Search

Your search keyword '"Qihong Liu"' showing total 4 results
Start Over Author "Qihong Liu" Journal journal of economics & management strategy
4 results on '"Qihong Liu"'

3. Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets

Author

Qihong Liu and Konstantinos Serfes

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management, media_common.quotation_subject, Price discrimination, Monetary economics, Conventional wisdom, General Business, Management and Accounting, Dilemma, Competition (economics), Carry (investment), Management of Technology and Innovation, Economics, Profitability index, Welfare, media_common
Abstract

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of targeted price discrimination (PD) in two-sided markets. First, we show that equilibrium discriminatory prices exhibit novel features relative to discriminatory prices in one-sided models and uniform prices in two-sided models. Second, we compare the profitability of perfect PD, relative to uniform prices in a two-sided market. The conventional wisdom from one-sided horizontally differentiated markets is that PD hurts the firms and benefits consumers, prisoners' dilemma. We show that PD, in a two-sided market, may actually soften the competition. Our results suggest that the conventional advice that PD is good for competition based on one-sided markets may not carry over to two-sided markets.

Published
2013
Full Text
View/download PDF

4. Quality of Information and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination.

Author

Qihong Liu and Serfes, Konstantinos

Subjects
PRICE discrimination, RESTRAINT of trade, LOSS leaders, REBATES, SMALL orders, CONSUMERS
Abstract

Recent developments in information technology (IT) have resulted in the collection of a vast amount of customer-specific data. As IT advances, the quality of such information improves. We analyze a unifying spatial price discrimination model that encompasses the two most studied paradigms of two-group and perfect discrimination as special cases. Firms use the available information to classify the consumers into different groups. The number of identifiable consumer segments increases with the information quality. Among our findings (1) when the information quality is low, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate arise in equilibrium; (2) after a unique threshold of information precision such a commitment is a dominated strategy, and the game becomes a prisoners' dilemma; and (3) equilibrium profits exhibit a U-shaped relationship with the information quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2004
Full Text
View/download PDF

Catalog

Books, media, physical & digital resources
See catalog results