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Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups' capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's (EU's) responses to the economic and financial crisis provided a vigorous illustration for how the role of the Union's core intergovernmental bodies – the European Council and the Council – has evolved in recent years. The European Council has emerged as the centre of political gravity in the field of economic governance. The Council and the Eurogroup fulfil a crucial role as forums for policy debate. The emphasis on increased high-level intergovernmental policy co-ordination is the reflection of an integration paradox inherent to the post-Maastricht EU. While policy interdependencies have grown, member state governments have resisted the further transfer of formal competences to the EU level and did not follow the model of the Community method. Instead, they aim for greater policy coherence through intensified intergovernmental co-ordination. Given its consensus dependency, this co-ordination system can best be conceptualized as deliberative intergovernmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aims to explain variation between member states in compliance with provisions of a European Union (EU) law. Predictions are derived about the effects of technical fit, discretion, Commission warnings, and conflict in the Council on the probability of member-state transposition of separate EU policy requirements. Hypotheses are tested on the level of compliance of 15 member states with 27 major provisions laid down in the Framework Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). Extensive analysis of documents and reports from key informants provided information on member-state transposition progress at the end of 2004 and 2006. Results show that the domestic adaptation costs to a provision play an important role for member-state transposition success: high levels of fit and provisions granting discretion improve member-state transposition success. Formal warnings by the Commission lead to a better compliance record, while conflict in the Council does not affect the successful transposition of provisions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Ideology is widely seen as a powerful explanatory force of behaviour in collective decision-making. Yet, research on the Council of the European Union, the chief legislative body in the European Union, has only recently started to pay attention to ideology. We investigate to what extent formal position-taking can be explained by the ideological party affiliation of the governing parties. The focus is twofold. First, can aggregated coalition patterns be explained by ideological party affiliation? Second, do countries change coalition partners when there is a change of parties in government? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2001 the European Council adopted the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. The story of how conflict prevention became an integral and legitimate part of EU policy and practice illustrates the influence of powerful ideas and successful norm advocacy of a small state managing to punch above its weight in the EU. The aim of this article is to analyse norm advocacy as a potent addition to traditional strategies of gaining influence in the Union. By tracing the process of Swedish promotion of conflict prevention the article explores norm advocacy strategies, such as framing, agenda-setting, diplomatic tactics and the power of the Presidency. The EU institutional setting also provides ample opportunities for a small state to exert normative power, and in areas where great powers are generally regarded as dominant, such as the CFSP and the ESDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]