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Most governments aim for net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050, but none know fully how to get there. The papers in this special issue examine the role of climate governance for climate action, addressing three research questions: a) what characterizes enduring climate governance, b) which factors drive climate governance developments, and c) how can these be sustained within the polity? In this introductory article, we present three ideal-typical models of climate governance that provide answers to these questions. The models are, respectively, the market failure, the socio-technological transition, and the public support models. Political science, as a discipline, is ideally suited to contribute to the further development of the public support model, which bears much promise for sustaining the climate and energy transition. The models and the special issue's contributions highlight two concepts as crucial regarding climate governance: complexity and consensus. These concepts can be mutually constitutive: policy packages addressing the complexity of the climate question, including its (heterogenous) societal dimensions, will have a greater chance of being more efficacious and less contested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement on climate change adopted in December 2015 reflects EU policy objectives to large extent. To find an explanation, we develop a general framework that incorporates both structural and actor-/process-related factors, paying particular attention to negotiation strategy and diplomacy. On this basis, we argue that the high level of EU goal achievement in Paris resulted from the interplay of (1) evolving international structures, (2) effective EU strategy fitting these structures and domestic politics, and (3) favourable situational circumstances. While the EU arguably pushed others to their limits, downscaled ambitions also meant that it accepted a Paris Agreement that is insufficient by itself and needs to be strengthened quickly. The application of our conceptual framework to the Paris Agreement demonstrates its added value and that it can build the basis of a fresh programme of work comparing the EU’s performance in international institutions/negotiations across time and policy fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While in 2007 the European Commission suggested a national binding target of 20 per cent for the renewable energy share of European Union (EU) energy consumption by 2020, its proposal of January 2014 for the follow-up period until 2030 is less ambitious: first, the suggested 27 per cent share of renewables is only slightly above the expected level of 24.4 per cent which would be achieved by the implementation of current policies; and second, the target is not legally obligatory for the member states. This article argues that the less-ambitious target is explained by changed context conditions for the EU's climate and renewable energy policy, whereas the abandonment of the legally binding force of the target for the member states is the result of the bargaining strategy employed by the energy commissioner. This illustration of a commissioner's individual influence has so far been neglected by the literature on the European Commission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]