Search

Background: To reduce their decisional uncertainty, health policy decision‐makers rely more often on experts or their intuition than on evidence‐based knowledge, especially in times of urgency. However, this practice is unacceptable from an evidence‐based medicine (EbM) perspective. Therefore, in fast‐changing and complex situations, we need an approach that delivers recommendations that serve decision‐makers' needs for urgent, sound and uncertainty‐reducing decisions based on the principles of EbM. Aims: The aim of this paper is to propose an approach that serves this need by enriching EbM with theory. Materials and Methods: We call this the EbM+theory approach, which integrates empirical and theoretical evidence in a context‐sensitive way to reduce intervention and implementation uncertainty. Results: Within this framework, we propose two distinct roadmaps to decrease intervention and implementation uncertainty: one for simple and the other for complex interventions. As part of the roadmap, we present a three‐step approach: applying theory (step 1), conducting mechanistic studies (EbM+; step 2) and conducting experiments (EbM; step 3). Discussion: This paper is a plea for integrating empirical and theoretical knowledge by combining EbM, EbM+ and theoretical knowledge in a common procedural framework that allows flexibility even in dynamic times. A further aim is to stimulate a discussion on using theories in health sciences, health policy, and implementation. Conclusion: The main implications are that scientists and health politicians – the two main target groups of this paper—should receive more training in theoretical thinking; moreover, regulatory agencies like NICE may think about the usefulness of integrating elements of the EbM+theory approach into their considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale, aims and objectives: McHugh and Walker introduced a model of knowledge to demonstrate that EBM is a form of scientism that ignores important sources of knowledge thereby impairing the practice of medicine. We study the development of this model and explore additional applications. Methods: Review of the relevant literature and identification of possible areas for fruitful application. Results: We show that the McHugh and Walker model is closely related to the model of evidence considered earlier by Upshur et al. We also indicate that the utility of this model is not limited to showing scientism distorts clinical practice. Several representative applications are identified, including psychotherapy, the Salk polio vaccine trial, and the placebo effect. Conclusions: Priority should be given to Upshur et al for the development of a model that has far‐reaching application to medical epistemology. It is shown that all four of the types of evidence considered—qualitative/personal, qualitative/general, quantitative/general, and quantitative/personal—are required to adequately characterize epistemology in medical research and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background The Users' Guides to the Medical Literature Manual has been a major influence on the teaching and practice of health care globally. Methods The 3rd edition of the multi-authored Manual was reviewed using the principles outlined in Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) texts. One 'clinical scenario' was selected for critical appraisal, as were several chapters; objectivity was enhanced by citing references to support opinions. Results (summary of the appraisal) (1) Strengths: Clinical pearls, too numerous to list. Examples: (i) evidence is never enough to drive clinical decision making; (ii) do not rush to adopt new interventions; and (iii) question efficacy data based only on surrogate markers. (2) Weaknesses: The Manual shares shortcomings of textbooks discussed by Straus et al.: (i) references may not be current, important ones may be excluded and citations may be selective; (ii) often, opinion-based; and (iii) delays between revisions. (3) Notable omissions: Little or no discussion of: (i) important segments of the population: those <18 years of age, >65 years of age and those with multimorbidity; (ii) surgical disciplines; (iii) Greenhalgh et al.'s essay on EBM; (iv) alternate views on the hierarchy of evidence; and (vi) critical thinking. (4) Additional issues: (i) Omission of important references on dabigatran (clinical scenario: chapter 13.1); (ii) authors' advice (Chapter 13.3) to 'bypass the discussion section of published research'; and (iii) the advocacy of pre-appraised sources of evidence and network meta-analysis without warnings about limitations, are critiqued. Conclusion The Manual has several clinical pearls but readers should also be aware of shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction There is increasing concern about the unreliability of much of health care evidence, especially in its application to individuals. Hypothesis Cognitive biases, financial and non-financial conflicts of interest, and ethical violations (which, together with fallacies, we collectively refer to as 'cognitive biases plus') at the levels of individuals and organizations involved in health care undermine the evidence that informs person-centred care. Methods This study used qualitative review of the pertinent literature from basic, medical and social sciences, ethics, philosophy, law etc. Results Financial conflicts of interest (primarily industry related) have become systemic in several organizations that influence health care evidence. There is also plausible evidence for non-financial conflicts of interest, especially in academic organizations. Financial and non-financial conflicts of interest frequently result in self-serving bias. Self-serving bias can lead to self-deception and rationalization of actions that entrench self-serving behaviour, both potentially resulting in unethical acts. Individuals and organizations are also susceptible to other cognitive biases. Qualitative evidence suggests that 'cognitive biases plus' can erode the quality of evidence. Conclusions 'Cognitive biases plus' are hard wired, primarily at the unconscious level, and the resulting behaviours are not easily corrected. Social behavioural researchers advocate multi-pronged measures in similar situations: (i) abolish incentives that spawn self-serving bias; (ii) enforce severe deterrents for breaches of conduct; (iii) value integrity; (iv) strengthen self-awareness; and (v) design curricula especially at the trainee level to promote awareness of consequences to society. Virtuous professionals and organizations are essential to fulfil the vision for high-quality individualized health care globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is frequently portrayed as a value-free approach to knowing what kinds of treatment 'really work.' Since practitioners should help patients to improve their health, and EBM tells us which interventions will work, then it follows that we must practice EBM, offering only those interventions supported by evidence. The primary goal of EBM, then, is an ethical one - to improve health. More recently, EBM's authors have also committed themselves to 'shared decision making' in which evidence plays a role in the clinical encounter, but where patients, motivated by their own values, should have final decision-making authority. Envisioned this way, strengthening the informed consent process, rather than improved health per se, is viewed as the goal of EBM. In this paper, I will explore this shift in EBM's ethics from the goal of improved health towards the goal of strengthened informed consent. Drawing upon data from a qualitative enquiry of scholars involved in the development of EBM, I will argue that EBM is now committed to both of these ethical goals. Where they conflict, the aim of the intervention will determine which goal practitioners should pursue. Having increased the ethical complexity of EBM, we are left with the question of whether EBM would still be judged a success if it did not lead to much in the way of improvements in health, but primarily strengthened informed consent. This paper will conclude by arguing that this more nuanced version of EBM's ethics accurately reflects the dynamics of real clinical practice but undermines the original, perceived need for EBM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale, aims and objectives Although many barriers to practising evidence-based medicine (EBM) are described, it remains poorly understood why clinicians do, and do not, incorporate high-quality evidence into their routine practice. To date, a comprehensive framework for the classification for barriers to practising EBM is lacking. This qualitative study explored the relationship between differences in career stage and work setting among doctors and their perceived barriers for practising EBM. We also explored an alternative classification of barriers. Methods Purposive participant sampling reflected three career stages in two different work settings: four registrars, four consultant anaesthetists and four senior anaesthetists from two departments of anaesthesiology, in an academic and a general hospital, in The Netherlands. Perceptions on practising EBM and its barriers were explored in semi-structured interviews. Using grounded theory approach, we build a framework for the classification of these barriers. Results In both departments, registrars and consultants demonstrated little sense of urgency to work on their EBM performance; registrars struggled with information overload and hierarchical dependence, and consultants practised confidence-based medicine. Senior doctors in both departments reported that combining clinical work with leadership tasks made them more reflective, and therefore more susceptible to the reasoning approach inherent within the current approach to EBM. They considered themselves willing and able to apply EBM, and were reported to act accordingly. Differences in setting that complicated practising EBM related to the general hospital. The absence of formal hierarchy among doctors resulted in a lack of medical consensus and an absence of integrated management teams hindered collaboration between doctors and non-medical managers. We identified 10 conditions that were conducive to the practice of EBM. Conclusions Both career stage and work setting were associated with perceived barriers to practising EBM. We have included these in our theoretical framework for classification of these barriers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both defenders and certain critics of evidence-based medicine (EBM) share philosophical commitments – assumptions about the meaning of and relationship between such fundamental concepts as ‘objectivity’, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘rationality’– that frame the debate between them. Critics need to be particularly careful in analysing their own philosophical commitments. Ironically, failure to do so has led some to ground their rejection of EBM in philosophical theses that are less clear and/or more contentious than the reasonable conclusions they wish to defend. There is no need to label ‘objectivity’ a ‘myth’ or ‘scientific method’ an ‘illusion’ in order to identify what is wrong in EBM. Such strategies play into the hands of EBM dogmatists, allowing them to continue to position themselves as the defenders of ‘science’ and ‘reason’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]