongoing administrative reform in the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) has included adoption of community-based policing as the main philosophy of the police department since 2012; however, the democratic values inherent in the community-oriented concept have stagnated under the military influences in Myanmar caused by political instability and armed conflicts among the ethnicities of the country. Many research reports reveal that the success of reform with community-based policing is highly dependent on reducing military influences and establishing the police department as an independent organisation. Subsequently, the problem of adopting community-oriented policing has become chronic under the existing democratisation process. By utilising Herbert A. Simon's decision-making study, the current study examined the decision-making process in community-based policing, and found that the problem of stagnation of democratic reform in the police department was caused by the nature of the MPF, cognitive limitations in the decision-making process, and value conflicts, rather than military influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Myanmar's transition towards a limited form of constitutional democracy is taking place in the absence of national measures to deal with the legacy of massive human rights abuses: without criminal prosecutions for historical crimes; without the establishment of institutions for truth-telling; without reparations. This article considers the escalation of violence against ethnic minorities during the early period of Myanmar's democratic transition in the context of the claim that transitional justice has the potential to deter future atrocities. First, the article explains why the military, the democratic opposition, Western states, and the United Nations (UN), all accepted that Myanmar's democratisation should proceed without the establishment of institutions and processes of transitional justice. Second, the article shows how, in the absence of transitional justice, the transitional government attempted to bolster the rule of law by conducting its own investigations into allegations of misconduct by the military and through low-level prosecutions of individual military officers, and explains why this strategy failed. Finally, the article considers the potential impact of recent efforts at the international level to establish accountability, such as the UN Human Rights Council's establishment of an Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, the International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings related to the crime against humanity of deportation, and the case bought by Gambia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for Myanmar's violation of the Genocide Convention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the patterns of parliamentary change observed in Myanmar since a constitutionally sanctioned, partially elected legislature was revived in January 2011. In particular, it poses the question as to whether processes of legislative institutionalisation have taken place in the course of the 2010s. Grounded on ethnographic work carried out between 2013 and 2018 in Myanmar's Union parliament, established in Naypyitaw, the article explores how in the two post-junta legislatures elected in 2010 and 2015 a number of institutional legacies and parliamentary procedures and functions have been both reintroduced and also reappropriated. The findings point to emerging patterns of routinisation of some legislative tasks and duties performed by neophyte lawmakers and parliamentary staff alike. It is argued that, despite persistent capacity and efficiency problems, and a continuing dominance of the executive and the armed forces in the post-junta context, a parliamentary culture has re-emerged in Myanmar. The article concludes by drawing attention to how a process of legislative institutionalisation has been developed, albeit cursorily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 Indonesian presidential elections indicate that ideology played an important role in voting behaviour, as aggregate subnational results seem to mirror the mid-1950s, when Indonesian politics was organised around ideological and partisan groups known as aliran. However, the extent to which these macro-level patterns are rooted in real ideological divisions among Indonesian voters is an open question. This article analyses an original survey specifically designed to measure aliran identities, ideological orientations and political preferences of ordinary Indonesians. Findings indicate that aliran identities are still present and associated with party choice but only loosely connected with political ideology. Most notably, however, political Islam is associated with important political attitudes and behaviours. Islamist Indonesians are less likely to support liberal understandings of democracy, more likely to see economic issues as policy priorities and more likely to support economic redistribution and regional autonomy. This suggests that ideology should receive greater attention in the study of Indonesian politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of political parties in Myanmar’s democratisation process. We argue that the substance of democratisation depends on popular representation through political parties but question their capacity to provide such representation. Examining capacity through the concept of party institutionalisation, we find that most parties have not been able to build effective organisational structures. However, we also find a degree of party institutionalisation in the form of rootedness in society. Political cleavages between those favouring authoritarian rule over democratic rule and Burman nationhood over ethnic notions of nationhood have produced divisions between state-centred parties associated with Myanmar’s authoritarian legacy and society-centred pro-democracy and ethnic parties. Although being less dichotomous than in the past, we argue that these cleavages continue to provide a basis for party identity and rootedness in society. We conclude that further development of political parties and popular representation will be shaped by the relations between parties, the state, and society – where individual parties are shaped according to their tendencies towards state-centred cartel parties or society-centred mass parties.

The results of the recent 2018 general election (GE14) in Malaysia were exceptional. The ruling party -- Barisan Nasional (BN) -- was ousted from power after over six decades of authoritarian rule, by a new opposition coalition -- the Pakatan Harapan (PH). In this historic election, BN lost all the federal states in Peninsular Malaysia except for the two less developed ones of Perlis and Pahang. BN was also defeated in Sabah for the second time since its dramatic recapture in 1995. However, these results are not as surprising if one looks at the outcome from its historical and developmental perspectives. The indication of the breakdown of the one-party dominant state of Malaysia can (at least) be traced back to 10 years ago -- since the 2008 general election (GE12). BN then lost several parliamentary seats in the urban centres, even with a less unified opposition. It had also lost four states on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, and had been fairly incompetent in reclaiming control over Selangor and Penang since that particular election. Five years later, in the 2013 general election (GE13), the results aggravated BN. It had lost its popular votes to the then opposition coalition -- the Pakatan Rakyat (PR). The main objectives of this article, therefore, are twofold. First, it intends to shed light on the recent general elections through historical and developmental approaches by linking them to the electoral results, and political development in Malaysia, respective to GE12 and GE13. Second, it strives to make available for analysis the arguments on how the opposition pact managed to unseat BN in GE14. The analysis in this article is based on the data gathered by the author through a mixture of media studies, library research, and direct observation -- as this author was one of the official observers appointed by the Election Commission of Malaysia for GE14. The main argument of this article on the breakthrough of PH to the federal government is that the opposition managed to reshape the multiparty electoral system to a "two-plus-one party system" from late 2016, which boosted the level of political competition between the two main parties in Malaysia -- namely, BN and PH -- in GE14. Four major factors have been identified as constituting the triumph of PH and the fall of BN in the election. These are: the existence of a credible representative and strong opposition, with the inclusion of Mahathir and two Malay/Bumiputra ("the natives") political parties; the rupture of the elites within the ruling regime; the presence of impactful issues surrounding Najib's administration; and, the advancement of information and communications technology as well as its impact on the emergence of a digital and much more participative society in Malaysia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the dynamics of ethnicity and politics in the 2007 and 2012 gubernatorial elections in Jakarta. Previous research has mostly emphasised the negative impact of ethnicity on politics in the reformasi era, particularly through ethnic polarisation. By closely evaluating the major ethnic groups living in the mega-city, i.e. the Javanese, Betawi and Chinese, the author shows that the relationship between ethnicity and voting patterns is an intricate one that is not static, particularly if one evaluates a commonly overlooked but crucial factor – the time frame. The author argues that ethnicity continues to play a role in elections even though it is less significant than education and flood variables. The relationship between ethnicity and voting patterns is thus very dynamic, being related to the political context at the time of an election. The findings in this paper open up new questions on ethnicity and politics in a plural society like Indonesia.

This study examines the role played by purnawirawan (retired military officers) in political party development in post-authoritarian Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The role of purnawirawan remains a critical research gap in the literature on democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia, particularly in studies which focus on civilian--military relations. The article finds that purnawirawan have had a significant impact on the creation of a new type of party--one which combines militarycentred leadership and civilian-controlled management. This new arrangement has enabled these former military officers to protect their interests. This study contributes to the existing literature on the impact of military reform on the increasing numbers of purnawirawan turning to civilian politics in order to maintain influence via electoral political contestation in the context of democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia is a critical case of liberal democratisation. Most of the country's old dominant actors were included in compromises aimed at democracy and were expected to become democrats by adjusting to the new institutions. The pro-democrats were expected to propel change from civil society. However, the recurrent participatory surveys and follow-up studies summarised herein point to remarkable freedoms, along with deplorable governance and representation. The major causes are biased institutions of representation, plus weak political capacity of the crucial actors of change within modern business and among the middle classes and labourers. Advances presuppose new ways to represent their interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this article is Myanmar’s transition to democracy, which is taking place after almost half a century of military rule. The former military rulers are themselves the architects of transition. This article notes that one of the key challenges faced by military regimes during this kind of transition is the problem of “credible commitments”. In short, the issue is this: a transition will only be successful if it has the support of the political opposition and the public at large. But why should these groups believe in the promises of former tyrants? Problems of credibility and low expectations about the intention and capacity of the military to effect reform can cause destabilisation and undermine prospects for a successful transition. In worst case scenarios, instability leads to a resurgence of authoritarianism, or to a(nother) military coup. This article highlights the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in assisting the transition and stabilisation of Myanmar’s fledgling democracy. The argument is that ASEAN provides a means whereby Myanmar’s leaders can make credible commitments about their intentions in relation to liberalisation and democratisation, lending support to Myanmar’s reformist government at a crucial time in the transition to democracy. The article concludes that under certain circumstances, even regional organisations such as ASEAN, which are not comprised of a majority of democratic states, can (to a degree) influence perceptions about a democratising regime’s commitment to reform.

In political science and in development cooperation, civic organisations (COs) under authoritarian rule are usually seen as supporters of processes that move towards democratisation. However, these organisations are sometimes criticised for their support of those in power. Within this context, critics refer to the fact that many COs have, for example, authoritarian intra-organisational structures. This characteristic clearly limits their potential to be supporters of democratisation processes. In this paper, we proceed from the assumption that Vietnamese COs can be both supporters of democracy and organisations that help to maintain authoritarian rule; they can sometimes even be both at the same time. COs are “polyvalent” (Kößler). More concretely, what COs are and which role(s) they play in the political system is mainly but not exclusively dependent on the impact the state has on them, and is at the same time dependent on the effects that those organisations have on the state.The results from an empirical survey, supported by the German Research Council (2013–2016) and carried out as a co-operation between the Institute of Asian Studies/GIGA Hamburg and the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, suggest the following:- Most Vietnamese COs are hierarchically structured, if not organised in an authoritarian way. They are not “schools of democracy”, in the sense of Tocqueville.- Most Vietnamese COs that have engaged in the welfare provision sector, either willingly or unwillingly, have helped to foster the foundations of authoritarianism.-In the field of economic policies, the COs invited by the state to participate in and contribute to the formulation of policies do help, overall, to secure existing power structures, even though these organisations also help change various economic policies and even though their activities produce some democracy-promoting effects.- In the policy field of gender equality, women’s rights, and rights of sexual minorities, the mass organisation Vietnam Women’s Union supports the state’s respective discourse. Some NGOs active in this policy field are doing both: They support and criticise the state’s discourse on gender norms and the rights of sexual minorities.In the conclusion, we answer the question of which Vietnamese COs can be seen as supporters of further democratisation and which can be classified as obstacles.

The history of democracy is typically a history of struggle against monarchs and other such autocrats. The elevation of one person over others by virtue of blood and birth has come to be seen as anachronistic; yet some monarchies have managed to survive to this day. This paper analyses two examples of the uneasy coalition between popular sovereignty and royal leadership that is constitutional monarchy. Whereas Juan Carlos of Spain has been described as having steered Spain away from dictatorship, Bhumibol of Thailand has come under scrutiny for allegedly lacking a principled approach to democracy. I argue that structural as much as personal factors influenced the ways in which the two monarchies were legitimised – one by positively responding to the modern aspirations of the king’s subjects, giving him a “forward legitimacy,” the other by revitalising the king’s traditional charisma and opting for “backward legitimacy.”

While the general elections in Myanmar in November 2010 were widely condemned, both national and international actors approached the by-elections of April 2012 as a political rite-de-passage to improve relations between the government and the opposition inside, and between the former pariah state and the international community outside the country. An undercurrent to the government-led transition process from an authoritarian to a formally more democratic regime was the development of a politically oriented civil society that found ways to engage in the electoral process. This article describes the emerging spaces of election-related civil society activism in the forms of civic and voter education, national election observation, and election-related agency in the media. Noting that, in particular, election observation offers connections for civil society to regional and international debates, the paper draws preliminary conclusions about further developments ahead of the general elections in Myanmar expected for 2015.

In political science and in development cooperation, civic organisations (COs) under authoritarian rule are usually seen as supporters of processes that move towards democratisation. However, these organisations are sometimes criticised for their support of those in power. Within this context, critics refer to the fact that many COs have, for example, authoritarian intra-organisational structures. This characteristic clearly limits their potential to be supporters of democratisation processes. In this paper, we proceed from the assumption that Vietnamese COs can be both supporters of democracy and organisations that help to maintain authoritarian rule; they can sometimes even be both at the same time. COs are "polyvalent" (Kößler). More concretely, what COs are and which role(s) they play in the political system is mainly but not exclusively dependent on the impact the state has on them, and is at the same time dependent on the effects that those organisations have on the state. The results from an empirical survey, supported by the German Research Council (2013-2016) and carried out as a co-operation between the Institute of Asian Studies/GIGA Hamburg and the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, suggest the following: ∎ Most Vietnamese COs are hierarchically structured, if not organised in an authoritarian way. They are not "schools of democracy", in the sense of Tocqueville. ∎ Most Vietnamese COs that have engaged in the welfare provision sector, either willingly or unwillingly, have helped to foster the foundations of authoritarianism. ∎ In the field of economic policies, the COs invited by the state to participate in and contribute to the formulation of policies do help, overall, to secure existing power structures, even though these organisations also help change various economic policies and even though their activities produce some democracy-promoting effects. ∎ In the policy field of gender equality, women's rights, and rights of sexual minorities, the mass organisation Vietnam Women's Union supports the state's respective discourse. Some NGOs active in this policy field are doing both: They support and criticise the state's discourse on gender norms and the rights of sexual minorities. In the conclusion, we answer the question of which Vietnamese COs can be seen as supporters of further democratisation and which can be classified as obstacles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Review of the edited volume:Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner (eds.) (2010), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesISBN: 978-981-4279-90-1, 359 pages

The article examines the role of political parties in Myanmar’s democratisation process. We argue that the substance of democratisation depends on popular representation through political parties but question their capacity to provide such representation. Examining capacity through the concept of party institutionalisation, we find that most parties have not been able to build effective organisational structures. However, we also find a degree of party institutionalisation in the form of rootedness in society. Political cleavages between those favouring authoritarian rule over democratic rule and Burman nationhood over ethnic notions of nationhood have produced divisions between statecentred parties associated with Myanmar’s authoritarian legacy and society- centred pro-democracy and ethnic parties. Although being less dichotomous than in the past, we argue that these cleavages continue to provide a basis for party identity and rootedness in society. We conclude that further development of political parties and popular representation will be shaped by the relations between parties, the state, and society – where individual parties are shaped according to their tendencies towards state-centred cartel parties or society-centred mass parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the dynamics of ethnicity and politics in the 2007 and 2012 gubernatorial elections in Jakarta. Previous research has mostly emphasised the negative impact of ethnicity on politics in the reformasi era, particularly through ethnic polarisation. By closely evaluating the major ethnic groups living in the mega-city, i.e. the Javanese, Betawi and Chinese, the author shows that the relationship between ethnicity and voting patterns is an intricate one that is not static, particularly if one evaluates a commonly overlooked but crucial factor - the time frame. The author argues that ethnicity continues to play a role in elections even though it is less significant than education and flood variables. The relationship between ethnicity and voting patterns is thus very dynamic, being related to the political context at the time of an election. The findings in this paper open up new questions on ethnicity and politics in a plural society like Indonesia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The focus of this article is Myanmar's transition to democracy, which is taking place after almost half a century of military rule. The former military rulers are themselves the architects of transition. This article notes that one of the key challenges faced by military regimes during this kind of transition is the problem of "credible commitments". In short, the issue is this: a transition will only be successful if it has the support of the political opposition and the public at large. But why should these groups believe in the promises of former tyrants? Problems of credibility and low expectations about the intention and capacity of the military to effect reform can cause destabilisation and undermine prospects for a successful transition. In worst case scenarios, instability leads to a resurgence of authoritarianism, or to a(nother) military coup. This article highlights the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in assisting the transition and stabilisation of Myanmar's fledgling democracy. The argument is that ASEAN provides a means whereby Myanmar's leaders can make credible commitments about their intentions in relation to liberalisation and democratisation, lending support to Myanmar's reformist government at a crucial time in the transition to democracy. The article concludes that under certain circumstances, even regional organisations such as ASEAN, which are not comprised of a majority of democratic states, can (to a degree) influence perceptions about a democratising regime's commitment to reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the general elections in Myanmar in November 2010 were widely condemned, both national and international actors approached the by-elections of April 2012 as a political rite-de-passage to improve relations between the government and the opposition inside, and between the former pariah state and the international community outside the country. An undercurrent of the government-led transition process from an authoritarian to a formally more democratic regime was the development of a politically oriented civil society that found ways to engage in the electoral process. This article describes the emerging spaces of election-related civil society activism in the forms of civic and voter education, national election observation, and election-related agency in the media. Noting that, in particular, election observation helps connect civil society to regional and international debates, the paper draws preliminary conclusions about further developments ahead of the general elections in Myanmar expected to take place in 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of democracy is typically a history of struggle against monarchs and other such autocrats. The elevation of one person over others by virtue of blood and birth has come to be seen as anachronistic; yet some monarchies have managed to survive to this day. This paper analyses two examples of the uneasy coalition between popular sovereignty and royal leadership that is constitutional monarchy. Whereas Juan Carlos of Spain has been described as having steered Spain away from dictatorship, Bhumibol of Thailand has come under scrutiny for allegedly lacking a principled approach to democracy. I argue that structural as much as personal factors influenced the ways in which the two monarchies were legitimised - one by positively responding to the modern aspirations of the king's subjects, giving him a "forward legitimacy," the other by revitalising the king's traditional charisma and opting for "backward legitimacy." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2010, national elections in the Philippines saw front-runner presidential candidate Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III win a landslide victory which set the stage for an orderly transition of power from the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. This article argues that Aquino's victory, rather than signalling a clear departure from the old ways of doing politics or the mere reproduction of established patterns of oligarchical politics, points towards a more gradual and limited change in the mobilisation of voters in the Philippines. This change, it is further argued, reflects in part the rise of "public opinion" as a social fact in Philippine politics and society in the period since the resurrection of formal democratic institutions and regular elections. The article identifies the broad parameters of the rise in polls and surveys in the Philippines, and, drawing on the critical insights of Pierre Bourdieu, examines the nature and significance of "public opinion" itself. However, the argument advanced here is a cautionary one, indicating that, while the emergence of public opinion as a social fact alters political calculations and dynamics associated with voter mobilisation, the politics of public opinion may only have limited transformative potential for democracy in the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]