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Within the heterodox economic literature on pluralism, attention has predominately focussed on epistemic and methodological levels. The response to the question of what ontological pluralism could mean, and its contribution to the debate, remains limited. This paper argues for greater attention to be given to ontological pluralism, not only because it enriches the existing discussions around pluralism in the heterodox literature but it also provides support for a plurality of epistemological standards and methodological approaches. The paper proposes an alternative definition of ontological pluralism based on the work of McDaniel and Turner. Both argue that ontological pluralism should be understood as saying that there are different ways to exist and that acceptance of the semantic characteristics of ontological questions and statements within different ontological discourses are essential in a proper definition. This paper details their definition and explores its consequences with an analysis of the Searle–Lawson dispute on social objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the extent to which the availability of unprecedentedly rich data-sets and the need for new approaches – both epistemological and computational – is an emerging issue for Macroeconomics. By adopting an evolutionary approach, we describe the paradigm shifts experienced in the macroeconomic research field and emphasize that the types of data the macroeconomist has to deal with play an important role in the evolutionary process of the development of the discipline. After introducing the current debate over Big Data in social sciences, the paper presents a detailed discussion of possible and existing interactions between Big Data and Computational Behavioral Macroeconomics. We argue that Big Data applied to economic questions can lead to new styles of thinking and research methods, namely to the development of a new research paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A quantitative turn in history of economic thought is looming. We argue that engineering it consciously is of crucial importance for historians of economics. We also highlight the limitations of quantitative techniques. Yet, the combination of qualitative and quantitative research could substantially enrich our narratives of the development of economics and its practice, of how ideas and tools disseminate and influence other spheres. A failed quantitative turn could lead our field to a house divided and, in the worst case, a civil war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have recently been novel applications of medical systematic review guidelines to economic policy interventions which contain controversial methodological assumptions that require further scrutiny. A landmark 2017 Cochrane review of unconditional cash transfer (UCT) studies, based on the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE), exemplifies both the possibilities and limitations of applying medical systematic review guidelines to UCT and universal basic income (UBI) studies. Recognizing the need to upgrade GRADE to incorporate the differences between medical and policy interventions, the GRADE Public Health Project Group (PHPG) was convened to enumerate and address these methodological challenges. However, in light of our analysis of additional methodological challenges that arise for UCT and UBI studies, we argue that the adaptation of medical systematic review guidelines to economic methodology is far from straightforward and is in fact more challenging than claimed by the PHPG. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconsiders Frank Ramsey's essay on subjective probability (1926) as a consistent way to articulate logic, rationality and knowledge. The first part of the essay builds an axiomatic theory of subjective probability based on ‘formal logic’, defining rationality as choice-consistency. The second part seems to open up different horizons: the evaluation of degrees of belief by ‘human logic’. Because of the interest Keynes (1931) had taken in ‘human logic’, it was considered to be a possible alternative to the formal logic underlying the neoclassical theory of individual behaviour. The analysis of Ramsey's method in the entire paper, the relation between logic and rationality it constructs and the conception of uncertainty it reveals, lead me to note on the contrary that Ramsey's human logic was a complementary logic rather than an alternative to formal logic. Defining a standard to evaluate beliefs formation according to a frequentist criterion, it completes a normative representation of rationality which supports an original theory of knowledge that appears more in line with further developments of neoclassical methodology than with Keynesian economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hayek and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) are often seen as proposing a similar theory of prices. Hayek is seen as proposing to understand prices as information conveyer, incorporating information during the process of competition, while EMH is defined as the fact that all information in a market is integrated into assets prices. This paper explains how a lineage between Hayek and the EMH can be illustrated while taking into account these differences. We introduce in order to defend this claim a distinction between methodological and epistemological differences: methodological differences are seen as the way an author operationalizes his broader conceptions whereas epistemology is defined as the core concepts of his theory. We particularly want to shed light on the homogeneous shift that can be identified in the epistemology of Hayek and the EMH. We conclude that this shift fleshes out the understanding that some authors have of neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1940 Schumpeter wrote a paper entitled: 'The Meaning of Rationality in the Social Sciences', which was intended as a contribution to one of the meetings of a seminar including Talcott Parsons, Wassily Leontief, Paul Sweezy and other Harvard scholars, that he initiated. In this paper Schumpeter develops thoroughly his own conception of rationality in economics. First, this paper is interesting in itself because it relates to contemporary methodological debates on rationality in the social sciences. Second Schumpeter's conception of rationality is linked to his methodological background (both individualistic and holistic), which is rooted in his economic sociology and explains the relationships he stresses between individual behavior and collective entities. In this contribution we present the arguments developed by Schumpeter in his 1940 paper and analyze the reason why his notion of rationality can be seen as a key component of his conception of economic and institutional change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In policy implementation, the knowledge that leads to its success is as necessary as the knowledge of its possible alternative paths. Cartwright and Hardie's approach [(2012). Evidence-Based policy. A practical guide to doing it better. Oxford University Press.] accounts for the first but ignores the chance that a policy may 'deviate' from the desired outcome. The problem lies in whether these deviations lead to substantially negative consequences. The present paper offers a conceptual account meant to complement Cartwright and Hardie's approach. It is argued that a policy maker's decision should not be based exclusively on a policy's chances of success, but also on the consequences of potential alternative results, that is, on what there is to gain or to lose if a policy succeeds or fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1987, George Soros introduced his concepts of reflexivity and fallibility and has further developed and applied these concepts over subsequent decades. This paper attempts to build on Soros's framework, provide his concepts with a more precise definition, and put them in the context of recent thinking on complex adaptive systems. The paper proposes that systems can be classified along a ‘spectrum of complexity’ and that under specific conditions not only social systems but also natural and artificial systems can be considered ‘complex reflexive.’ The epistemological challenges associated with scientifically understanding a phenomenon stem not from whether its domain is social, natural, or artificial, but where it falls along this spectrum. Reflexive systems present particular challenges; however, evolutionary model-dependent realism provides a bridge between Soros and Popper and a potential path forward for economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to bring Austinian themes into methodological discussion about models. Using Austinian conceptual vocabulary, I argue that models perform actions in and outside of the academic field. This multiplicity of fields induces a variety of felicity conditions and types of performed actions. If for example, an inference from a model is judged according to some epistemological criteria in the scientific field, the representation of the world which the model carries will not be judged by the same criteria outside the scientific field. A model can be considered as a standard in a strict scientific framework, while not being used as part of public policies, orvice versa. However, we focus on the dynamics between different fields. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Two important arguments in the methodological literature on experimental economics rely on the specification of a domain for economic theory. The first one is used by some experimenters in their skirmishes with economic theorists, and moves from the assumption that theories have (or ought to have) their domain of application written in their assumptions. The other one is used to play down the relevance of certain unwelcome experimental results, and moves from the symmetric assumption that the domain of economic theory is more limited than a literal reading of its assumptions would suggest. Of course, only one of them can be right. In this paper I criticise the former, and outline some well-known arguments that strongly point in the direction of the incompleteness of economic theory. Some remarks on the role of methodological arguments conclude the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that contemporary macroeconomic and finance models suffer from insuperable epistemological flaws and that their empirical difficulties – which are particularly apparent in modeling market participants' expectations – can be traced to economists' core premise that they can adequately specify in probabilistic terms how individuals alter the way they make decisions and how the processes underpinning market outcomes unfold over time. We refer to such accounts of change as determinate. The first part examines how this core premise has derailed the development of macroeconomic analysis for the last four decades. The second part sketches how imperfect knowledge economics (IKE) jettisons conventional models' core premise and how doing so helps to overcome these models' epistemological flaws. By opening economic models to change, that is, at least in part, indeterminate, and by recognizing imperfect knowledgeon the part of economists, IKE explores the frontier of what empirically relevant mathematical macroeconomic and finance models can deliver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic development and growth are driven by the emergence of new technologies, new products and services, new institutions, new policies, and so on. Important though it is, the emergence of novelty is not well understood. Epistemological and methodological problems make it a difficult research topic. They imply a 'bound of unknowledge' (Shackle) for economic theorizing wherever novelty occurs in economic life. To make progress, this paper takes stock of the problems. The methodological consequences for causal explanations and the modelling of economics dynamics are discussed, and some possibilities for positively theorizing about novelty are outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hutchison's 1938 essay has been mainly interpreted as introducing positivism and ultra-empiricism into economics. Such interpretations misrepresent his position. While he clearly drew on logical positivism, his methodology stems from a more moderate form of empiricism. However the issue at stake is not the exact degree of Hutchison's empiricism, but rather the extent to which such negative labelling has trivialised his position and distracted attention from the main concern of his 1938 essay. This was to mount a sustained and systematic criticism of the traditional abstract-deductive method in economics. In its place Hutchison sought to promote a more empirical, inductive approach. The paper is concerned with demonstrating the extent to which Machlup failed to provide evidence of Hutchison's ultra-empiricism. It thereby seeks to clear the way towards a reappraisal of Hutchison's methodology and towards a reappraisal of its relevance in our post-positivist era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the contribution of Marxian approaches to the evolution of development economics and the reasons for their current state of impasse, and suggests some areas in which this work may still be capable of providing useful contributions. Development economics was one of the few economics sub-disciplines where Marxian approaches were considered to offer a key perspective and had a wider influence on more mainstream analysis. We explore how, during the 1970s and 1980s, Marxian analysis was published alongside other perspectives in development journals, producing theoretical and empirical work analysing the conditions under which capitalism in developing economies would continue to play a developmental role. We then consider the critical engagement with dependency theory that denied the possibility of independent capitalist development, as well as with more orthodox perspectives. The conclusion of leading proponents of Marxian development by the mid-1980s, that such work had reached an impasse with no clear evidence of either theoretical or empirical progress, is then assessed. JEL Classifications: B51, O10, P10 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been considerable discussion lately of the concept of open systems, which has revealed that different participants are using the terms ‘openness’ and ‘closure’ in different ways. The purpose of this paper is to address issues of meaning that arise in this particular discourse, with a view to clarifying both conflicts in usage and the underlying issues involved. We explore the different meanings of openness and closure extant in the literature, as applied at the ontological and epistemological levels, focusing on our own use of the terms in relation to that which prevails in neoclassical economics on the one hand and to the use made of them by Tony Lawson and other critical realists on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the rationality postulate is generally considered the paradigmatic core of economics, there is little agreement about its specific content and methodological status. This paper seeks to clarify some of the ambiguity surrounding the postulate by drawing a distinction between the non-refutable, purely heuristic rationality principle and refutable rationality hypotheses . An alternative, evolutionary outlook at purposeful human behavior is outlined that captures much of what makes the rationality postulate attractive to economists but avoids the ambiguities that have made it the subject of enduring controversy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the epistemological and conceptual foundations on which current attempts to model crises and assess financial risks are based. It draws a distinction between two research programs, in Lakatos' sense: on the one hand, crises understood as structural events within a cycle; on the other hand, crises seen as statistical tail events. The methodological, theoretical and practical consequences of such a dichotomy are exposed. A crucial difference lies in the assumptions about change in the causal processes generating economic outcomes, especially asset returns. Furthermore, this article insists on providing conceptual definitions of key terms that have distinct meanings within the two research programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This note focuses on George Soros's challenge to macroeconomics and finance theory that any valid methodology of social science must explicitly recognize fallibility in a Knightian sense. We use a simple algebraic example to sketch how extant models formalize fallibility. We argue that contemporary theory's epistemological and empirical difficulties can be traced to assuming away fallibility in a Knightian sense. We also discuss how imperfect knowledge economics provides a way to open mathematical models to such fallibility, while preserving economics as an empirical science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the formation of the field of economic methodology in the 1990s, doubts have been raised about its discursive closure from both inside and outside the field. Rather than embarking on a programmatic discussion, I present a historical narrative regarding the conditions of the formation of the field, which may have necessitated this closure. These conditions are found in the role methodological reflections played in the formalist revolution of the 1950s and in its critique in the 1970s. Both episodes gave occasion to, but did not require the import of philosophy of science in the mid-1970s. Since the 1980s, when the field became separately established through post-Popperian methodology, it remains an open question whether this imposition still holds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The methodological debate between Frank Knight and Terence Hutchison is usually framed in terms of the philosophical debates between positivism and intuitionism, or between empirical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. Hutchison's argument was, after all, a defense of the need for empirically-based economic knowledge, using the justificatory framework provided by logical positivism, and Knight was widely known for his defense of the understanding of economic theory often associated with Lionel Robbins. But the dispute between Knight and Hutchison was much more than a battle over the epistemological status of economics' basic postulates. For Knight, Hutchison's positivism posed risks for the discussion at the heart of liberal democracy. Hutchison, also, aimed his methodological criticism of economic theory at a similar target: the economic objectives of all societies would be achieved sooner if planners were guided by an empirical economic science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hayek maintains that models of complexity must consider two closely interrelated factors: the large number of variables and the connections among them. These two conditions, which define complex phenomena, exhibit a different logical dimension. The former (the 'large number of variables') describes complexity in quantitative (numerical) terms; the latter provides a view of complex phenomena in logical-relational terms, and it is evoked to explain the emergent properties of the whole. Despite the close relation between these concepts, the first notion essentially prevails over the latter, delineating a distinctive configuration of the theory. This perspective also emerges when Hayek defines 'dispersed' and 'inarticulate' knowledge, and introduces the concept of the 'explanations of the principles'. Finally, the notion of level of analysis is discussed in order to interpret Hayek's two concepts which define complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a theoretical framework for modeling communication between agents that have different conceptual models of their current context. We describe how the emergence of subjective models of the world can be simulated and what the role of language and communication in that process is. We consider, in particular, the role of unsupervised learning in the formation of agents' conceptual models, the relative subjectivity of these models, and the communication and learning processes that lead into intersubjective sharing of concepts. We also discuss some implications of the subjectivity of conceptual learning in the area of economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]