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Theoretical work on attitudinal ambivalence suggests that anticipated regret may play a role in causing awareness of contradictions that subsequently induce a feeling of an evaluative conflict. In the present paper we empirically examined how the anticipation of regret relates to the association between the simultaneous presence of contradictory cognitions and emotions (objective ambivalence), and the evaluative conflict associated with it (subjective ambivalence), in the context of decision-making. Across three studies ( N s = 204,127,244), manipulating both objective ambivalence and regret, we consistently found that when a dichotomous ambivalent choice had to be made, (objectively) ambivalent attitude holders for whom feelings of anticipated regret were made salient reported higher levels of subjective-attitude ambivalence than participants in the other conditions. Moreover, in Studies 2 and 3 we found that the effect of anticipated regret on subjective ambivalence had consequences on information processing. Specifically, anticipating regret made ambivalent participants search for attitude-congruent information. This effect was mediated by the increase in subjective ambivalence. This work provides the first empirical evidence for the role of regret in the association between objective-and- subjective attitude ambivalence, and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the possibility that individuals selectively identify with groups as a means of restoring certainty in their attitudes. Specifically, we contend that (i) groups offer social validation in the form of attitudinal norms, (ii) individuals heighten their identification with groups that offer norms that are consistent with attitudes that have been undermined, and (iii) access to these norms reduces attitude uncertainty. Two experiments support this hypothesis by demonstrating greater identification following a loss of attitude certainty, though only with groups offering relevant attitudinal norms. Moreover, this identification is subsequently shown to promote attitude restoration in the form of increased certainty. Consequently, groups serve an important role in attitude restoration by protecting attitudes against uncertainty when a relevant group is available to bolster the attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper tests the competing hypotheses that social dominance orientation (SDO) reflects a specific desire to protect ingroup interests vs. a general desire to maintain status hierarchies by examining attitudes toward hierarchy-enhancing (i.e., legacy) and hierarchy-attenuating (i.e., affirmative action) selection policies. Study 1 found that social dominance orientation (SDO) was positively related to support for legacy policies and negatively related to support for affirmative action. In a more direct test of the ingroup interest vs. general dominance hypotheses, Study 2 found that among Asian participants, SDO is negatively related to policy support when a legacy policy is perceived to benefit the ingroup (i.e., fellow Asians); however, when the policy is perceived to benefit the dominant group (i.e., Whites), SDO is positively related to support. In all, these findings suggest that attitudes toward selection policies depend not on their specific content or effects on the ingroup, but rather on their impact on status hierarchies. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In an experimental study, we investigated how decisions in social dilemmas are affected by the valence of outcomes that are at stake. Prospect theory states that individuals are risk-averse when outcomes are framed as gains, and risk-seeking when outcomes are framed as losses. On the basis of this framework, previous research on social dilemmas has addressed the question of whether people are more cooperative in the negative domain than in the positive domain, but this research has led to inconsistent results. A possible explanation for this is that in many social dilemmas it is unclear whether cooperation or defection is the risky choice. In the current paper, we compare the well-studied prisoner’s dilemma with the less studied chicken game. Whereas in the prisoner’s dilemma it is unclear what constitutes the risky option, in the chicken game the risky option is quite clear. Consistent with predictions, we found in the chicken game more defection in the loss frame than in the gain frame, but no difference between the gain and loss frame in the prisoner’s dilemma. Moreover, choices were predicted by risk attitude in the chicken game, but not in the prisoner’s dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We assume that a state of distrust is the mental system’s signal that the environment is not normal—things may not be as they appear. Hence, individuals sense they should be on guard. In particular, they are likely to avoid routine strategies, ones proven to be optimal and regularly used in normal environments, because these strategies are easily anticipated by whoever may be seeking to deceive them. Conversely, a state of trust is associated with a feeling of safety. The environment is as it normally is and things really are as they appear to be. Thus, individuals see no reason to refrain from doing what they routinely do. Accordingly, we hypothesize that figuring out a new situation depends on the type of environment and the actor’s state of mind: in normal environments, where routine strategies are optimal, individuals who trust should outperform those who distrust; however, in unusual environments, where non-routine strategies are optimal, individuals who distrust should outperform those who trust. This paper reports three experiments that manipulate distrust via orienting tasks that participants perform prior to attempting to predict a series of events (Experiments 1 and 2) or solve matchstick arithmetic problems (Experiment 3). Performance success depends on discovering and implementing an appropriate rule. We found that, as predicted, the manipulation of distrust sensitized participants to the existence of non-routine contingencies, that is, contingencies that were not expected. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]