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This paper analyzes the impact of the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy on the stability of an one-sector AK economy. The monetary authority pegs the money growth factor while the fiscal authority implements a progressive consumption tax. The demand of money is motivated by a fractional liquidity constraint on consumption expenditures. When only the monetary authority operates, the unique steady state is locally indeterminate if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is low enough. When the fiscal authority is introduced, the interaction of fiscal policy and monetary policy modifies significantly the stability properties. In particular, the fiscal authority could either stabilize or destabilize the economy depending on the tax progressivity, the strength of the liquidity constraint and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Our numerical examples further verify those theoretical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the effects of alternative tax policies (a consumption tax, seigniorage tax, and tax switch) on economic growth under different methods of government budget adjustment in a monetary endogenous growth model with a labor-leisure choice and a cash-in-advance constraint which is only imposed on consumption. It is found that the validity of both the Mundell-Tobin effect and the consumption tax neutrality crucially depends on the adjustment methods used to maintain the balanced government budget. In addition, we find that a switch from a consumption tax to a seigniorage tax unambiguously enhances economic growth. This result stands in sharp contrast to that of Ho et al. (J Money Credit Bank 39:105-131, ), in that it does confirm the validity of the qualitative equivalence between the money-in-the-utility-function and cash-in-advance approaches in terms of the effect of tax shifting away from a consumption tax towards a seigniorage tax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

government would like to subsidize an indivisible good. Consumers’ valuations of the good vary according to their wealth and benefits from the good. A subsidy scheme may be based on consumers’ wealth or benefit information. We translate a wealth-based policy to a benefit-based policy, and vice versa, and give a necessary and sufficient condition for the pair of policies to implement the same assignment: consumers choose to purchase the good under the wealth-based policy if and only if they choose to do so under the translated benefit-based policy. General taxation allows equivalent policies to require the same budget. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect of a consumption tax on economic growth using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with money holdings. We show that the neutrality of the consumption tax does not hold in the money-in-the-utility-function model, because a change in consumption taxation induces the substitution of money holdings for consumption, and the money is the net wealth within the OLG structure. An increase in the consumption tax rate lowers (raises) the growth rate under a low (high) monetary expansion rate. On the other hand, in the cash-in-advance model and the money-in-the-production-function model, the neutrality of consumption taxation holds even within the OLG structure, because in these models there is no substitution of consumption and money holdings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the relative wealth-induced status motive in affecting the neutrality of consumption taxation in an optimizing growth model. It is found that a key factor determining the validity of the neutrality of consumption taxation in both the level sense and the growth rate sense is the desire for relative wealth-induced social status. When individuals care about their relative wealth, a rise in consumption tax enhances the steady-state level of capital stock and consumption. Furthermore, if the production function takes a linear technology form as the engine of sustained growth, then increases in consumption taxation raise the economy's long-run growth rate. In addition, an optimal consumption tax policy provides full subsidies to consumption so as to induce the economy to achieve the social optimum and the optimal growth rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the design of a consumption tax in a world of capital risk. The certainty literature discusses two standard options, namely the cash flow method and the pre-payment method (i.e., the wage tax), and finds the two approaches to be equivalent. Models that consider capital risk (via asset choice) reach different conclusions. This discrepancy arises in part due to a different choice of the social discount rate. In light of the failure of the discount-rate argument to resolve the issue at hand, we explore the market certainty equivalence of risky government revenue. We let revenue risks stay in the private sector, and examine the market value of the feasible transfer (e.g., in the form of a public good) back to households. We reach three broad conclusions. First, we find that if the state returns to each household its own tax-revenue risks, equivalence will be re-established as in certainty models. Next, we show that if the state engages in intergenerational risk sharing (e.g., through a system of stochastic tax transfers), the wage tax cannot be construed to be a valid pre-payment alternative to the cash flow or a modified wage-taxation system. Efficient risk allocation across generations under a cash flow tax (or, one that includes future capital gains as well as wages in the tax base) leads to a Pareto improvement over the simple wage tax. Finally, a major policy implication follows; in order to be practicable, a consumption tax would have to be implemented via registered savings accounts much in the fashion of the Canadian registered retirement savings plans program rather than through the pre-payment route. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]