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European Union (EU) negotiations take place within the framework of a set of formal and informal institutions. Member states negotiate in the organizational context of the Council and the European Council, take decisions through alternative procedures and decision rules, and sustain a set of norms for the conduct of negotiations. While the effects of these institutions on negotiation behaviour and outcomes have received extensive attention, the question of why these particular institutions have been established or evolved remains underexplored. This contribution makes an argument in favour of systematic attention to the design of negotiation institutions in the EU, and suggests that we should draw on general theoretical approaches to institutional design for these purposes. Moreover, rather than engaging in the exercise of trying to prove or falsify theoretical approaches, we should exploit the potential for explanatory complementarities in concrete empirical domains. To this end, the paper advances a domain-of-application approach to institutional design and illustrates its applicability to EU negotiation institutions through four empirical illustrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups' capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite extensive research examining the implications of European integration, the determinants of national adaptation to EU legislation remain poorly understood. There is particular debate as to whether successful adaptation is determined by the compatibility of national and European procedures and practices ('goodness-of-fit'), or domestic institutional veto points. When implementing the Packaging Waste Directive, Britain introduced new legislation swiftly despite severe mismatches between European and national standards and regulatory styles. However, the German government encountered prolonged difficulties negotiating domestic veto points despite making only incremental changes to existing legislation. Whilst this contradicts 'goodness-of-fit' explanations of integration, the situation was reversed for implementation of the Directive's environmental objectives, with Germany exceeding European requirements but Britain struggling to achieve compliance. It is argued that although institutional vetoes are important during transposition, national resistance is often prompted by poor policy fit during both legal and practical implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A curious interconnectedness/consent conundrum marks today's world. Whereas states and societies are becoming more closely interconnected, increased proximity need not increase popular acceptance of federal democracy. Nowhere is this conundrum more apparent than in the European Union. The EU is engaged in a process of democratic federalization, but this process is clearly shaped by the interconnectedness/consent conundrum. In the EU democratic federalization unfolds under conditions of polity contestation. This article discusses what we may learn about democratic federalization from reflecting on the EU experience. For that we need adequate analytical tools because no ready-made analytical framework that fully captures democratic federalization is available, certainly not one that is amenable toward resolving the interconnectedness/consent conundrum. This article provides the bare bones of such a framework. The framework consists of the core components or dimensions of democratic federalization, which are devised to address the specific challenges that the interconnectedness/consent conundrum raises. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The recent economic crisis has brought into focus how even open and highly interdependent economies in the European Union try to govern their economies according to territorially defined interests. The aim of this article is to examine an area, online gambling, with the technological and legal conditions that challenge approaches that favour economic patriotism. The article compares two cases, the United Kingdom and Italy, that represent two different models of economic governance to argue that they are similar in which interests they seek to protect and at which level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article offers a first comprehensive overview of the workings of enhanced cooperation in the European Union (EU). Although this form of secondary law differentiation exists since the Amsterdam Treaty, it has only rarely been used so far. In the article, we formulate a theory of when and why enhanced cooperation is used in EU decision-making. Our theory builds on rationalist institutionalism focussing on institutions, preference constellations and the externality structure of policies. We test the plausibility of our theoretical claims by combining comparative and within-case analyses of nine cases. The empirical findings underline that the usage of enhanced cooperation depends to large degrees on the externality structure of the goods under consideration. The article ends with a short normative evaluation of the enhanced cooperation procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Orthodox integration scholarship failed to identify the factors leading to the euro area (EA) economic and financial crisis because of weaknesses that Horkheimer identified in ‘traditional’ theory: disciplinary splits and a tendency to idealize from particular instrumental perspectives. By contrast, critical political economy offered a plausible and coherent elucidation of the emergent properties and limits of finance-led capitalism and their concrete manifestation in the EA. This contribution both reviews state-of-the-art critical political economy research on the EA crisis and makes a distinct contribution to it. In addressing the puzzle of why not only the Economic and Monetary Union persists despite morbid symptoms but why crisis management is extending and deepening a discredited finance-led capitalism, the contribution synthesizes theories of transnational class formation and inter-state relations, and proposes that Europe is caught in an ordoliberal iron cage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is interested with the legal mobilization of transnational interest groups at the European level (European Union and Council of Europe). It compares the legal and political lobbying strategies of two umbrella organizations – the European Women's Lobby (EWL) and the European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF), which seek respectively to promote the rights of women and those of Roma – focusing on their interactions with European institutions and law. The article analyses the contrasted relationship of these groups to legal mobilization as a rights advancement strategy, shedding new light on how law can be strategically used by both strong and weak civil society actors. Beyond classical factors linked to organizational characteristics and identity, the differential usages of law by the two groups are explained by the role of strategic actors who adapt to the specificities of the system of governance in the two policy sectors – gender equality and anti-discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do European Union (EU) member states decide whether soft or hard law instruments better serve their interests? We address this question in the context of financial supervision. In the past years, financial supervision has changed dramatically from soft co-ordination (2009) to a banking union based on hard law (2012/13). This article draws on insights from the hard/ soft law distinction, the informal governance literature and personal interviews to analyze what factors precipitated change, which actors were central to it and how it occurred. Our main argument is that member states' power, perceptions of uncertainty, distributive conflict, as well as the interests of the domestic banking industry, have shaped the choice of soft or hard law instruments in financial supervision. Our analysis suggests that we need to theorize more rigorously about the sources of member state preferences over formal and informal co-ordination mechanisms in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The jury is still out with respect to whether European Union (EU)-level agencies act primarily as tools of national governments or not, although parts of the literature as well as the legal framework of EU agencies seem to favour the former interpretation. We argue that EU agencies which might be able to act relatively independently of national governments and the Council, but not necessarily independently from the Commission, would contribute to executive centre formation at the European level and thus to further transformation of the current political-administrative order. By measuring along several dimensions, we demonstrate that the Commission constitutes by far the most important partner of EU agencies. EU agencies deal (somewhat surprisingly) to a considerable extent with (quasi-) regulatory and politicized issues. When engaging in such areas, national ministries and the Council tend to strengthen their position, however, not to the detriment of the Commission. In addition to the Commission, national agencies make up the closest interlocutors in the daily life of EU agencies, indicating how EU-level agencies become building blocks in a multilevel Union administration, partly bypassing national ministries. We build our analysis on an on-line survey among senior officials in EU agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aims to explain variation between member states in compliance with provisions of a European Union (EU) law. Predictions are derived about the effects of technical fit, discretion, Commission warnings, and conflict in the Council on the probability of member-state transposition of separate EU policy requirements. Hypotheses are tested on the level of compliance of 15 member states with 27 major provisions laid down in the Framework Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). Extensive analysis of documents and reports from key informants provided information on member-state transposition progress at the end of 2004 and 2006. Results show that the domestic adaptation costs to a provision play an important role for member-state transposition success: high levels of fit and provisions granting discretion improve member-state transposition success. Formal warnings by the Commission lead to a better compliance record, while conflict in the Council does not affect the successful transposition of provisions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This contribution argues for extending the public administration turn in EU studies to the civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). First it delineates the research gap with regard to governance networks and sections of the Council Secretariat that fulfil executive and operational management responsibilities for civilian crisis management. Then it highlights the need to look at cognitive factors, such as bounded rationality and learning, in explaining organizational behaviour and change in civilian CSDP. Such a research agenda on the everyday working of the bureaucratic level in EU civilian crisis management would also allow more comparative analyses on administrative processes and reforms in international organizations in the context of multidimensional peace operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a consequence of liberalization policies in the European Union (EU), a number of formerly inward-looking incumbents in telecommunications and electricity transformed themselves into some of the world's leading multinationals. The relationship between liberalization and incumbent internationalization, however, is contested. Three political economy arguments on this relationship are tested. The first claims that incumbents most exposed to domestic liberalization would internationalize most. The second asserts that incumbents operating where liberalization was restricted could exploit monopolistic rents to finance internationalization. The third argument claims that a diversity of paths will be adopted by countries and incumbents vis-a-vis liberalization and internationalization. Using correlation and cluster analysis of EU telecoms and electricity incumbent multinationals, evidence is found in favour of the third hypothesis. Internationalization as a response to liberalization took diverse forms in terms of timing and extent and this is best explained using a country, sector and firm logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diversity of market economies that constitute the European Union (EU) presents both constraints and opportunities for Europe when it comes to shaping the post-neoliberal global economic order. Diversity is a constraint in that it often prevents strong common positions in global negotiations and thus undermines the ability of Europe to exercise its collective hard power resources. Paradoxically, however, the EU's enduring diversity over time has become the source of a different type of power that also provides Europe with opportunities to shape the nature of global economic governance. By reconciling commitments to greater economic openness and extensive multilateralism with national discretion, the EU enjoys 'model power'. This type of power is based in specific institutional innovations within the EU that accommodate internal diversity and allow the EU to exercise important, if limited, influence over the substantive content and rules guiding the management of globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manner in which time is institutionalized is critical to how a political system works. Terms, time budgets and time horizons of collective and individual political actors; rights over timing, sequencing and speed in decision-making; and the temporal properties of policy matter to the distribution of power; efficiency and effectiveness of policy-making; and democratic legitimacy. This article makes a case for the systematic study of political time in the European Union (EU) - both as an independent and a dependent variable - and highlights the analytical value-added of a time-centred analysis. The article discusses previous scholarship on the institutionalization of political time and its consequences along the dimensions of polity, politics and policy; and then reviews dominant perspectives on political time, which centre on power, system performance and legitimacy. These perspectives tie in with diverse theoretical traditions in the study of the EU. Taken together, dimensions, perspectives and theories help to guide time-centred analyses of the EU political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines how the notion of an EU timescape may be developed into a fruitful research agenda. It sets out central tasks involved, including clarification of the concept of an EU timescape; of the key empirical questions to be asked; and of the status of political time in variable-oriented research. The article illustrates the potential value-added of a time-centred approach to the study of the EU by highlighting temporal issues in EU enlargement, differentiated integration and democratization. It concludes with thoughts on the comparison of democratic timescapes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the decisions behind group membership in the European Parliament (EP) using a rational-choice institutionalist framework. Following the goals ascribed to them by Strøm (1990) in other settings, national parties should join the largest group that matches their socioeconomic preferences. Yet, whilst explanations taking national parties as the basic unit of analysis might sometimes suffice, we argue that it is often necessary to consider the influence of individual parliamentarians and existing EP groups. The scope open to these various actors to pursue their interests determines the attractiveness of the various options available to a national party. We illustrate our conceptual framework by reference to the attempt by the British Conservative Party to leave the European People's Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) group, an effort ending in the formation of an extra-parliamentary federation, the Movement for European Reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France traditionally attempted to achieve its national objectives via the medium of European integration by means of a strategy of playing a leading role in shaping institutional and policy developments at the European level. Behind this strategy lay a tension between a desire for a strong Europe and an unwillingness to cede national autonomy to European institutions. However, at least until the end of the 1980s, this tension was successfully ignored and France's European policy proved to be relatively successful. Since that time, however, increasing pressures have brought this tension to the fore. Faced with a need to respond to altered circumstances within the European Union (EU), President Chirac has responded uncertainly. As a result, and for the first time since the 1940s, France faces the prospect of losing the leading role it has traditionally played within European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between the phenomenon known as 'globalization', on the one hand, and the regional integration process undertaken by European Union (EU) member states, on the other. Bearing in mind that the EU single market programme was a more deliberate and radical act of integration than the more haphazard globalization process, the article argues that the relationship between the two is a complex mix of convergence and conflict. The argument is applied to the financial services sector, and in particular the securities industry. The first conclusion is that the EU integration process is compatible with global financial integration. The EU single financial area has not led, and will not lead, to the emergence of a separate European 'bloc'. Indeed, on a number of regulatory issues, the combination of globalization and EU integration has induced convergence and a degree of harmonization between the EU and other jurisdictions such as the United States and Japan. The second conclusion is, however, that this progress towards convergence and harmonization is inherently conflictual and is currently blocked on the key issue of capital adequacy for securities firms. The US, supported by Canada and Japan, has resisted convergence, or indeed compromise, with what it views as unduly lax EU capital standards. Internal EU dynamics, domestic considerations within the US, market-driven pressures and the temptations of regulatory arbitrage have all contributed to the conflictual aspects of the convergence process. The EU and the Basle banking supervisors have now accepted the EU approach to capital adequacy, and the pressure is on the US regulatory authorities to conform to these lower standards or take the risk that trading activity will migrate to where standards, and therefore transaction costs, are lower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]