Search

Previous work on the threat-creativity link has mainly used paradigms in which participants had ample time to generate ideas. However, people under imminent threats have limited time to think of, and select, the single best response for actual implementation. In three studies, we examined the effect of imminent threats on the generation and selection of threat responses. Participants facing self-directed or other-directed threats were asked to select one out of two alternative responses that differed on either originality or usefulness to deal with the displayed situation (Studies 1 and 2) or think of and decide on, a fitting response themselves (Study 3). They did so under high or low time pressure (Studies 1–3) and reported their perceived effectiveness of each alternative response in managing the threats (Study 2). Participants selected and generated useful rather than original responses. Whereas time pressure did not moderate this effect, threat direction impacted the selection and generation of imminent threat responses: Self-directed rather than other-directed threats increased the selection and generation of original and creative responses because original responses were seen as more effective.

In four studies we examined the effect of overconfidence on escalation of commitment in investment tasks. Study 1 (N = 105) revealed a positive relationship between overconfidence and decisions to escalate. In contrast, Study 2 (N = 121) showed that overconfidence was negatively related to escalation of commitment. The reversal of this effect appeared to emerge as a function of the public (Study 1) versus private (Study 2) context in which the investment decisions were made. In Study 3 (N = 108) and Study 4 (N = 380) we experimentally replicated this pattern of findings and found support for the explanatory role of reputational concerns. A meta-analysis of the findings from our four studies showed that overconfidence is positively related to escalation of commitment in public contexts, and that this relationship is absent when decisions are made privately.

Social norms regulate group processes and ensure group survival. Despite the pivotal role of norms in social life, norm violations are widespread. It is therefore crucial to understand what motivates people to reinforce norms and prevent norm violators from gaining influence. Here we examine how psychological entitlement modulates observers' tendencies to reject norm violators' claims to higher rank. On the one hand, entitled individuals behave loosely themselves, which may render them tolerant of others' norm violations. On the other hand, entitled individuals are concerned about their standing, which may fuel negative reactions to norm violators' claims to higher rank. We tested these competing hypotheses in three studies. Participants read vignettes of an organizational meeting (Study 1) or a political debate (Studies 2–3) during which a protagonist either followed or violated social norms. We measured participants' trait entitlement (Study 1) or manipulated entitlement with a writing prompt task (Studies 2–3). The results showed that participants generally rejected norm violators' claims to higher rank. However, the rejection of norm violators was stronger among high-entitlement participants, who were less willing to support norm violators as leaders (passive rejection; Studies 1–2) and more willing to punish them (active rejection; Study 3). When confronted with norm violators, high-entitlement participants experienced greater threat to their social position, which mediated their rejection of norm violators (Studies 2–3). Entitled individuals' tendency to reprimand norm violators highlights the potentially adaptive benefits of entitlement as a social-regulatory mechanism in organizations and society at large.

It is argued that depleted individuals are concerned with conserving energy and therefore prefer strategies framed as easy. When such easy strategies can be adopted, the concern with conserving energy is reduced, and subsequent task performance restored. Indeed, Experiment 1 showed that adopting a strategy framed as easy but suboptimal (vs. difficult but optimal) reduced the need to conserve energy, and this enabled depleted individuals to perform as well as non-depleted individuals. Experiment 2 showed that when an objectively optimal negotiation strategy was framed as easy (rather than difficult), depleted negotiators were more likely to adopt the strategy and therefore achieved better outcomes. We conclude that depleting executive functions leads to a preference for an easy strategy and that when framing strategies as easy, the need to conserve energy is alleviated and task performance is maintained.

When do followers feel valued by their leader? We propose that leaders' regulatory focus can make followers feel valued when leaders' regulatory focus is the same as followers' regulatory focus, that is, when there is regulatory fit between leaders and followers. We further propose that the reason why this occurs is that leaders' regulatory focus impacts on their transformationals-transactional leadership, and these behavioral styles in turn also differentially fit followers' regulatory focus. Results from a group experiment supported these expectations. Followers felt valued by their leaders when the two parties' regulatory foci fit, and this effect resulted from leaders' transformational and transactional leadership behavior.

A key barrier to conflict resolution is that parties exaggerate the degree to which the other side's interests oppose their own side's interests. Here we examine egocentrism as a fundamental source of such biased conflict perceptions. We propose that parties rely on their own interests and priorities when estimating those of the other side, and ignore the other side's true interests and priorities. Three experiments involving multi-issue negotiations provide strong evidence of such egocentric misperception. Participants judged their own important issues to be more important to their negotiation opponent, regardless of their opponent's actual interests (Experiment 1). Furthermore, accuracy increased when attention was experimentally focused on the opponent's interests rather than their own (Experiment 2), and perceptions of opponent's interests were more closely related to own interests than to the opponent's actual interests (Experiment 3). In the discussion, we highlight the broader implications of the egocentrism account for other areas of conflict.

The question of what makes people rise to power has long puzzled social scientists. Here we examined the novel hypothesis that power is afforded to individuals who exhibit prosocial norm violations-i.e., breaking rules for the benefit of others. Three experiments using different methods provide support for this idea. Individuals who deliberately ignored a prohibition to tilt a bus chair (Study 1; scenario) or to close a window (Study 2; film clip) were afforded more power than individuals who obeyed the rules, but only when the norm violation benefited others (i.e., by giving them more leg space or fresh air). Study 2 further showed that this effect was mediated by perceived social engagement, which was highest among prosocial norm violators. In Study 3 (face-to-face), a confederate who stole coffee from the experimenter's desk was afforded more power than a confederate who took coffee upon invitation, but only when he also offered coffee to the participant. We discuss implications for hierarchy formation, morality, and social engagement. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Anecdotes and introspective reports from eminent scientists and artists aside, a systematic test of the putative creativity-enhancing effect of anger is missing. This article fills this void with three experiments examining creativity as a function of anger (vs. sad or a mood-neutral control state). Combining insights from the literatures on creativity and on mood and information processing the authors predicted that anger (vs. sadness and a mood-neutral control state) triggers a less systematic and structured approach to the creativity task, and leads to initially higher levels of creativity (as manifested in original ideation and creative insights). Following work on resource depletion, the authors further predicted that anger more than sadness depletes resources and that, therefore, creative performance should decline over time more for angry than for sad people. Results supported predictions. Implications for creativity, information processing, and resource depletion are discussed. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Previous research conducted in the United States has demonstrated that help-seekers fail to appreciate the embarrassment and awkwardness (i.e., social costs) targets would experience by saying “no” to a request for help. Underestimation of such social costs leads help-seekers to underestimate the likelihood that others will comply with their requests. We hypothesized that this error would be attenuated in a collectivistic culture. We conducted a naturalistic help-seeking study in the U.S. and China and found that Chinese help-seekers were more accurate than American help-seekers at predicting compliance. A supplementary scenario study in which we measured individual differences in collectivistic and individualistic orientations within a single culture provided converging evidence for the association between collectivism and expectations of compliance. In both cases, the association between collectivism (culturally defined or measured) and predicted compliance was mediated by participants' ratings of the social costs of saying “no”.

Information advantage enables people to benefit themselves by deceiving their counterparts. Using a modified ultimatum bargaining game with an exit option, we find that people are more likely to avoid settings enabling them to privately deceive their counterparts than settings which do not enable deception. This tendency is explained by people's reduced desire to become responsible for the other's outcomes when deception is possible. Results of three experiments show that people avoid entering a setting that enables deception by appearing fair while being unfair (Exp. 1-3). Experiment 2 showed that this tendency was reduced when interaction partners were displayed as competitive rather than cooperative. Experiment 3 showed a stronger tendency to avoid tempting situations that enable private deception than to approach situations in which one can privately benefit others. We conclude that when navigating through social space, people avoid situations enabling them to deceive others.

Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? According to the spillover hypothesis, negotiators demand less from previously angry partners because they perceive them as tough. According to the retaliation hypothesis, negotiators demand more from previously angry partners because of negative impressions and a desire to get even. Experiment 1 showed that participants demanded less in later negotiations when their partner in a previous negotiation had expressed anger (rather than no emotion) and the later negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spillover hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner’s toughness. Experiment 2 showed that apologies reduce the negative effects of anger on impressions and desire for future interaction. Behavioral reactions were moderated by social value orientation: extending the established might/morality effect, prosocial participants responded cooperatively to an apology, whereas proselfs responded competitively.

In the current research, we investigate the effects of breaks—temporary recesses in which participants stop interacting and withdraw from the situation—on negotiation processes and outcomes. We conducted two laboratory experiments in which participants engaged in buyer-seller negotiations. Experiment 1 (N = 140) showed that dyads reached higher-quality agreements after a break in which they were cognitively busy with a distraction task than after a break in which they could reflect upon the negotiation. Experiment 2 (N = 76) showed that competitive thinking during a break lead to lower-quality agreements than cooperative thinking during the break. It seems that the negative effects of competitive thoughts during a break can be compensated by turning one’s mind to other issues than the negotiation, or by actively engaging in cooperative thinking.

Integrating dual-process models [Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork: Guilford Press] with work on information sharing and group decision-making [Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision making: biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1467-1478.], we predicted that groups with high epistemic motivation engage in more information-driven and less preference-driven interaction, and achieve better decisions. An experiment manipulating process accountability showed that groups under process accountability experienced greater need for more information, repeated unshared information more often, and more often chose the correct decision alternative. Mediation analysis established that epistemic motivation produced high quality decisions because it stimulated systematic information processing. Results also revealed that preference heterogeneity stimulated information-driven interaction and led to higher decision quality. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Previous research on coalition formation has established that people will not hesitate to exclude others in order to maximize their payoff. The authors propose that this view is too narrow and that the decision to exclude depends on the valence of the payoff. Consistent with a “do-no-harm” hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed that participants were more reluctant to exclude in order to minimize their losses than to maximize their gains. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and showed that participants were most affected by payoff valence when they were disposed to consider the viewpoint of others. Additional analyses revealed that participants were more motivated by fairness (Experiment 1) and that fairness was more cognitively accessible (Experiment 2) when payoffs were negative rather than positive.

Production blocking (group members must take turns expressing their ideas) is an important cause of productivity loss in brainstorming groups. However, it is not yet clear why production blocking has this detrimental effect. We hypothesized that delays between the generation and articulation of ideas, arising when group members wait for their turns, interfere with the cognitive process of generating ideas. In three experiments, production blocking was simulated for individuals working at computer terminals. Production blocking interfered with idea generation in two ways. First, it disrupted the organization of idea generation when delays were relatively long. Second, it reduced the flexibility of idea generation when delays were unpredictable. Implications for group information processing are discussed. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.