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Numerous scholars have argued that economic governance in the European Union (EU) has undergone an undemocratic shift as part of the crisis, with accountability moving from parliamentary to executive powers. This paper challenges this view, arguing that the crisis has led to a shift from economic to political accountability. I define economic accountability as the market-led accountability regime enshrined in EU Treaties and contrast it to the current political accountability regime, by which creditor states and monetary institutions have supplanted markets as a forum for rewarding and disciplining market actors. This 'substitution effect' has been sustained by European Court of Justice (CJEU) jurisprudence, with the CJEU positing a functional equivalence between market-driven pressures and political conditionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Europeanization literature assumes that European integration affects domestic policies, politics and polities; yet, the impact on domestic corporatist patterns, which characterize policy-making in small European states, has received little attention so far. While contradictory theoretical expectations exist, this paper argues that European market-making policies tend to weaken domestic corporatist policy-making by offering new opportunities to domestic actors, in particular the executive. This allows them to bypass policy concertation. However, the impact depends on the usage domestic actors make of the European policies and is mediated by domestic factors. A comparison across policy sectors in two countries – Belgium and Switzerland – largely confirms these arguments. This means that domestic institutions such as corporatist policy-making are not only mediating factors in the process of Europeanization, but themselves subject to change. This effect even goes beyond the borders of the European Union, affecting policy-making in Switzerland as well. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper adapts and then uses principal-agent (PA) theory to conceptualize and thereafter to analyse the EU-level development of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), a crucial component of the Lisbon Strategy as a 'governance architecture'. The PA model theorizes the continuous interaction and power struggle between the Commission ('agent') and the member states ('principal') in the emergence and institutionalization of the OMC. It is innovative for several reasons: first, it acknowledges that the member states and Commission interact in a PA logic prior to a contractual agreement; second, it recognizes that the 'principal' does not only control and monitor the 'agent', but also (re-)defines features of the OMC via political initiatives; third, it underlines the importance of the ideational action of the 'agent'. On the basis of the model, two hypotheses are formulated: first, that the 'agent' will be more influential in defining the OMC when it is nascent; and second, that the 'principal' will be more influential in the reconfiguration of the OMC. The model is tested and the hypotheses are confirmed via a longitudinal analysis (1992 to 2005) of the OMC in employment policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe is a heavyweight in global finance. But does it have a presence in global financial governance to match? This paper employs a principal-agent approach to analyse patterns of policy-making delegation in the EU to explore this question. It finds a U-shaped relationship between the extent of delegation and the 'European presence' in global financial governance: when member states either remain in control of policy or delegate extensive competencies, European stakeholders are well represented. In contrast, intermediate levels of delegation can undermine the European presence by tying member states' hands without sufficiently empowering supranational agents to fill the gap. Patterns of delegation are traced to the heterogeneity of member state interests and the pre-existence of international governance arrangements. These arguments about the origins and consequences of delegation patterns are supported by evidence from three core domains of financial governance: banking regulation; accounting standards; and capital market regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the extent of euro area policy convergence during the third stage of EMU. The policy convergence hypothesis from international political economy posits that euro zone national economies should become more similar over time in terms of economic growth, employment and inflation outcomes as a result of using a common currency and taking the same regional monetary policy. Yet the descriptive data show little evidence of euro area policy convergence post-1999. One possible explanation for the lack of macroeconomic convergence within the euro zone is advanced (fiscal policy divergence), and the implications of policy divergence for the long-term viability of EMU are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]