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We examine the effects of wrongdoer status on receiving moral license, a social acceptance of norm-violating behavior. Compared to a control condition, we found that both high and low status wrongdoers receive more license, but for different reasons. Judges gave high status wrongdoers moral credentials by reinterpreting their behavior less negatively; whereas judges gave low status wrongdoers moral credits by showing them greater sympathy. Of import, our analyses provide insights into the underlying mechanisms explaining the moderating role of wrongdoer status. If transgressions are ambiguous (versus unambiguous), so as to allow for positive reinterpretation, judges were more inclined to evaluate behavior as less wrong and thus credential high status wrongdoers. Likewise, if judges are dispositionally more (versus less) amenable to showing others sympathy, they were more likely to credit low status wrongdoers. Our results shed light on different paths to receiving moral license and suggest that factors other than prior behavior (in our case, actor's status) may influence the severity of punishment.

In two experimental studies we investigated how curiosity and regret aversion affect decision-making under uncertainty. Building on insights derived from information-gap theory [Loewenstein, G. (1994). The psychology of curiosity: a review and reinterpretation. Psychological Bulletin, 116 , 75–98], we demonstrate that curiosity may overcome regret aversion. In Experiment 1, we concentrate on the reluctance to opt for alternatives with uncertain outcomes and demonstrate that curiosity about the uncertain outcomes may override regret aversion. In Experiment 2, we focus on reluctance to expose oneself to potential regret-inducing information and demonstrate that curiosity may overcome this reluctance.

Two hundred and twelve subjects were given one of two interpretive sets prior to viewing an event. Following observation, the first interpretation was discredited, and subjects were asked to interpret the event they had seen under the contrasting set. Some subjects were only provided with the alternate interpretation, while others were also given an opportunity to view the event a second time. Both the perceptual segmentation and the subjects' impressions of the participants in the event were assessed. Results disclosed that (1) the two sets produced both differing perceptual organization and differing impressions of the participants; (2) reversing the sets produced a reversal of the impressions of the participants only when accompanied by a second viewing; and (3) the reversal of the impressions was accompanied by a shift in the perceptual organization of the event. It was concluded that observers may differ in their initial perception of an event as the result of differences in prior expectations, and that the resulting biased sample of information they acquire may limit their retrospective reinterpretation of the event.

A reinterpretation is offered for Jones, Worchel, Goethals and Grumet's recent study of attribution theory. The several unrelated processes which were suggested in the original paper are replaced by a single information integration model: the attributed attitude is seen as a weighted average of three pieces of information. Using parameter values which are meaningful within the context of attribution theory, the model provides intuitive explanations for the interesting qualitative aspects of the study. In addition, it gives a good quantitative fit to the data.