Search

The article discusses how dialogue between policymakers from various countries can assist in generating learning responding to dilemmas faced when integrating migrants fully within local communities. It considers existing contributions from various forms of international exchanges between policymakers on migrant integration and highlights the importance of generating deeper exchanges incorporating more critical mutual reflection. These dilemmas include minimizing prejudice and discrimination.

This essay examines civic dialogue that is connected to local roots. The conceptual emphasis suggests that locality often houses what one might term monologic tendencies. The conviction of this essay is that without acknowledgment and understanding of what matters to another, that is, of the importance of monologue, the possibility of maintaining a vital public sphere that is open to a multiplicity of ideas and positions is minimal. In this essay, the term monologue is not to be confused with a particular style of communication, but IS the ground of the conviction that one takes into a given discourse. Monologue houses the ground of the conviction that shapes what we seek to protect and promote in a given communicative exchange. Monologue is the creative engine of conviction that shapes the uniqueness of our participation and contribution to any potential dialogic interaction. To illustrate this point, I turn to the Scottish Enlightenment and the insights of Adam Ferguson as he wrote them in An Essay on the History of Civil Society. The essay explicates a series of implications that arise from Ferguson's work and have relevancy to an understanding of civic dialogue that accounts for the local. Ferguson's distinct contribution was his refusal to dismiss the monologic sentiments of places of particularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship of dialogue to integrity. It sets out a traditional philosophical view of integrity, noting that these are predominantly assertive, holding certain principles or values against others, and therefore they do not involve dialogue. Based on more recent views on integrity, which stress agency, the paper then develops a view of integrity based on a threefold view of responsibility. This view is based on dialogue, and with that a greater engagement with plural values and a complex social environment. The paper looks at the nature of that dialogue, and then goes on to examine implications for the practice and theory of dialogue itself. The paper uses illustrations from the Mid Staffs Hospital Trust case and from fiction, with the example of Shakespeare's Henry V. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the theoretical and practical basis for engaging in dialogue with very disadvantaged people. Using a selective literature review, conceptual analysis, and clinical examples, we explore the reasonable limits of dialogue with disadvantaged populations in order to better understand dialogue, as well as to explore ways to effectively involve disadvantaged people in dialogue. Although people with serious mental illness represent only one very disadvantaged population, we suggest that examining dialogue with this population can serve as a test case for dialogue with disadvantaged people more generally. A recovery-oriented approach can support dialogue processes with people who have mental illness, as their recovery may require, or at least benefit from, dialogue. The inclusion of two clinical scenarios serves to highlight differences in clinical and personal recovery outcomes when dialogue is and is not present in mental health care. Furthermore, although it is not required from a standard principles-based bioethical approach, involving people with mental health issues in dialogue can complement a standard bioethics approach, through dialogical bioethics. A dialogical approach goes beyond the standard principles of bioethics by means of a process that allows relevant bioethical principles to be prioritised, based in part on the person's informed choice. Overall, our findings suggest that involving very disadvantaged people in dialogue -- in this case, people with serious mental illness -- is not only possible, it is plausible and can be constructive in relation to a variety of dialogical aims that range from informing to supporting to decision-making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how dialogue between policymakers from different countries can help generate learning which responds to the dilemmas they face when seeking to integrate migrants more fully within local communities. These dilemmas include reducing prejudice and discrimination between those who don't want to interact, and building collective belonging whilst valuing the complexity of diverse individual identities. The article highlights ways in which the ethical dimensions of the dialogue process can interact with the ethical dimensions of the issues under discussion within such policymakers' dialogues. In the process, the article demonstrates how research which adopts dialogical approaches, whilst being critically aware of these ethical dimensions, can help to address the gaps and limitations in existing policymakers' understandings, by generating improved exchanges of learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here, I examine the nature of ethical dialogue from the point of view of its foundations in the critique of the dominant, disinterested conception of ethics, relating this to my 20 year experience corresponding with students taking courses with Pathways to Philosophy, including a prisoner on Death Row, Texas, USA. Ethical dialogue, where we seek the best outcome by our collective lights, is contrasted with activity in the business arena, where traders are assumed to be acting from purely self-interested motives. The role of philosophy as an activity of seeking, in the words of the metaphysician F.H. Bradley, 'bad reasons for what we believe on instinct' is examined from the point of view of our practical interest in learning how to engage in ethical dialogue, as well as the need to defend the theory of ethical dialogue against rival views. From the standpoint of theory, the ethics of dialogue is the conclusion of a three-part dialectical argument involving the refutation of solipsism and the subsequent refutation of anti-solipsism. Looking at ethical dialogue from the standpoint of praxis, it appears that learning ethical dialogue is more like learning to dance than learning an intellectual game like chess. It can't be taught from a book. One learns ethical dialogue by engaging in ethical dialogue. One consequence of this radical conception of ethics is a new version of the problem of akrasia. You have the knowledge and the will, but fail ethically because of your practical inability to engage the other person in ethical dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]