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Formal institutions, most prominently laws, impact society and also the economy by changing actors' behavior. How that impact can be conceptualized is in need of more elaboration. Klammer & Scorsone's (2022) recent publication opens avenues on how to understand the ways in which institutions can over-instruct, under-instruct and ambiguously instruct the behavior of actors. Sources of and direction for institutional change can then be better understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important way for the agrifood industry to continue to feed a growing world population as well as reduce its environmental impact is to extensively adopt Information Technologies that will "datafy" the industry. While the promises of datafication are high, the realization is lagging behind. We identify and discuss from an institutional economics point of view three related issues that help explain needs run behind realization: supply of data is separated from use of data; data quality, interoperability and standardization; and data completeness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suggesting socio-cultural values are selectors of institutions and institutional practices, and institutions in turn are selectors of (economic) behaviors, we investigate what explains the persistence of institutions that were aligned with past socio-cultural values when the values subscribed to in society have fundamentally changed. What, in other words, explains the persistence of obsolete institutions? We do so by investigating the labor market situation for academics in post-communist societies in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efficient knowledge and information transfer within as well as across organizational boundaries are of a proven importance for survival and growth of firms. At the same time, however, on the one hand, knowledge available within organizations is not always used to its full capacity, at times at the considerable detriment of organizations involved. Furthermore, on the other hand, despite the recognized importance of an efficient interorganizational knowledge transfer, many collaborations have not delivered on their promises. Merges and acquisitions deals, for instance, are prone to fail. The goal of this article is to propose and illustrate a conceptual argument why knowledge and information transfer that crosses departmental and firm boundaries, and in doing so often also domain or disciplinary boundaries, is challenging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose to analyze the supply chain not (just) as interconnected firms where products move from primary production, through processing, down to final consumer (user), but rather as collaborating firms that exchange information in order for each to function. This opens the analysis of supply chains up for institutional economic analysis and also allows one to acknowledge that information can be used strategically. Yet, information exchange can also be hampered because of a supply chain's structure—we focus on this. The difficulty of exchanging information is particularly important when an industry and its supply chain newly emerges or is disrupted. In such circumstances the way in which information is presented and used is not institutionalized yet in a way that works for the parties involved. We show the relevance of this approach to understanding supply chains by referencing the agrifood supply chain as it is on the cusp of being disrupted by the extensive use of Information Technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we suggest an institutional economic approach to classifying government policies, thus offering suggestions to improve the expected outcomes of government policy as well. We elaborate the argument for industrial policy-government policy to directly influence investment and resource allocation decisions by private companies. By adopting dimensions for industries that are stable over time, we can suggest which policies are suitable for which industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even when the neoliberal ideology of the free market was more dominant than it now is, the state was involved in economic activities that could be undertaken by private firms. State capitalism takes increasingly diverse forms, including beyond direct, partial or even indirect ownership. This paper briefly reviews some of these forms without claiming to be exhaustive as the shape state capitalism takes differs widely across the institutionalized contexts of countries. We assess state capitalism using Polanyi's double movement framework and argue that this framework needs adaptation to novel forms of state capitalism that include, e.g., state-owned multinationals and sovereign wealth funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How markets and firms function is critically related to what knowledge and information is exchanged between whom, how quickly. Exchange of (symbolic) information needs to be properly institutionalized in order to be understood by others, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, cannot avoid being ambiguous to some degree as well (Dolfsma et al. 2011). Ambiguity allows for the dissent that allows for innovation in the broadest sense of the term. Institutionalization of communication is community-specific. The tension between institutionalization of and ambiguity in communication explains why innovations cannot depart too much from what is known and accepted in a community to be (ultimately) accepted as a legitimate novelty. The view of markets and firms as settings for institutionalized communication and knowledge exchange offers a perspective that institutional economists are well positioned for to offer insights on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa is perhaps more affected by the quality of institutions than that of other regions. We investigate what alternatives managers may have and what their firms would need to function in case the institutional furniture they encounter is of low quality. We find that, in high quality institutional environments, management spending effort to deal with the authorities and to navigate regulations negates the effect of the institutional environment. Managers do not need to spend such efforts. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the positive effect of high-quality institutional environments on firm performance is enhanced by making informal payments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firm survival or reproduction does not occur as a matter of course. Especially under circumstances in which uncertainty and equivocality prevail is firm reproduction potentially problematic. Uncertainty prevails when there is insufficient or inadequate information to assess a situation, equivocality when the information available is multiinterpretable. Firm routines, social networks in a firm, and an organization’s identity can explain how a firm reproduces. We offer suggestions as to which of these will contribute to firm reproduction under what circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In some societies, entrepreneurs coming from outside of a community (i.e., outside entrepreneurs) are more active than entrepreneurs from within the community (i.e., inside entrepreneurs). Institutions and relationships that entrepreneurs entertain may hamper insiders from starting or succeeding. Institutional economics and anthropology suggest that, rather than outside entrepreneurs having more resources, the case may be that inside entrepreneurs could be hampered by existing institutions that blind and social relations that bind. Outsiders, however, may be less inclined to generate societal value in a community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firm reorganizations deeply affect employees. Management can reorganize in different ways, focusing on costs or acknowledging the involvement of employees. The latter implies following a social contract that complements incomplete (formal) labor contracts. Little is known about how the way in which firms reorganize affects their subsequent performance. Should a firm reorganize more socially, keeping the concerns of employees in mind as evident from an existing social contract, or should it focus on control the future direction of the firm and the costs made? We show that reorganizing more socially does not increase firm performance ex post, but taking more time when reorganizing does. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking the idea that institutional reproduction is not obvious and that institutions are vulnerable has significant conceptual implications. Institutional vulnerability can arise through communication between actors in a common language. To apprehend this requires an elaboration of John Searle's (1995, 2005) argument that language is the fundamental institution. Ontologically, language delineates and circumscribes a community. A community cannot function without a common language, and language at the same time constitutes a community's boundaries, allowing for focused and effective communication within a community. Communication through language introduces ambiguity as well, however, and so institutional reproduction, mediated by language, is a deeply contentious process. Communication across boundaries may particularly "irritate" a system, as Niklas Luhmann has argued. How can institutions then be re-identified through change? Searle's general form for institutions is in need of elaboration. We develop arguments by drawing upon Luhmann's (1995) systems analysis and notion of communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economists tend to see the market as a default option for social order and a role for government only when markets fail. Developing a convincing analysis of the role of government in economic processes, however, needs to start by considering government failure in its own terms. Drawing on insights from institutional economics, law and economics and the philosophy of law, emphasizing the necessity of rules for the economy, this paper develops the concept of government failure. The paper identifies and develops four different types of government failure. Government can set rules for economic processes and actors that are (1) too specific, (2) too broad, (3) that are arbitrary, or (4) that conflict with other rules it has set out to address other, related issues (possibly primarily non-economic). Government failure is illustrated in the context of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) law as it relates to Anti-Trust law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From an institutionalist perspective, we identify five sources of policy conflict. Each may explain why policies intended to obtain particular goals for an institutionalized practice may have unintended consequences. We illustrate by analyzing attempts at introducing market-oriented reform in health care provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study makes a number of observations about the way in which the current crisis in particular, but economic crises more generally, are reported upon by the media. Considering terminology used to describe the financial crisis of 2007/2008 by employing a dataset of 956 articles from The Economist, we study what terms are used why, and how they evolve. We consider how the frequency of negative emotional terms and the frequency of negative economic terms increase from the period of no-crisis to the period of the crisis. Increasing incidence lowers levels of consumer confidence. We predict that as the crisis evolves the nature of the terminology used to describe it will change, and that the present crisis will receive a special name, like the "Great Depression" of the 1930s. We explore a number of possibilities, and conclude that the preferred name will be the "Credit Crunch." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]