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This paper examines the impact of changes in the stringency of environmental regulations on productivity growth. We exploit several data sources, including the OECD Environmental Policy Stringency Index and balance sheet information from ORBIS and iBACH, to test the Porter hypothesis, according to which firms' productivity can benefit from more stringent environmental policies. We estimate the regulatory impact over a five-year horizon using panel local projections. To identify the direction of the effects, we estimate CO 2 equivalent emissions for all firms in our sample using a machine learning algorithm. As suggested by the country-level analysis and confirmed by the firm-level analysis, policy tightening negatively affects productivity growth of high-polluting firms and to a larger extent than that of their low-polluting peers. Hence, we do not find support for the Porter hypothesis in general. However, not all policies have the same impact – non-market based policies are the most detrimental to productivity growth – and not all highly polluting firms are affected in the same way – the negative impact is mitigated for large firms, which may benefit from easier access to finance and greater innovativeness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the investment incentives of market-based regulation, focusing on the technology characteristics that different regulatory schemes tend to incentivize. The firms' technology choice is socially optimal if and only if the aggregate emission allowance supply is completely inelastic. Furthermore, in the presence of uncertainty, elastic emission allowance supply, and strictly convex environmental damage, it is optimal to tax investments in technologies that induce a large variance in emissions. Lastly, price elastic supply of emission allowances may either increase or decrease the volatility in the product market, depending on the risk environment the firms face. The results indicate that introduction of permit price-stabilizing measures in an emission trading system will come at the cost of suboptimal technology investments, and may also lead to increased fluctuations in product prices. • I examine investment and technology characteristics induced by environmental regulation. • Firms' technology choice is suboptimal unless the cap on emissions is exogenous. • It is optimal to tax investment in technologies that induce large variance in aggregate emissions. • Elastic emission allowance supply can impact product market volatility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economists tend to view a uniform emissions price as the most cost-effective approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This paper scrutinizes the assumptions in general equilibrium which underlie the established view that uniform emissions pricing is optimal, focusing on economies where society values the well-being of future generations more than private actors. When social and private discount rates differ, we show that a uniform carbon price is optimal only under restrictive assumptions about technology homogeneity and intertemporal decision-making. Non-uniform pricing spurs capital accumulation and benefits future generations. Depending on sectoral heterogeneity in the substitutability between capital and energy inputs, we find that optimal carbon prices differ widely across sectors and yield substantial welfare gains relative to uniform pricing. Realizing these welfare gains, however, requires that the regulator has information on the technology heterogeneity across sectors. Differentiated carbon pricing based on imperfect estimates of technology heterogeneity can yield significant welfare losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a formal model that analyzes the trade-offs between environmental policy and economic growth in a developing economy. The adoption of restrictive environmental policies limits the use of abundant fossil energy resources, which may slow down economic development and thus violate the Right-to-Development. If faster economic growth allows a country to grow out of pollution sooner, less stringent policies are good for growth and even for the environment, having adopted a long-term horizon. Accounting for a ceiling on cumulative emissions can reinforce the argument by providing an additional rationale to phase out pollution. One assumption is crucial for the argument to hold: polluting fossil energy is an essential input over the early phase of economic development, but not in the later phases. Such a discontinuity could result from structural change. We provide empirical evidence for the plausibility of a discontinuity in the elasticity of carbon dioxide emissions with respect to aggregate output, using cross country data, even if it does not appear to be as strong as assumed in the model economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The degree of substitutability between clean and dirty energy plays a central role in leading economic analyses of optimal environmental policy. Despite the importance, assuming a constant and exogenous elasticity of substitution has been a dominant theoretical approach. We challenge this assumption by developing a dynamic general equilibrium model with an endogenous elasticity of substitution that interacts with the relative share of clean inputs in the economy. We find strong dynamic feedback effects arising from endogenous substitution capacity that amplifies the impact of directed technical change and accelerates the transition to a green economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that the effects of this political influence crucially depend on the distribution of carbon tax revenues. If these are transferred to the households, lobbying distorts carbon taxes downwards to reduce the tax burden and does not affect coalition sizes. This leads to higher emissions and lower welfare. By contrast, if tax revenues are given back to the firms, lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes, whereas lobbies in the coalition countries favor carbon subsidies to raise the international commodity price. This reduces the tax difference and the welfare difference between the countries, which reduces the free-rider incentives. Then, lobbying stabilizes the grand coalition and reduces global emissions compared to a "perfect" world without lobbying if the political influence is sufficiently strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate policy needs to set incentives for investors who face imperfect, distorted markets and large uncertainties about the costs and benefits of abatement. These investors decide on uncertain investments according to their expected return and risk (carbon beta). We study carbon pricing and financial incentives in a consumption-based asset pricing model distorted by technology spillovers and time-inconsistency. We find that both distortions reduce the equilibrium asset return and delay investment in abatement. However, their effect on the carbon beta and the risk premium for abatement can be decreasing (when innovation spillovers are not anticipated) or increasing (when climate policy is not credible). We show that the distortions can be overcome by modified carbon pricing by a regulator, or by financial incentives, implemented in our model by a long-term investment fund. The fund pays a subsidy to reduce technology costs or offers financial contracts to boost investment returns to complement the carbon price. The investment fund can thus pave the way for carbon pricing in later periods by preventing a capital misallocation that would be too expensive to correct, thus improving the feasibility of ambitious carbon pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ongoing debate concerning the ranking of taxes versus cap and trade for climate policy begins with Weitzman's (1974) seminal slope-based criterion and concludes that taxes likely dominate quotas. We challenge this conclusion and the intuition behind it. Because technology shocks and pollution stocks are both persistent, a technology shock alters the intercepts of both the marginal damage and abatement cost curves. The ratio of these two intercept shifts is as important as the ratio of slopes in ranking policies. Technology innovations diffuse gradually, strengthening the importance of the ratio of intercept shifts. For plausible parameter combinations, quotas can dominate taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In decentralized environmental governance, local governments are likely to adopt the "beggar-thy-neighbor" strategy to relax regulations at boundaries. This study investigates the impact of China's Joint Atmospheric Prevention and Control Policy (JAPCP) in "2 + 26" cities enforced by the central government on pollution at provincial boundaries. The theoretical model suggests that dual incentives for environmental protection and economic growth may prompt local governments to reduce boundary pollution within the JAPCP-covered area while relocating pollution to uncovered boundaries. Based on Shandong Province data using the difference-in-differences approach, our analysis reveals a 9.6% decline in the air quality at JAPCP-covered boundaries compared to non-boundary areas and a 5.3% increase at JAPCP-uncovered boundaries, which is associated with migration of key regulated industries. Through examining annual work reports, we provide evidence that local governments modify regulatory intensity at various boundaries. These findings indicate that, while regional environmental policies are intended to promote inter-jurisdictional cooperation, the local government responses lead to unintended costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) provides a market mechanism to mitigate carbon emissions and has been introduced in many countries. Its fundamental idea is to make carbon emissions costly. Consequently, firms undertaking cross-border expansions may have to consider this extra cost when entering markets with an ETS. They may avoid these countries or relocate their investment to countries without an ETS. Using a large sample of international firms between 2002 and 2019, we investigate this issue via a difference-in-difference approach. Our results show that ETS implementation leads to significantly less cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) deals in the host countries, indicating an avoidance effect or potential carbon leakage. Further analysis reveals that ETS implementation decreases firms' financial performance and increases market risks, both contributing to cross-border M&A decisions. We demonstrate strong evidence of cross-sectoral differences, where carbon-intensive sectors tend to bear higher costs. This study contributes to the environmental economics and finance literature and provides evidence with policy relevance. • This paper explores the effects of Emission Trading Schemes on cross-border M&As. • ETS implementation is associated with a significant reduction in cross-border M&As. • The introduction of ETS can lead to lower financial performance of the acquiring firms. • Climate policy can significantly influence firms' strategic investment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we assess the effectiveness of early climate policy in emerging economies by causally evaluating the impact of China's Low-carbon City Pilot (LCCP) on city-level per-capita CO 2 emissions and CO 2 intensity of GDP over the period 2003–2017. The idiosyncrasies of the policy design pose significant challenges for causal identification, which we overcome within a synthetic control framework. Contrary to previous contributions, our results suggest that the LCCP had no significant impact on either carbon emissions or intensity. The main takeaway of our empirical investigation is that even in emerging economies, effective environmental policy requires transparent, quantifiable targets, and credible enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the literature on the potential negative employment effects of environmental policy by bringing to the fore a key factor that directly regulates its magnitude: the elasticity of substitution between labor and energy. Using firm-level data from the French manufacturing sector and addressing endogeneity concerns, we provide empirical estimates that point to strong complementarity between labor and energy. We then investigate the empirical relevance of the elasticity of substitution in studying firms' response to changing energy prices. Our findings suggest that the negative employment effects of rising energy prices are largely driven by firms with limited substitution capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of the timing of adaptation on the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for different levels of cooperation. This issue is addressed by solving a three-stage coalition formation game in a Nash-Cournot setting. In the first stage, countries decide non-cooperatively on their participation in an IEA. Then, depending on the timing, countries decide on adaptation and emissions in the second and third stage. The game is solved for three levels of cooperation. Countries can either cooperate on emissions (emission agreement), on adaptation (adaptation agreement), or both actions (complete agreement). When emissions are chosen first, this extension to an emission–adaptation game is a generalization of the pure emission game. However, when adaptation is chosen first, the grand coalition is stable, provided that countries sign a complete agreement. With partial cooperation, stable coalitions are small. The results establish a connection between the strategic role of adaptation, the levels of adaptation of non-signatories and signatories for the different types of agreements and the participation in an IEA. Moreover, the results indicate that the grand coalition is stable even when it significantly enhances net benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article evaluates if and to which extent policy can steer innovation towards eco-friendly technologies. We construct a cross-country dataset on sectoral green innovation and complement it with data on policies designed to address environmental market failures: environmental taxes, regulation, and R&D subsidies. While all of these tools exert a positive effect on green innovation, our IV estimates reveal substantial heterogeneities across policies. Overall, green innovation reacts most strongly to R&D subsidies for renewables, but interaction effects between different policies need to be considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the economic implications of an environmental policy when we account for the life expectancy of heterogeneous agents. In a framework in which everyone suffers from pollution but health status also depends on individual human capital, we find that the economy may be stuck in a trap in which inequality rises steadily, especially when the initial pollution intensity of production is too high. We emphasize that such inequality is in the long run costly for the economy in terms of health and growth. Therefore, we study whether a tax on pollution associated with an investment in pollution abatement can be used to address this situation. We show that a stricter environmental policy may allow the economy to escape from the inequality trap while enhancing the long-term growth rate when the initial inequality in human capital is not too large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study theoretically and numerically the effects of an environmental tax reform using endogenous growth theory. In the theoretical segment, mobile labor between manufacturing and R&D activities, and elasticity of substitution between labor and energy in manufacturing lower than unity allow for a growth dividend, even if we consider preexisting tax distortions. The scope for innovation is reduced when we consider direct financial investment in the lab, or elastic labor supply. We then apply the core theoretical model to a real growing economy and find that a boost in long-run economic growth following such a carbon policy is a possible outcome. Redistribution of additional carbon tax revenue by lowering capital taxation performs best in terms of effciency measured by aggregate welfare. In terms of equity among social segments the progressive character of lump-sum redistribution fails when we consider very high emissions reduction targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce nine papers on sustainable resource dynamics. In addition, we provide analytical results on the effect of stochastic damages on optimal economic growth, the effects of habits and loss aversion on the cost-benefit discount rate, and the effect of a carbon budget and carbon capture and storage (CCS) on optimal investment in technical change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships. The analysis emphasizes, first, the effects of the different geographical relationships among decision makers; and second, the strategic behaviour of the agents. The dynamic game considers a pollution stock (the state variable) distributed among one large region divided in subregions which control their own emissions of pollutants. The emissions are also represented as distributed variables. The dynamics of the pollution stock is defined by a parabolic partial differential equation. We numerically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model that still captures the spatial interactions among agents. We evaluate the impact of the strategic and spatially dynamic behaviour of the agents on the design of equilibrium environmental policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the resource-extraction policy of a government that is lobbied by an environmental organization and an extraction firm from foreign countries. To analyze this situation, we propose a sequential Nash bargaining solution: The government bargains with both lobbies simultaneously. Should this trilateral negotiation fail, it chooses one lobby for a bilateral negotiation. The disagreement point then is to bargain with the other lobby. Finally, should this second bilateral negotiation break down, the government chooses the welfare-maximizing policy. As long as cumulative extraction is low, such that stock-dependent extraction costs are also low and extraction profits are high, the environmental organization has a weak bargaining position, but it takes influence to reduce extraction. Once that cumulative extraction has increased so much that extraction profits are below a threshold, the bargaining positions change, and the environmental organization gets compensated by the extraction firm for not letting the trilateral negotiation fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper develops a general framework for the analysis of environmental shocks in growing economies. Endogenous capital investments allow identifying the dual role of capital as a buffer against shocks and a source of pollution. We study the effects of recurring natural disasters on optimal growth and efficient environmental policies. Emissions may cause continuous fluctuations, entail discrete and recurring jumps, or trigger so-called "tipping points" with large costs to the economy. Closed-form solutions are provided for all the model variants. We discuss possible applications in environmental economics and identify current research gaps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely acknowledged that there is an urgent need for policies that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, the policies implemented by governments are far from sufficient to reach their long-term climate targets. In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework to study the implications of political pressure on optimal climate policy. A key feature of the framework is its ability to capture dynamic inconsistency, which naturally arises from the long time horizon of climate policies and their susceptibility to modifications due to political pressure. Our findings offer a new rationale for why green lobbying can make pollution regulation less stringent. We also show that political pressure from the polluting sector leads to a higher rate of clean energy investment chosen by the government and can shift the energy mix towards renewables in the long run. Similarly, this long-run shift can be caused by political pressure from members of the public who care only about immediate consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a novel method to quantify the market equilibrium impacts of tighter environmental policies. The approach is taken to evaluate the welfare effects of emerging environmental regulations to protect the biodiversity of river ecosystems that put pressure on reducing hydropower generation capacity. A dataset of 129 million bids in the Nordic electricity market is used to calculate how small reductions in hydropower capacity change market outcomes and surpluses hour-by-hour for the years 2011–2022. Reaching the EU Biodiversity Strategy target of 2030 is estimated to reduce 56 MW of hydropower capacity in Finland. Such a change would lead to quantifiable welfare losses of €62 million over time, not counting environmental benefits. Notably, the producer surplus increases by €318 million over time through electricity market price changes, suggesting that instead of lobbying against biodiversity enhancing regulation, agreeing to an industry-wide implementation could benefit both the environment and the firms. Yet the fact that consumer costs increase more than the mere implementation cost reads as a sign of caution when tighter biodiversity policies are introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Population growth has two potentially counteracting effects on pollution emissions: (i) more people imply more production and thereby more emissions, and (ii) more people imply a larger research capacity which might reduce the emission intensity of production, depending on the direction of research. This study investigates how to achieve a given climate goal in the presence of these two effects. A growth model featuring both directed technical change and population growth is developed. The model allows for simultaneous research in polluting and non-polluting technologies. Both analytical and numerical results indicate that population growth is a burden on the environment, even when all research efforts are directed toward non-polluting technologies. Thus, research subsidies alone cannot ensure environmental sustainability. Instead, the analysis highlights the importance of carbon taxes for climate change mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meta-regression models (MRMs) are commonly used within benefit transfer to estimate willingness to pay for environmental quality improvements. In virtually all benefit transfers of this type, a single regression model is fit to all source points in the metadata, and used to produce out-of-sample predictions for all possible policy-site applications. Despite the advantages of this approach over other types of benefit transfer, the predictive accuracy of these MRMs generally leaves room for improvement. In this paper we propose a locally-weighted regression approach to MRM estimation to enhance the accuracy of benefit transfer predictions in an environmental valuation context. We introduce the concept of locally-weighted meta-regression, provide econometric underpinnings, and discuss the construction of weight functions. We illustrate the use of cross-validation to decide between weight functions, and show how this framework can be applied in an actual benefit transfer setting. For our empirical application on willingness-to-pay for water quality improvements, we find that the proposed approach brings substantial gains in predictive accuracy in a leave-one-out setting, and measurable improvements in predictive efficiency for benefit transfer. • Semi-parametric estimation. • Bayesian modeling and methods. • Improved accuracy and efficiency for benefit transfer. • Water quality changes through environmental policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the implications of absolute risk aversion with respect to intertemporal utility, i.e. temporal risk aversion, in the presence of a stylized climate tipping risk affecting productivity irreversibly. Optimal climate policy is more stringent under temporal risk aversion, in order to reduce all present and future probabilities of crossing the tipping point and avoid a situation where all generations are badly off. Temporal risk aversion implies a 30% increase in the social cost of carbon (SCC) under our benchmark calibration and for a 10% irreversible increase in the level of economic damage from climate change. The optimal SCC under temporal risk aversion increases sharply with the level of damage brought by a potential tipping point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract I develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development (R&D) to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil. In equilibrium, the cartel is forced to deter the substitute, which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time. Credible carbon taxes are below the Pigovian level, implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality, much less capture resource rents. Without carbon pricing, the importer curtails long-run pollution using a costly R&D programme. Normatively, climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green R&D programmes only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper presents a model that combines within and across sector channels through which trade affects our environment by embedding heterogeneous firms and fixed costs into a two-sector framework with an endogenous response to environmental policy. In contrast to existing literature that tends to examine these channels separately, the combined framework developed here shows how cross-sector comparative advantage and within-sector responses to trade and environmental policy or factor endowments interact to affect our environment through three channels: changes in output, cross-sector market share, and emissions intensity. In contrast to a single-sector model with neutral productivity, consideration of two sectors allows for trade liberalization to affect the allocation of inputs in each sector and thereby affect total pollution output. The additional consideration of heterogeneous firm responses to falling trade costs will generate endogenous increases in productivity that increase output, reduce aggregate emissions intensity, and moderate the cross-sector resource adjustment, relative to a representative-firm model. Simulation results show how the combined framework can replicate existing empirical outcomes, and provide concise ceteris paribus insights regarding the potential role of trade and environmental policy changes and factor expansion in driving observed outcomes and their contribution to each of the three channels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Leakage occurs when partial regulation of consumer products results in increased consumption of these products in unregulated domains. This article quantifies plastic leakage from the banning of plastic carryout bags. Using quasi-random policy variation in California, I find the elimination of 40 million pounds of plastic carryout bags is offset by a 12 million pound increase in trash bag purchases—with small, medium, and tall trash bag sales increasing by 120%, 64%, and 6%, respectively. The results further reveal 12–22% of plastic carryout bags were reused as trash bags pre-regulation and show bag bans shift consumers towards fewer but heavier bags. With a substantial proportion of carryout bags already reused in a way that avoided the manufacture and purchase of another plastic bag, policy evaluations that ignore leakage effects overstate the regulation's welfare gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract We evaluate three farmer behavioral responses to incentive payments for ecosystem services, specifically a cover crop cost-share program aimed at reducing nitrogen loads in the Chesapeake Bay. Using farmer survey data in Maryland, we estimate a two-stage simultaneous equation model to correct for voluntary enrollment. Econometric model results are integrated with the Chesapeake Bay Program watershed model to estimate nitrogen abatement for the Bay and associated abatement costs. Estimated additionality for nitrogen abatement is 97% for enrolled farmers when only the direct treatment effect on cover crops is taken into account, but reductions in vegetative cover (slippage) and indirect effects on conservation tillage are consequential. Slippage is particularly large among farmers not currently enrolled in the program, indicating that loss of vegetative cover may substantially offset pollution abatement if cost sharing is extended to this group. These findings suggest that unenrolled farmers may not be a low-cost source of pollution abatement as is often assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract We assess how regional rail service affects air pollution in Germany, where rail service is procured in auctions or negotiations. We argue that the procurement mode is plausibly exogenous, and show that auctions deliver stronger rail service growth than negotiations. Instrumenting rail service growth with procurement mode, we find that increasing rail service by 10% reduces carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide pollution by around 1% and 2%, respectively. Sulfur dioxide and ozone, pollutants with no clear link to rail, are not affected. Expanding rail service reduces car and motorcycle use, especially on leisure and shopping trips. The effects of railway services on car and motorcycle use and on air pollution build up over time. Lives saved by reducing pollution via rail service growth are worth substantially more than the required subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental policies often regulate energy-using durable goods rather than targeting externalities directly. How should such indirect policies be set? In this paper, we model the impact of efficiency incentives (EIs) on consumer behavior and analyze the normative implications of these policies in settings with internalities and externalities. We elucidate how the conditionally-optimal EI depends upon key empirical values and we also demonstrate how EIs can be paired with auxiliary policies to achieve optimality across various settings. Our analysis pinpoints the importance of the rebound effect in determining the net impact of the EI on externalities. Thus, our theoretical exposition provides concrete guidance for policy makers and program managers seeking to implement such policies. We further elucidate these theoretical insights through two empirical examples pertaining to air conditioner and refrigerator replacements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their efforts to affect regulations, firms have developed specific strategies to exploit scientific uncertainty. They have manufactured doubt by hiring and funding dissenting scientists, by producing and publicizing favorable scientific findings and by generally concealing their involvement in biased research. We propose a new model to study the interplay between scientific uncertainty, firms' miscommunication and public policies. The government is benevolent but populist, and maximizes social welfare as perceived by citizens. The industry can produce costly reports showing that its activity is not harmful. Citizens are unaware of the industry's miscommunication. We first characterize the industry's optimal miscommunication policy. The industry notably ceases miscommunicating abruptly when scientists' belief reaches a critical threshold. We identify a natural condition under which miscommunication is stronger under a tax on emissions than under command and control. We then analyze research funding. A populist government may support research to enable firms to falsely reassure citizens. Establishing an independent research agency helps limit the welfare losses induced by populist policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We demonstrate how the presence of an informal sector can sharply lower the cost of environmental and energy tax policy through two mechanisms. First, energy taxes indirectly tax the informal sector because even informal firms must buy formal sector sources of energy such as electricity. Second, a revenue-neutral shift in the tax base toward energy can decrease the tax burden on goods which are substituted for by the informal sector. These mechanisms can lead to welfare-enhancing substitution from informal labor into the formal sector. We consider the magnitude of these effects in a stylized model of the U.S. tax system. Even though the U.S. informal sector is relatively small, we find that distortionary costs of energy taxes are reduced by more than half. In developing countries, where the informal sector is typically much larger, the effect we identify here become even more relevant: we find negative gross costs in many cases. Finally, we address two potentially important countervailing effects: the use of informal fuels in developing countries and the potential for informal production to substitute for energy-intensive goods. We show how these different types of informality compete, and find that welfare enhancing effects typically dominate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are commonly promoted as a policy tool to reduce emissions associated with fossil generation, while also stimulating development of local renewable resource endowments. We develop a general equilibrium model of an RPS policy that captures key features such as a fixed factor renewable endowment, substitution across sectors of the economy, and endogenous price responses. We analytically decompose the effects of an RPS into a) a substitution effect, b) an output-tax effect, and c) an output effect. We show that an increase in the RPS can either deliver large resource booms or large emissions savings but not both. Our framework can translate different renewable resource endowments and pre-existing standards across states into economic and environmental impacts to inform current renewable energy and climate policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the time, polluting firms lobby against environmental protection, but there are major exceptions to this rule, for example in the regulation of both ozone and greenhouse gases. Political support from firms can be pivotal for governments trying to protect the environment. I offer an explanation for this phenomenon, suggesting firms behave as they do in order to steal market share from their rivals. I develop a model in which a polluting firm makes a clean technology investment and then lobbies successfully for strong environmental protection, since this will shift market share away from its rival who has not made the clean investment. The key result concerns the impact of lobbying on the equilibrium outcome: for a region of the parameter space, it is only because of firms' lobbying that environmental protection is achieved. This is because lobbying increases a firm's returns to going green, by increasing the market share it can steel. The net effect of this distortion is an increase in welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental policies often include exemptions for some firms, e.g. the small emitters. This paper explores the implications of such exemptions in the case of an emission tax, and in the presence of monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) costs. We develop an analytical framework capturing the trade-off between the cost-effectiveness of a broader tax base, and the savings on MRV costs enabled by a partial coverage. Second-best partial coverage is defined by a threshold value of some characteristic of the firms below which firms are exempted. We characterize the optimal threshold and discuss its welfare implications. Since determining this threshold is demanding in terms of information regarding firm-level MRV and abatement costs, we show how limited knowledge about these costs at the aggregate level can be used in practice to approximate the optimal threshold. We apply this framework to assess the welfare implications of such an instrument in the case of greenhouse gas emissions from European agriculture. The findings indicate that exempting the small emitters may provide significant savings on MRV costs compared to the full coverage, while still incentivizing cost-effective reductions in emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses individual-level data to estimate the labor market consequences of environmental policies. The focus on workers rather than industries as the unit of analysis allows me to investigate previously unobserved outcomes, such as (i) unemployment rates, labor force participation rates, and the natures of layoffs and new hires and (ii) the distributional effects of these policies, both of which are critical to understanding costs and their distributions associated with environmental policies. Exploiting the introduction of a revenue-neutral carbon tax in British Columbia (BC), I find that environmental taxes, though revenue-neutral, tax away jobs disproportionately, more likely from less-educated workers. In particular, the policy increases the unemployment rates of medium- and low-educated males by 1.4 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively. The policy is implemented mainly at the expense of the low-educated: because of these job losses, some engage in temporary and part-time jobs, and, eventually, some, being discouraged workers, leave the labor force, with the caveat that the effects could, though unlikely, be partially driven by an unobserved differential shock to BC's labor market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study oil extraction by a monopolist who faces demand from a climate-aware and a climate-ignorant region. A renewable, perfect substitute for oil is available at constant unit cost. The climate-aware region uses a carbon tax and a renewables subsidy as policy instruments. Due to heterogeneity in climate policies between regions, the oil price path possibly contains two limit-pricing phases. We specify conditions under which a tightening of climate policies results in lower initial carbon emissions. A renewables subsidy and a carbon tax effectively force the monopolist to sell more oil to the climate-ignorant region, during the stage when demand from the climate-aware region has already vanished. We calibrate the model and numerically investigate climate damage and welfare effects of the policies of the climate-aware region. We find that both the carbon tax and a renewables subsidy lower climate damage, even though cumulative emissions are fixed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate behavioral spillovers from environmental policy within the context of a natural experiment on food waste in Sweden. Exploiting the staggered implementation of food-waste collection across Swedish municipalities, we use a difference-in-difference design to measure the causal effect of introducing such collection on another pro-environmental behavior, namely the sorting of packaging waste. Results suggest a positive spillover effect on packaging waste which corresponds to 5–10% of the population average and rises gradually over time, possibly due to slow implementation of food-waste collection in many municipalities. These estimates are unconfounded with a number of shifts in the waste-related incentives facing households, e.g. introduction of curbside collection of packaging waste from single-family homes. Although we are unable to directly account for all such factors, indirect robustness tests provide no compelling evidence that estimated spillovers are spurious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combining time variations, cross-province variations in policy intensity, and variations in pollution intensity across industries, we estimate the impact of environmental regulation on firm exports. We find that in more pollution-intensive industries, stricter environmental regulation reduces both the probability that a firm will export and the volume of exports. Heterogeneous tests show that the impact is smaller for SOE firms and for firms located in the central and western part of China. We also find that the reduced probability that a firm will export is driven by a decline in non-exporters entering the export market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a two-good general equilibrium model of a small open economy to decompose the effect of a country's unilateral strengthening of environmental policy on pollution emissions in the rest of the world, known as emissions leakage. We show analytically and numerically that the level of emissions leakage depends on the level of trade friction in the service sector. In the model, production in the manufacturing sector is associated with pollution emissions, and production in the service sector is clean. In a special case with free trade in manufacturing and no trade in services, no leakage occurs. Allowing for trade in services, we solve for the relationship between trade frictions in the service sector and leakage. At lower levels of service sector's trade friction, leakage from a small strengthening of environmental regulation decreases (increases) if services are imported (exported). Finally, we simulate the model, calibrating the to the Canadian economy to compare these effects’ relative sizes over a range of plausible parameter values. Leakage is about 18% lower when using trade friction levels estimated from the literature rather than assuming no trade friction in services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a multi-sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to account for both the direct cost of regulations on regulated firms as well as the indirect cost associated with loss of variety and factor reallocations. The model derives an analytical marginal abatement cost function, dividing the cost according to these direct and indirect effects, and explores the implications for optimal environmental policy. The model is numerically simulated using parameters for the U.S. manufacturing sector for criteria air pollutants, demonstrating that the direct cost of regulations understates the true cost. Moreover, because marginal abatement costs vary across industries, reallocating pollution across industries to achieve cost-effectiveness can generate modest cost savings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pigovian regulation provides monetary penalties/rewards to incentivize prosocial behavior, and may thereby trigger behavioral effects beyond a more standard response associated with a change in relative prices. This paper quantifies the magnitude of these behavioral effects using data from an experiment on real product choices together with a structural model of consumer behavior. First, we show that information about external effects (products' embodied carbon emissions) triggers voluntary substitution towards cleaner alternatives, and we estimate that this effect is equivalent to a change in relative prices of GBP30.69-165.15/tCO 2 . Second, comparing a Pigovian intervention (GBP19/tCO 2 ) with a neutrally-framed price change of the same magnitude, we find a negative behavioral effect associated with regulation. Compensating this bias would require increasing the Pigovian price signal by up to 48.06/tCO 2 . Finally, based on a cross-product comparison, we show that the magnitude of behavioral effects declines with substitutability between clean and dirty product alternatives, a measure of effort to reduce emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subglobal and subnational greenhouse gas policies are often thought to be less effective than comprehensive policies as production and emissions of trade exposed industries may move from the regulated to the unregulated regions, a process referred to as “leakage”. Leakage negates some emission reductions from the regulated regions. We use detailed electricity generation and transmission data to show that this is the case for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a CO 2 cap-and-trade program for the electricity sector in select Northeastern U.S. states. More specifically, our results indicate that RGGI induced a reduction in coal-fired generation in RGGI states and an increase in NGCC generation in RGGI-surrounding regions. This finding suggests that the pollution haven hypothesis holds for state-level variation in environmental policy, even when compliance costs are low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our analytical general equilibrium model, polluting inputs can be substitutes or complements. We study a tax increase on one pollutant where the other faces a tax or permit policy. Our solutions highlight key parameters and welfare effects with gains from abatement plus positive or negative co-benefits from other pollutants in the covered and uncovered sectors. We demonstrate several ways taxes and permits differ. First, the change in taxed pollutant depends on whether the other pollutant faces a tax or permit policy. Also, only with a tax on the other pollutant can a co-benefit arise. The sign of co-benefits depends on the sign of cross-price elasticities and on whether the other pollutant's price is above or below marginal damages. Finally, the other pollutant's tax or permit policy also affects emissions in the uncovered sector (leakage). In a numerical illustration of carbon tax in U.S. electricity, we calculate emissions of CO 2 and SO 2 in both sectors. For plausible parameters, co-benefits are larger than direct [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To explore whether and why people sometimes reject environmental policies that improve individual and collective outcomes, we create an experimental market in which transactions generate a negative externality. Market participants endogenously determine whether to implement corrective policies. We consider three policy instruments (Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and quantity regulation) and two levels of policy efficiency (full and half). We then explore how individual cultural worldviews might contribute to the rejection of policies that correct the market failure. Our results indicate that people often oppose policies that improve their material outcomes, and we find that such opposition is significantly explained by cultural worldviews. Interesting connections emerge between individual worldviews and specific policy instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study explores the technological interdependencies between green and non-green inventions. First, we look at whether inventive activities in environmentally-friendly domains depend on patenting in related technological domains that are not green. Based on patent data filed over the 1978–2014 period, we estimate a spatial autoregressive model using co-occurrence matrices to capture technological interdependencies. Our first finding highlights that the development of green technologies strongly relies on advances in other green and in particular non-green technological domains, whose relevance for the green economy is usually neglected. Building on this insight, we detect the non-green interdependent technologies that co-occur with green ones and assess whether environmental policies affect this particular instantiation of technologies at the country level. The results of the instrumental variable approach confirm that while environmental policies spur green patenting, they do not displace the development of the non-green technological pillars upon which green inventions develop. However, at the same time, environmental policies do not enhance patenting in non-green interdependent technologies which would speed-up the transition towards sustainable economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Promoting investment in low carbon "clean" sectors has gained popularity over the last years under the heading of sustainable finance, at the same time raising concerns about adverse welfare effects of such policies. We analyze the political economy of subsidizing investment in "clean" industries in a stylized two-sector small open economy model with irreversible investment and reelection risks. We show that sustainable finance has a welfare cost if more targeted climate policy instruments are available. However, sustainable finance may be used by incumbent governments as an instrument to influence environmental policy decisions of future governments, which may have different preferences. Our model also offers an explanation for the political polarization about sustainable finance and climate policy currently observed in the United States. • We analyze impacts of tax-favoring capital invested in "clean" sectors. • Our approach considers a two-sector small open economy model. • Commitment to future environmental policies is preferred to sustainable finance. • Sustainable finance can induce stricter policies of future governments. • Our model sheds light on the polarization in the debate about such policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]