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Past research on vicarious dissonance (Monin, Norton, Cooper, & Hogg, 2004; Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003) has demonstrated that participants experience vicarious discomfort and change their attitudes when witnessing counterattitudinal behavior from a fellow ingroup member. It has not been shown, however, whether witnessing this counterattitudinal behavior arouses vicarious dissonance because it contradicts the attitudes of the observed ingroup member or for egocentric reasons — that is, because it contradicts the attitudes of the observer. In three experiments, we test the hypothesis that the conditions necessary for arousing vicarious dissonance—namely, observing an ingroup member's responsibility for aversive consequences and level of choice—are processed egocentrically by the observer. By manipulating perspective taking in a vicarious induced compliance task, and manipulating choice difficulty in a vicarious free-choice dissonance paradigm, we show that the arousal of vicarious dissonance crucially depends on the consequences of the ingroup member's actions for the observer, and not for the observed ingroup member. Implications for other aspects of vicarious dissonance and vicarious experience in general are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four studies tested the prediction that when highly identified group members observe another ingroup member behave hypocritically, they experience vicarious hypocrisy, which they reduce by bolstering their support for the ingroup hypocrite's message. Participants in Experiment 1 (N = 161) who witnessed a similar ingroup member act hypocritically about using sunscreen reported more positive attitudes toward using sunscreen than participants exposed to an outgroup hypocrite or to a dissimilar ingroup hypocrite. The effect of vicarious hypocrisy on attitude bolstering was attenuated in Experiment 2 (N = 68) when ingroup identity was affirmed. In Experiment 3 (N = 64), more highly identified participants acquired sunscreen when a fellow ingroup member's hypocrisy was attributed to high compared to low choice. Experiment 4 (N = 68) showed that a misattribution cue attenuated the effect of vicarious hypocrisy on sunscreen acquisition. The discussion focuses on the vicarious dissonance processes that motivate some observers to defend, rather than reject, a hypocritical ingroup member. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychological and behavioral economic theories have shown that people often make irrational and suboptimal decisions. To describe certain decisions, people often use words related to pain (“hurt,” “painful”). Neuroscientific evidence suggests common overlap between systems involved in physical pain and decision-making. Yet no prior studies have explored whether a pharmacological intervention aimed at reducing physical pain could reduce the pain of decision-making. The current investigation filled this gap by assigning participants to consume the physical painkiller acetaminophen or placebo and then exposing them to situations known to produce cognitive dissonance (Experiment 1) or loss aversion (Experiment 2). Both experiments showed that acetaminophen reduced the pain of decision-making, as indicated by lower attitude change that accompanies cognitive dissonance and lower selling prices when selling personal possessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: People generally say they prefer to have the opportunity to revise decisions at a later point in time. Research has shown, however, that reversible decision-making leads to lower as opposed to higher levels of post-choice satisfaction (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). In three studies we aimed to gain insight into the underlying processes driving this counterintuitive finding. Our results show that irreversible decision-making increases the accessibility of the positive aspects of the chosen and the negative aspects of the rejected alternatives. Hence, in line with what would be expected on the basis of cognitive dissonance theory, irreversible decision-making results in a focus on aspects of the decision that optimize choice satisfaction. After reversible decision-making, however, the negative aspects of the chosen and the positive aspects of the rejected alternatives tend to become relatively more accessible. Apparently, reversible decisions automatically direct people's attention to those aspects of the decision that potentially decrease satisfaction with the chosen alternative. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Although the existence of a negative affect related to dissonance has been largely documented, there is still much debate about exactly when this negative affect appears. The present study tested two hypotheses, the first being that it emerges immediately after individuals have committed to the counterattitudinal behavior (Elliot & Devine, 1994), and the second that it arises somewhat later, after an undifferentiated arousal state (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). The facial electromyograms (EMGs) of participants in no-dissonance and dissonance conditions were analyzed during the production of a counterattitudinal advocacy. As expected, only in the dissonance condition did participants' facial EMGs indicate the presence of a negative affect. Instead of appearing just after they had committed to the counterattitudinal behavior, this affect emerged further on in the dissonance process, after participants had embarked on the counterattitudinal advocacy. In addition, the intensity of the negative affect was correlated with attitude change. Taken together, our findings suggest that dissonance arousal is initially undifferentiated and is only later labeled as negative. Furthermore, this negative affect motivates attitude change. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Five studies tested when and why individuals engage in confirmatory information searches (selective exposure) following predictions. Participants engaged in selective exposure following their own predictions, even when their predictions were completely arbitrary (Studies 1 and 3). The selective exposure was not simply the result of a cognitive bias tied to the salience of a prediction option (Study 2). Instead, it appears that making a prediction—regardless of how ill-informed a person is while making the prediction—can cause the person to anticipate enjoyment from being right (Studies 4 and 5) and to select new information consistent with that outcome. The results establish a desirability account that can explain post-prediction selective exposure effects even in cases when defense motivations, pre-existing differences, or positive-test strategies can be ruled out as explanations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We present a new experimental paradigm where choice-induced preference change is measured for alternatives which are never compared directly, but rather confronted with other alternatives in a way which keeps choices predictable without exogenously manipulating them. This implicit-choice design improves on the free-choice paradigm, avoiding the recently criticized selection bias. Rating and ranking spreads in two experiments show that preference-based choices feed back into and alter preferences even if choices are not directly among similarly evaluated alternatives. In agreement with recent brain-imaging evidence, response time measurements for direct choice pairs in our experiments indicate that reappraisal processes are already triggered during decision making, with larger post-choice spreads (sharper attitude change) being associated to quicker decisions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Although the role of issue-importance has been central to theorizing about dissonance, its impact on dissonance-related shifts in attitude is not clear. Drawing on recent distinctions between high-level construals, which capture an object''s gist and lead people to focus on their more‐important concerns, and low-level construals, which emphasize secondary issues, the current paper explores the role of construal-level in moderating the effect of importance on dissonance-induced attitude change. Adopting a widely used induced‐compliance paradigm, participants in a high or low-level construal mindset wrote counter‐attitudinal essays about instituting a senior comprehensive exam under conditions of high or low choice. As expected, participants in a high-level construal mindset more strongly favored comprehensive exams under high choice than low‐choice conditions, but only when the issue was personally important. Participants in a low-level construal mindset showed a choice effect when the issue was unimportant. Implications and future directions are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Past research on cognitive dissonance indicated that people from independent (e.g. European-American) and interdependent (e.g. East-Asian) cultural backgrounds show different patterns of choice justification: whereas choice made for oneself affirms the independent view of the self, choice made for close others affirms the interdependent view of the self. We hypothesized that interpersonal choice considerations may be temporally accessible even among habitually independent European-Americans. The present research provides the first experimental evidence that choice justification varies as a function of both subliminal affiliation priming and the target of choice (self vs. close others). Results from three studies indicate that subliminal priming of affiliation increases justification of a choice European-Americans made for a close other, while decreasing justification of a choice made for the self. Implications for theories related to cognitive dissonance, subliminal processing and cultural meaning systems are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: People generally prefer to have the opportunity to revise their decisions. Surprisingly however, research has shown that keeping one''s options open yields lower satisfaction with the decision outcome (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Two studies aimed to gain more insight into the detrimental consequences of decision reversibility and the cognitive processes underlying decision reversibility. Building upon literature on goal fulfillment we hypothesized and found in a first experiment that as long as decisions are still open to change, accessibility of decision-related constructs is increased compared to neutral constructs. A second experiment demonstrated that decision reversibility undermines working memory capacity. Moreover participants experienced higher regret after having made a reversible decision, an effect that was mediated by decreased working memory capacity. The study set implies that reversible decisions yield lower working memory capacity because people continue to think about the, still relevant, choice options. In the end this might increase dissatisfaction with the decision and regret. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The meaning maintenance model (MMM) maintains that violations of expectations can elicit compensatory behavior. When anomalies are encountered, people may compensate either by affirming an intact schema or by abstracting new, meaningful connections. Past research has shown that implicitly perceived events can be threatening, and can cause changes to behavior that were not consciously intended. However, no research has yet explored whether fluid compensation responses can occur implicitly, in response to an implicit threat. This paper introduces a novel meaning threat and provides evidence that both threat and response can happen entirely outside conscious awareness. Two studies present participants with subliminally incoherent word pairs (e.g., turn-frog). Study 1 finds that these subliminal presentations enhance the ability to implicitly learn new patterns. Study 2 finds that these same presentations lead to the affirmation of an unrelated moral schema, and to the same extent as a subliminal mortality salience manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The effort justification phenomenon, in which greater value is given to rewards that require more effort to obtain, is frequently explained in terms of cognitive dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Here, we employed a novel combination of operant and lick analysis techniques to show that rats place more value on a sucrose reward when it follows high effort than when the same reward follows low effort. This is the first demonstration of a direct analogue of the effort justification phenomenon in nonhuman animals. As the behavior of rats is normally considered in terms of relatively simple mechanisms, the current results question the need for complex cognitive accounts for the effort justification phenomenon (in rats or humans). As an alternative, we examine the possibility that high effort produces an aversive state that enhances reward value by a process of contrast. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This article examines how performance is facilitated with simple tasks and is impaired with complex ones in individuals experiencing dissonance. Experiment 1 measured the performance of dissonance participants at a simple reaction time task. Reaction times were shortest in the dissonance condition. This facilitation effect was interpreted as resulting from increased arousal with dissonance. In Experiment 2, participants performed a more complex secondary memory task that required to memorize and to recall short and long series of numbers. Participants in the dissonance condition performed less well than participants in the no-dissonance condition only under a high memory load and did not differ with a low load. It is suggested that dissonance requires some working memory resources. Accordingly, it is assumed that the arousal properties of dissonance facilitate performance with simple task that do not involve working memory and require a dominant response, but that dissonance impairs performance with tasks that strongly involve working memory. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Two studies demonstrate that negotiation processes and outcomes can be altered by the creation of Positive Expectations. Study 1 participants were American undergraduates seeking agreement with a confederate about allocation of funds to programs differentially favoring undergraduates vs. graduates. Study 2 participants were Israeli Business School students seeking agreement with an Arab confederate about allocation of funds to projects differentially favoring Israelis vs. Palestinians. In both studies prior information suggesting the consistent success of previous dyads prompted acceptance of the confederate’s “final proposal” whereas merely urging participants to try to reach agreement resulted in consistent rejection of the same proposal. Moreover, participants reaching agreement in these Positive Expectations conditions subsequently offered more positive assessments of the negotiation process and of their counterpart than those doing so in control conditions. The theoretical and applied relevance of these findings, including the role played by post-agreement dissonance reduction, are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The current work explored how self-concept representation affects how experiencing dissonance results in changing one’s attitudes in response to acknowledging hypocrisy. We found a relation between self-complexity and attitude change after admitting past hypocritical actions. Specifically, people lower in self-complexity changed their attitudes to bring them more in line with their transgressions (presumably to quell the especially strong feelings of unpleasantness resulting from their acknowledging behavior-belief discrepancies) whereas those greater in self-complexity showed more bolstering of their attitudes following hypocrisy. This relation between self-complexity and attitude change following hypocrisy was eliminated when participants were given a chance to reaffirm their sense of personal value and integrity through other means (i.e., self-affirmation). Implications for how self-concept representation may play a role in moderating a number of psychological phenomena, ranging from goal attainment to stereotype threat, are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In two studies, we provide a test of the revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences. To do so, we introduce a blind two-choice task in which preferences cannot guide choices. Children chose between two similar objects while ignorant of the objects’ identities, and then chose between the rejected alternative and a third similar object. Monkeys were given an illusion of choice between two similar objects, and then chose between the rejected object and a third similar object. Both children and monkeys preferred the third object, indicating that they devalued the rejected object. This response pattern did not occur when the children and monkeys were not given the opportunity to choose between the two initial items. These results provide evidence against a revealed-preferences account of choice-induced preferences and demonstrate that the process of making a choice itself induces preferences. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Through three experiments we examined whether the act of rejecting reduces the desire to reconnect with others. In Experiment 1, female participants who had just rejected a job applicant were less motivated to make new friends than the controls. In Experiment 2, female participants who had insufficient justifications to reject a paper were more reluctant to work with others than those who had sufficient justifications to reject. In Experiment 3, high-choice female participants showed more reduction in reconnecting desire than low-choice female participants. Furthermore, female participants who could misattribute their discomfort away showed less reduction in reconnecting desire. However, in all three experiments, male participants showed less reduction in reconnection desire than females. A follow-up survey showed that males and females differed in their senses of social connectedness and their different discomfort level at rejecting others. Overall, results supported the cognitive dissonance account which posits that, because the act of rejecting is in conflict with the fundamental motive to affiliate, such conflict may compel the mind to modify the existing attitude. Thus rejecting reduces the desire to forge new social connections. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Research on the phenomenon of selective exposure to information demonstrates that after preliminary or final decisions, people show a preference for supporting rather than conflicting information (confirmation bias). In this article, we examine conditions that increase or decrease distortions in the search for information. We report on four experiments indicating that the confirmation bias is influenced by whether people focus on their decision or on the presented pieces of information during the information search. Focusing on the decision, for example, because a reward for a correct decision is promised or simply because participants repeatedly think of it, increases the confirmation bias. On the other hand, if participants focus on the available pieces of information because they have to invest money in order to search for information or because they have to evaluate the individual pieces of information, the confirmation bias decreases. Implications for theoretical understanding and interventions for decision-making situations are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The present research draws on cognitive dissonance theory [Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press] and social identity theory [] to examine how group members respond to discrepancies between their personal values and the behavior of an ingroup. In two experiments we manipulated whether participants’ ingroup violated a personal value (providing basic healthcare in Experiment 1 and self-reliance in Experiment 2) and measured participants’ emotional responses and strategies for reducing discomfort. As expected, individuals experienced psychological discomfort (but not negative self-directed emotion), when an ingroup, but not when an outgroup, violated a personal value, and this discomfort mediated participants’ disidentification with their group (Experiment 1) and value-adherence activism (Experiment 2). [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Research in the cognitive dissonance tradition has shown that choosing between two equally attractive alternatives leads to more favorable evaluations of chosen as compared to rejected alternatives (spreading-of-alternatives effect). The present research tested associative self-anchoring as an alternative mechanism for post-decisional changes of implicit evaluations. Specifically, we argue that choosing an object results in the creation of an association between the chosen object and the self. By virtue of this association, implicit evaluations of the self tend to transfer to the chosen object, such that implicit evaluations of the chosen object depend on implicit evaluations of the self. Importantly, this mechanism can lead to ownership-related changes in implicit evaluations even in the absence of cognitive dissonance. Results from four experiments provide converging evidence for these assumptions. Implications for a variety of phenomena are discussed, including cognitive dissonance, the mere ownership effect, the endowment effect, and ingroup favoritism. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We propose that people infer the relative attractiveness of the choice alternatives from decision difficulty. A difficult decision signifies that the alternatives are close to each other in attractiveness, and an easy decision signifies that the alternatives are remote from each other in attractiveness. In Study 1, observers used reported decision difficulty to infer preferences of the decision maker. Studies 2–4 showed that inferences about the source of one’s own decision difficulty may affect a decision maker’s preferences. Study 4 integrates the notion of inferences from decision difficulty with dissonance theory, showing that in repeatable decisions difficulty reduces post-decisional spreading of alternatives, as predicted by our model, whereas with one-time decisions, difficulty enhances post-decisional spreading of alternatives, as predicted by dissonance theory. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Two studies investigated the influence of cognitive dissonance on explicit and implicit attitudes. Employing the induced compliance paradigm, participants wrote a counterattitudinal essay under conditions of either high or low perceived situational pressure; control participants did not write an essay. Consistent with dissonance theory, results indicated a more favorable explicit attitude toward the initially counterattitudinal position when perceived situational pressure was low, but not when it was high. Implicit attitudes, however, were unaffected by dissonance manipulations. Moreover, explicit attitudes were significantly related to implicit attitudes under high perceived situational pressure and control conditions, but not when perceived situational pressure was low. Results are discussed in terms of associative versus propositional modes of information processing. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This experiment examines the dynamics of preference change in the context of face-to-face negotiation. Participants playing the role of “student” or “financial aid officer” exchanged proposals regarding the terms of a student loan. Consistent with dissonance theory, participants increased their liking for proposals they offered and/or ultimately accepted. The reactance theory prediction that participants would devalue proposals received from their opponents was confirmed for loan officers, but not for students. A pair of experimental manipulations involving the pre-rating of proposals and/or the opportunity for participants to engage in a brief discussion period prior to the initial exchange of offers mediated these effects, and influenced subsequent rates of agreement. Underlying attributional mechanisms and the implications of these findings for facilitating agreements are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

An experiment was conducted to examine the conditions under which self-esteem operates as an expectancy, as a resource, or does not influence cognitive dissonance processes. Based on the self-standards model of dissonance (), it was predicted that following a high-choice counter-attitudinal behavior: (a) priming positive self-attributes that were relevant to the discrepant behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report more attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, (b) priming positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report less attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, and (c) priming neutral self-attributes would eliminate self-esteem moderation of attitude change. The results of the attitude change measure supported the predictions. The discussion explores different processes by which the accessibility of cognitions about the self mediate dissonance arousal and reduction. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Explores a motivated account of overconfidence and argues that overconfidence can result from a desire to see the self as knowledgeable and competent. Factors influencing the relation between accuracy and confidence; Important connection between cognitive dissonance and overconfidence.

Presents a model for understanding the role of the self in cognitive dissonance processes. Assessment of social appropriateness or personal quality of individual behavior; Description of self-standards in dissonance arousal; Implications of the model for other dissonance processes.

Examines whether misattribution can weaken the link between the factors that produce dissonance and the arousal state that leads to attitude change. Attitude toward early classes as a function of choice and misattribution; Checks on choice manipulation; Role of dissonance in an emerging self-system.

Abstract: Although torture can establish guilt through confession, how are judgments of guilt made when tortured suspects do not confess? We suggest that perceived guilt is based inappropriately upon how much pain suspects appear to suffer during torture. Two psychological theories provide competing predictions about the link between pain and perceived blame: cognitive dissonance, which links pain to blame, and moral typecasting, which links pain to innocence. We hypothesized that dissonance might characterize the relationship between torture and blame for those close to the torture, while moral typecasting might characterize this relationship for those more distant from it. Accordingly, this experiment placed participants into one of two different roles in which people may be exposed to torture. Participants in the proximal role of prison staffer saw suffering torture victims as relatively more guilty, while participants in the relatively distant role of a radio listener saw suffering victims as more innocent. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Examinations of post-choice decision-making behavior often involve two successive choices. At time 1, participants choose between two equally attractive items. At time 2, participants choose between the unchosen item from time 1 and a new item that is roughly equal in attractiveness to the other two. The option rejected at time 1 will tend to again be rejected at time 2, a tendency often attributed to a psychological carry-over effect. Chen (2008) (Available from: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16b/d1669.pdf) discounts these psychological explanations. He argues that, given the time 1 choice, there is, in fact, a baserate probability of 66.7% that the initially unchosen item will be rejected again at time 2. However, Chen’s argument rests on the unwarranted assumption that the time 1 choice provides a perfectly reliable measure of subjects’ preference for the chosen item over the unchosen item. With more realistic estimates of the association between preference and choice, Chen’s statistical explanation cannot fully account for the carry-over effect. Alternative experimental methodologies that eliminate Chen’s statistical explanation are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Chen argued that the proper null hypothesis for free-choice studies examining shifts in choice was 66.7%. Sagarin and Skowronki (2009) questioned the appropriateness of this value, noting that it was based on an unwarranted assumption that subjects always choose preferred options over less preferred options. In this paper, we respond to the points raised by Chen and Risen (2009), noting that: (a) violations of an additional unwarranted assumption (perfect transitivity) also move the proper null hypothesis towards 50%; (b) the validation of pretest measures would enable researchers to estimate an upper bound on the proper null; (c) the “blind” choice methodology proposed by Sagarin and Skowronski places the null unambiguously at 50%; and (d) Sagarin and Skowronski correctly call for null-hypothesis tests where needed. In the end, we again endorse the idea that this debate is best resolved empirically, but we believe the empirical avenues available are wider than those endorsed by Chen and Risen. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In a recent working paper, Chen (2008) argues that a methodology central to the cognitive dissonance literature (the free-choice paradigm) has suffered from an inability to separately measure how much choices affect people’s preferences, and how much they simply reflect those preferences, by failing to fully control for the fact that subjects tend to choose goods they prefer. Although Sagarin and Skowronski concede this, they discount Chen’s argument, claiming that for revealed preferences to completely account for observed choice-effects the relationship between choice and preference would have to be unrealistically high. In this comment, we argue that their critique both misses the crux of Chen’s analysis, and is incorrect. Specifically, to properly test whether choices affect preferences, it is essential that researchers experimentally control for revealed preferences rather than speculate how much of a role they may play. Moreover, Sagarin and Skowronski’s critique rests on two fundamental errors—a misunderstanding of the function of the null-hypothesis and a misunderstanding of preference-measurement psychometrics. These errors leads Sagarin and Skowronski to suggest alternative experimental designs which while a good first step, do not address the problems identified in Chen (2008). [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Across six experiments (N = 1304), people dealt with failure by dismissing the value of future goals. Participants were randomly assigned to receive good or poor feedback on a practice trial of a cognitive test (Studies 1–3, 5–6) or their academic performance (Study 4). Those who received poor (vs. good) feedback predicted that they would feel less happy about a future top performance. However, when all participants received a top score on the actual test they became equally happy, regardless of initial feedback. That is, initial failure made people underestimate how good it would feel to succeed in the future. Inspired by Aesop's fable of the fox and the grapes, we term this phenomenon the "sour-grape effect": A systematic tendency to downplay the value of unattainable goals and rewards. Mediation analyses suggest that the low happiness predictions were a self-protective maneuver, indicated by apparent denial of the personal and future relevance of their performance. Moderation analysis showed that people high in achievement motivation constituted the main exception, as they predicted (correctly) that a big improvement would bring them joy. In a final and high-powered experiment, the effect generalized from predicted happiness to predicted pride and gratitude. Crucially, the sour-grape effect was found repeatedly across two different countries (USA and Norway) and multiple settings (lab, field, online), including two pre-registered replications. In line with the principle of "adaptive preferences" from philosophy and cognitive dissonance theory from psychology, the results suggest that what people want is restricted by what they can get. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people plan to respond to a stimulus S with an action R, they hold an S-R association in working memory. Such S-R associations are called prepared reflexes. In the present investigation, we explored the possibility that prepared reflexes play a central role in evaluative processing. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that attitudes toward a given stimulus S (i) become more positive when prepared reflexes associate S with a positively valenced action representation R+, and (ii) become more negative when prepared reflexes associate S with a negatively valenced action representation R-. We found support for this hypothesis across 6 studies while ruling out alternative mechanisms including cognitive dissonance, self-perception, approach-avoid training, and biased scanning. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the predictive validity of implicit attitude measures. • Intentionally formed S-R associations (prepared reflexes) shape attitudes • Effects of prepared reflexes are powerful, readily altering attitudes that are firmly established and extremely negative. • Prepared reflexes create dissociations between implicit and explicit attitudes • Prepared reflexes may determine the behavioral outcomes of implicit attitudes [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this study was to understand the cognitive dynamics of stereotype influences on source monitoring employing mouse tracking. By continuously recording cursor movements, we examined how stereotypical knowledge influences decision uncertainty when processing and later remembering stereotype-consistent and - in consistent exemplars of the age categories of "young" and "old". In a source-monitoring task, participants (N = 60) learned age-stereotype consistent or - in consistent statements from two different-aged sources (young vs. old person) that they attributed to their original sources via mouse clicks in a later memory test. Our results showed that individuals experienced cognitive conflict during source attributions depending on both the correctness of the source response and whether the original source was (in)consistent with the stereotype of the respective age group reflected in the statement. This pattern of results was supplemented by the analysis of prototypical mouse-trajectory clusters. Modeling individual source-monitoring processes revealed that individuals' experienced conflict was less pronounced when they remembered the source and was unrelated to guessing resulting from memory failure. These results highlight the benefits of combining cognitive modeling and process-tracing techniques to unpack the mechanisms behind social influences on source monitoring. The methodology of mouse tracking illuminated the role of stereotypes in the underlying cognitive processes during source attributions that is not evident from discrete categorical responses. For designed counter-stereotypical interventions, process-tracing methods may also be used to test their effectiveness on cognitive processes involved in source monitoring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate the existence of an autonomous system justification motive that guides human behavior, we tested the dissonance-inspired strong system-justification thesis: that the cognitive effort expended to justify societal systems on which people depend , is greater amongst the disadvantaged than amongst the advantaged when their group identities are weak in salience/strength. Using a novel pupil dilation paradigm to tap cognitive effort, we exposed an ethnic minority group (N total = 263) to depictions of their ingroup as disadvantaged or advantaged after they had stated four things they liked about their ethnic group (strong group identity salience) or grandmother (weak group identity salience). We then measured fluctuations in their pupil diameter as they contemplated support for societal systems that were either relevant (high dependency) or irrelevant (low dependency) to their ethnic group. Results revealed that pupil sizes were larger in the group disadvantage condition than in the group advantage condition—indicating greater cognitive effort—but only when group identity was salient (Experiment 1) or when group identification was strong (Experiment 2). These effects occurred only for high dependency systems. Combined, this evidence contradicts the system-justification thesis, and questions the existence of an autonomous system justification motivation in humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]