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This paper advances an individual-based hybrid well-being theory and argues that it is able to overcome the main drawbacks of existing objective list theories and avoid the shortcomings of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories. The individual-based hybrid well-being theory has characteristics of perfectionist objective theories in that it recognizes objective goods and explains the commonality of goods from the perspective of perfectionism, but it also differs from existing objective list theories insofar as it provides not a single list of goods for everyone but plural lists of goods based on each individual for each individual. In addition, it represents a hybrid theory rather than a pure objective list theory because it recognizes the individual's desire as a factor influencing the contribution of objective goods to well-being and the individual's experiences of pleasure as a component of well-being outside the list of goods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have consistently found that hedonic and eudaimonic motives positively predict subjective well-being. In this study, we emphasized the importance of considering curvilinear effects alongside main effects and interactions to fully understand these relationships. Using polynomial regression models, we examined the relationships between hedonic motives, eudaimonic motives, and subjective well-being. To examine both trait-level and momentary-level relations with well-being, we used experience sampling methodology to collect real-time data from 161 participants over a 7-day period. Our findings suggested that engaging in activities towards fulfilling both motives was associated with positive experiences, and individuals with high levels of hedonic and eudaimonic motives in their daily lives generally reported higher subjective well-being. Nevertheless, we also identified negative interaction effects between both motives on subjective well-being, which imply that there may be a limit to the positive contributions of combinations of both motives to subjective well-being. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding the nuanced relationships between hedonic and eudaimonic motives and subjective well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several philosophical theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry and employ an Aristotelian construct of flourishing. Yet it is not clear how we should interpret Aristotle’s notion of flourishing or eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). In this article, we offer an analysis of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia and consider to what extent it can be categorized within the framework of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing. We stress the active character of Aristotelian flourishing and its focus on the development of living things over time, which contrasts with the static and passive character of contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. We suggest that Aristotle is closest to a perfectionist theory of wellbeing, though even this requires some qualification. While rational activity in accord with virtue is central to Aristotle’s account of living well, Aristotle also states that a range of practical human activities and propitious life circumstances are necessary (and, on some interpretations, constitutive) features of the flourishing life. As such, Aristotelian flourishing includes elements of moral and cognitive perfectionism as well as an objective list of external goods and presupposes one’s embeddedness within communities. We close with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of flourishing. Contemporary well-being philosophers should be mindful of ways in which Aristotelian eudaimonia extends beyond the dominant philosophical categories of wellbeing that have a static focus and concern themselves with subjective experience or the possession of objective goods. Social scientists should be transparent about the limits of invoking an Aristotelian pedigree to motivate their own theories of wellbeing and should understand the implications of more limited conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined the role of two Subjective well-being orientations, hedonism (maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain) and eudemonia (a desire for meaningful life), in prosocial behavior toward a close help recipient versus a distant one. Study 1 examined individual differences in levels of hedonism and eudemonia, while studies 2 and 3 used a priming manipulation to enhance the salience of the two orientations. In all three studies we found that these orientations interact with the attributes of the help recipient during the decision to help. Specifically, hedonism was found to be positively associated with prosocial acts when the recipient was presented as a close other (a friend, as opposed to an unfamiliar student; or a specific identified target, as opposed to a general one). Conversely, eudemonia predicted greater donations to more general or distant causes. A moderated mediation analysis (Study 3) suggests that the hedonic orientation increased donations specifically to closer recipients (the identified victim), due to the heightened emotional reaction raised by this help target. However, the increased donations to the general help target under eudemonic orientation was not driven by emotional reactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a four-wave, longitudinal study (N = 323), we tested the relationships between five positive dispositions—mindfulness, self-compassion, gratitude, hedonism, and eudaimonism—and time-varying negative affect, positive affect, life satisfaction, and meaning in life. These relationships were tested while controlling for the ups and downs in life across three months, operationalized as the effects, for a respondent, of having experienced more frequent and intense positive and negative events compared to other individuals in the sample (inter-individual variation) and of having experienced more frequent and intense positive and negative events than usual for that person (intra-individual variation). We also tested the interactive effects between each disposition and intra-individual variation in the frequency and intensity of negative and positive events on well-being variables. Results, obtained through multilevel models with repeated observations nested in individuals, showed that each disposition had specific associations with well-being indicators, although stronger effects were detected for eudaimonism and, especially, self-compassion. Moderation analyses showed that: mindfulness and self-compassion buffered intra-individual variation in negative events; people scoring higher on hedonism, eudaimonism, and self-compassion showed less need to rely on positive events to experience positive emotions; experiencing a negative event that was more intense than usual was associated with higher meaning in life for people with high levels of eudaimonism. Overall, findings suggest that mindfulness, self-compassion, gratitude, hedonism, and eudaimonism build well-being through different channels. Positive interventions could benefit from mixing these healthy functioning strategies and considering their roles in reactions to events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on hedonic and eudaimonic orientations has previously focused on their effects on well-being experiences. Very little is known about their associations with functioning. A preliminary objective of the study was to establish the factorial validity of the Hedonic and Eudaimonic Motives for Activities–Revised (HEMA-R) on an Italian sample (N = 461) through a confirmatory factor analysis. The main objective was to study the distinctive patterns of correlates between different types of orientations to well-being and several outcome measures of positive experiences (flourishing, life satisfaction, positive affect), negative experiences (negative affect, depression, anxiety, stress) and functioning (dispositional coping strategies) by means of a multivariate linear model. The Italian version of the HEMA-R showed a three-factor structure, namely eudaimonic, pleasure, and relaxation orientations. Pleasure orientation was positively related to positive experiences of well-being and negatively related to negative experiences. Eudaimonic orientation was associated with positive experiences. Furthermore, eudaimonic orientation showed a positive relation with several adaptive coping strategies, whereas relaxation was associated with avoidant coping strategies. The results reflect that pleasure orientation is aimed at achieving pleasant feelings, while Eudaimonic orientation is aimed at living well. Our findings also suggest that pleasure orientation may reflect the "pursuit of pleasure" component of Hedonia, while relaxation orientation may reflect its "pain avoidance" component. Overall, this study supports the importance of distinguishing between Eudaimonia, and the pleasure and relaxation components of Hedonia to predict individual differences in subjective experiences and functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A challenge in studying happiness is its conceptual nature. Is the happiness of hedonistic indulgence the same as the happiness of selfless volunteering? To understand some of these questions, a narrative review of 64 neuroimaging studies between 1995 and 2018 was conducted. Studies were grouped based on how they conceptualized happiness based on Seligman's (Authentic happiness: using the new positive psychology to realize your potential for lasting fulfillment, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2002) authentic happiness theory. A qualitative narrative review was performed as well as an ALE meta analysis of activation regions. Happiness was identified in 33 separate brain regions across the telencephalon, diencephalon, and metencephalon. Stratifying results by definition of happiness, regions of activity were generally relevant to the tasks performed during the experiment and the kinds of tasks enjoyed by the phenomenon of happiness examined. The ALE analysis identified the claustrum, insula, basal ganglia, and thalamus as showing meaningful activation clusters across studies. Happiness as pleasure and engagement demonstrated close relevance of neural activity to literal activities being performed. Tasks for happiness as meaning, on the other hand, were generally more abstract. Likewise, there was less direct relationship between behavior and phenomenon of happiness, the insula most likely to activate for happiness as meaning. It was concluded that happiness is not best understood as an affective state, but better understood within its behavioral context, as an emergent property of activity. For pleasure and engagement, this meant a literal relationship between behavioral and neurological activity. For meaning, this meant the ongoing assessment of the moral implications of events. Limitations included cross sectional design and hemodynamic focus. Future research should consider concordance of happiness and brain activity across the lifespan. Additionally, future studies should consider the dynamics of neuropeptides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainstream economics perceive an individual as highly individualistic, presuming that he/she consumes goods in the most efficient way to optimize his/her level of happiness. This study attempts to explore the nexus between socio-economic dimensions, basic needs, luxuries and personality traits and happiness in Mauritius. Material consumption and happiness are projected to be positively and strongly related. This is usually illuminated in terms of the increased possibilities to satisfy basic needs and luxuries along with other motives which additional spending provides. Other instrumental aspects of consumption, such as its relative, community-based and hedonic magnitudes are accounted. Cross-sectional data are compiled from a household survey with a sample size of 1015 observations. To conduct the analysis, an ordered probit model is applied. The general conclusion is drawn upon the results that socio-economic indicators like educational attainment, residential location, family size, income in addition to the intermediate needs deprivation index, brand consciousness, fashion innovativeness, commercial interest, shopping enjoyment, hedonism, bandwagon effect and personality traits are significantly related to people's happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pleasure is one of the most obvious candidates for directly improving wellbeing. Hedonists claim it is the only feature that can intrinsically make life better for the one living it, and that all of wellbeing derives from the relative pleasantness and unpleasantness of conscious experience. But Hedonism is incompatible with the ‘heterogeneity’ of pleasure: it cannot allow that distinct pleasures can feel completely differently, if experiences count as pleasant due to how they feel. I argue that a pluralistic variant of Hedonism can match its theoretical attractions while also accommodating the heterogeneity of pleasure. This has interesting implications for both the philosophical debate over the nature of wellbeing and psychological theories of how to measure and aggregate positive affect. In particular, my argument implies that there is no single dimension of ‘valence’ or ‘intensity’ on which pleasantness can be measured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many believe that the lack of correlation between happiness and income, first discovered by Richard Easterlin in 1974, entails the conclusion that well-being policies should be made based on happiness measures, rather than income measures. I argue that distinguishing between how well-being is characterized and how that characterization is measured introduces ways of denying the conclusion that policies should be made based on happiness measures. It is possible to avoid the conclusion either by denying that well-being hedonism is true or by denying that happiness measures are a better way of operationalizing hedonism than income measures are. By making these possibilities explicit, we find that less hinges on whether income and happiness are correlated than is often thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One common belief about happiness, espoused to varying degrees by both researchers and laypeople alike, is that happiness involves a lack of negative hedonic experiences. In the current investigation, we examine whether individual differences in endorsement of this belief, termed negative hedonic belief, moderate the effects of stress on happiness and several indicators of well-being. It was predicted that because stress involves the experience of negative hedonic states, increased stress would be more robustly associated with decreased happiness and well-being among those endorsing negative hedonic beliefs. Results from three studies utilizing both retrospective and prospective research designs generally support this prediction and suggest that endorsing the belief that happiness involves a lack of negative hedonic experiences is associated with more negative outcomes in response to the experience of heightened life stress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wellbeing is gaining acceptance as an indicator of social and economic progress by many governments and agencies. As such the scientific community is actively engaging in developing scales to gauge wellbeing at a community and national level. A common approach used comprises of asking subjects a single question on happiness. A major issue with single questions is the difficulty to establish reliability. Recognising this issue, researchers have developed an itemised Global Happiness Scale (GHS) comprising of four items. GHS is reported to have satisfactory reliability and convergent validity and the scale has been translated into a number of different languages. However to ensure GHS is measuring happiness at a global level, that is measuring eudaimonic happiness, it is necessary to ensure it is immune to hedonic happiness. GHS had not been previously subjected to a hedonic immunity test, which the current study addressed. This paper reports and discusses the reliability and hedonic immunity of GHS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that happiness is an exclusively categorical mental state. Daniel Haybron's inclusion of dispositions into his emotional state theory rests of a confusion of constituents of happiness in the narrow psychological sense with objects of prudential concern, to which obviously belong 'mood propensities' and other dispositional states. I further argue that while it is probably correct to require of a constituent of happiness that it must in some sense be 'deep' and belong to, or directly impact on, a persons' self, the importance of depth may be overrated by the emotional state theory, which also ignores the possibility that mental states other than moods and emotions can be deep in the relevant sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pleasure has long been implicated as an important aspect of happiness. Unfortunately, the study of pleasure in the science of happiness has largely been relegated to positive affective states. While pleasure and affect are difficult to disentangle there is, we argue, utility in examining pleasure on its own merits rather than using proxy measures such as those of positive affect. Relatively little research exists directly connecting sensual pleasures and similar pleasurable experiences with happiness. In this research, we used a large international sample (N = 229,728) to explore individual and cross-national differences in pleasure. In particular, we examined the dominant pleasure profiles of nations as well as the relations of personality, gender and age to pleasure variables. These pleasure profiles were drawn from an examination of distinct pleasure leanings including those associated with taste, touch, smell, sight, hearing, achievement, relaxation, social connection and thrills. Our findings reveal significant relationships between personality, gender, age and culture-respectively-with pleasure. The specific relationships are discussed in detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in eudaimonia (e.g., growth, meaning, authenticity, excellence) and its distinction from hedonia (e.g., pleasure, enjoyment, comfort, absence of distress) is growing rapidly, as researchers recognize that both concepts are central to the study of well-being. Yet research on these concepts faces challenges as well: findings based on different operationalizations can be quite discrepant; definitions of eudaimonia and hedonia sometimes fall into different categories of analysis (e.g. when eudaimonia is described as a way of functioning, hedonia as an experience); and the terms eudaimonia and hedonia are sometimes defined vaguely or applied to concepts that may be mere correlates. To aid in addressing these challenges, we propose the following terminology and classification for discussing conceptual and operational definitions: (1) degree of centrality-differentiating concepts that are core (i.e., definitional), close-to-core (i.e., given some attention but not central), and major correlates; (2) category of analysis-identifying which of the following categories a definition represents: (a) orientations (orientations, values, motives, and goals), (b) behaviors (behavioral content, activity characteristics), (c) experiences (subjective experiences, emotions, cognitive appraisals), (d) functioning (indices of positive psychological functioning, mental health, flourishing); and (3) level of measurement-identifying whether a definition is used for trait and/or state comparisons. The work of scholars with a program of research on eudaimonia or the distinction between eudaimonia and hedonia is reviewed and discussed within the framework of the proposed classification; several points of convergence and divergence across definitions are highlighted; and important questions and directions for future research are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both personality and emotional experiences may be influenced by people's time perspectives. The Zimbardo time perspective inventory measures five trait dimensions related to past, present and future perspectives. Two studies were conducted to investigate how these time perspective dimensions related to mood. The first study (n = 260) confirmed that ZTPI scales predicted moods including energetic arousal, tense arousal and Hedonic Tone, revealing that past negative and Present Hedonistic time perspectives are the most robust predictors of current emotional states. Moreover, future time perspective proved to predict energetic arousal, but the effect was suppressed by present hedonism. The second study (n = 65) measured mood twice in a 4-week period, and focused on relationships between the ZTPI and recalled and anticipated mood. Analyses conducted using DBTP, an index of temporal harmony based on the ZTPI scores, proved that balanced time perspective was related to more positive mood states in both studies. Findings confirmed that time perspective appears to influence both recall and anticipation of mood. For example, past negative time perspective is associated with anticipation of negative moods, and Past Positive perspective relates to both recall and anticipation of energy. Time perspective may structure the individual's affective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals' lay conceptions of well-being have been found to be associated with several indexes of positive psychological functioning, yet little is known about the mechanisms underlying these associations. In two studies, the current research examined whether conception-congruent behavior mediates associations between conceptions of well-being and two indexes of experienced well-being (subjective well-being and meaning in life). Study 1 addressed the above question using a prospective approach, whereby associations between conceptions of well-being, predicted engagement in hedonic and eudaimonic behavior, and predicted well-being were examined. Study 2 more directly addressed the above question using a daily diary approach, whereby conceptions of well-being, actual engagement in hedonic and eudaimonic behavior, and experienced well-being were assessed over a period of 1 week. In both studies, results indicated that associations between eudaimonic conception dimensions and experienced well-being were partially mediated by engagement in eudaimonic behavior. Hedonic conception dimensions were largely unrelated to hedonic behavior and well-being. The current findings thus suggest that eudaimonic behavior is one potential route through which eudaimonic conception dimensions exert their salubrious effects on well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies that have used both spirituality and religiousness measures to predict mental well-being are virtually nonexistent. Furthermore, in almost all of the past studies, the distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic aspects of well-being has not been taken into account. To address these limitations, the present study sought to examine the relation between spirituality and religiousness and a rather comprehensive set of well-being scales in an Iranian Muslim sample. Participants were 292 undergraduates at the University of Tehran. Results of bivariate correlation analysis showed that all aspects of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being were positively correlated with all aspects of spirituality and religiousness. Results of the multiple regression analysis demonstrated that spirituality was a stronger predictor of well-being than religiousness. In order to further examine the unique contribution of spirituality and religiousness over each other and gender, hierarchical regression analysis was applied. Findings indicated that while spirituality was a significant predictor of well-being after partialling out the effects of gender and religiousness, religiousness did not add significantly to the prediction of well-being over and above the contribution of gender and spirituality. Implications of the results are discussed, as are study limitations and directions for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hedonia (seeking pleasure and comfort) and eudaimonia (seeking to use and develop the best in oneself) are often seen as opposing pursuits, yet each may contribute to well-being in different ways. We conducted four studies (two correlational, one experience-sampling, and one intervention study) to determine outcomes associated with activities motivated by hedonic and eudaimonic aims. Overall, results indicated that: between persons (at the trait level) and within persons (at the momentary state level), hedonic pursuits related more to positive affect and carefreeness, while eudaimonic pursuits related more to meaning; between persons, eudaimonia related more to elevating experience (awe, inspiration, and sense of connection with a greater whole); within persons, hedonia related more negatively to negative affect; between and within persons, both pursuits related equally to vitality; and both pursuits showed some links with life satisfaction, though hedonia's links were more frequent. People whose lives were high in both eudaimonia and hedonia had: higher degrees of most well-being variables than people whose lives were low in both pursuits (but did not differ in negative affect or carefreeness); higher positive affect and carefreeness than predominantly eudaimonic individuals; and higher meaning, elevating experience, and vitality than predominantly hedonic individuals. In the intervention study, hedonia produced more well-being benefits at short-term follow-up, while eudaimonia produced more at 3-month follow-up. The findings show that hedonia and eudaimonia occupy both overlapping and distinct niches within a complete picture of well-being, and their combination may be associated with the greatest well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilitarian philosophy holds that public policy should aim at greater happiness for a greater number of people. This moral tenet meets many objections, on pragmatic grounds it is denounced as unfeasible and on ideological grounds as undesirable. As a result the principle is marginal in policy making. In this paper I consider these classic philosophical qualms in the light of recent empirical research on life-satisfaction. The data show first of all that the principle is feasible; happiness of a great number is possible in contemporary conditions and it is also possible to create more of it. The data also show that the promotion of happiness fits well with other ideals; happiness requires conditions that we value, such as freedom, and happiness fosters matters that we value, such as good health and civil behaviour. Though happiness can conflict with these values in theory, it appears to match them in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an earlier paper I defended an emotional state theory of happiness. In a basic form, emotional state theories identify happiness with a person’s moods and emotions. To this formulation I added a second component, “mood propensity”: roughly, an individual’s disposition to experience moods, which can vary with the circumstances. Scott Hill argues that this view is vulnerable to a serious counterexample and that my intuitive arguments for it are unconvincing. This paper extends my earlier defense of mood propensity as an aspect of happiness, in the process replying to Hill’s objections. I argue that the intuitive considerations favoring my view are not weakened by the points Hill raises. Moreover, the inclusion of dispositional elements in a theory of happiness is actually quite common, and there are good substantive, and not just intuitive, reasons for incorporating mood propensity in the account. In particular, it seems to be required by the guiding conception of happiness as a matter of a person’s overall emotional condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epicurus was a philosopher who lived in Greece in the 3rd century B.C. Like his contemporaries, he was much concerned with the question of how to live a good life. In his view the Chief Good is to decrease pain and increase pleasure. Though Epicurus is reputed for advocating the pursuit of refined sensorial pleasures, he recognized the need for deferring gratification or enduring pain. He advised his followers to lead a modest and contemplative life in friendly communities. His advice can be characterized as ‘serene hedonism’. This paper explains that position and considers its applicability for the present day. It concludes that Epicureanism was quite accurate in describing the conditions of happiness and that he offered valuable guidelines in dealing with hardship and difficult emotional content. His ideas that happiness is the same as the absence of pain and that one should withdraw from society are less fortunate. It made him assume that happiness automatically follows if one is in the right state of mind, and that there is no need to actively seek interaction with the environment for the betterment of the circumstances of life. However, Epicurus’ advice might have been a good option for his contemporaries given the societal turmoil in his times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To get happiness forget about it; then, with any luck, happiness will come as a by-product in pursuing meaningful activities and relationships. This adage is known as the paradox of happiness, but actually it contains a number of different paradoxes concerning aims, success, freedom, and attitudes. These paradoxes enhance our understanding of the complexity of happiness and its interaction with other values in good lives, that is, lives which are happy as well as morally decent, meaningful, and fulfilling. Yet, each paradox conveys a one-sided truth that needs to be balanced with others. Happiness, understood as subjective well-being, involves positively evaluating our lives and living with a sense of well-being. As such, it should not be confused with either pleasure or normative conceptions of “true” happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on well-being can be thought of as falling into two traditions. In one—the hedonistic tradition—the focus is on happiness, generally defined as the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect. In the other—the eudaimonic tradition—the focus is on living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. Recognizing that much recent research on well-being has been more closely aligned with the hedonistic tradition, this special issue presents discussions and research reviews from the eudaimonic tradition, making clear how the concept of eudaimonia adds an important perspective to our understanding of well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article distinguishes between hedonic and eudaimonic approaches to wellness, with the former focusing on the outcome of happiness or pleasure and the latter focusing not so much on outcomes as on the process of living well. We present a model of eudaimonia that is based in self-determination theory, arguing that eudaimonic living can be characterized in terms of four motivational concepts: (1) pursuing intrinsic goals and values for their own sake, including personal growth, relationships, community, and health, rather than extrinsic goals and values, such as wealth, fame, image, and power; (2) behaving in autonomous, volitional, or consensual ways, rather than heteronomous or controlled ways; (3) being mindful and acting with a sense of awareness; and (4) behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In fact, we theorize that the first three of these aspects of eudaimonic living have their positive effects of psychological and physical wellness because they facilitate satisfaction of these basic, universal psychological needs. Studies indicate that people high in eudaimonic living tend to behave in more prosocial ways, thus benefiting the collective as well as themselves, and that conditions both within the family and in society more generally contribute toward strengthening versus diminishing the degree to which people live eudaimonic lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia was evaluated in three data sets involving use of the Personally Expressive Activities Questionnaire—Standard Form (PEAQ-S) with college student samples ( n > 200 in each sample). Indices of these two conceptions of happiness were strongly and reliably related across the three samples. Differences between these two conceptions of happiness were evaluated in two ways. First, we examined and compared correlations of hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia with variables related to intrinsic motivation. Zero-order correlations involving hedonic enjoyment were significantly stronger with respect to measures of self-determination and interest than were the corresponding correlations involving feelings of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia). In contrast, correlations involving eudaimonia were significantly stronger with measures of the balance of challenges and skills, self-realization values, effort, and importance than were the corresponding correlations with hedonic enjoyment. Second, we empirically distinguished between activities for which both hedonic enjoyment and eudaimonia are present (intrinsically motivated activities) and activities for which hedonic enjoyment alone is present (hedonically enjoyed activities). Intrinsically motivated activities were judged to be significantly higher with respect to measures of the balance of challenges and skills, self-realization values, effort, importance, interest, and flow experiences. No differences between the two categories of activities were found for self-determination and the frequency with which activities were performed. Given these distinguishable patterns in the two conceptions of happiness, a reconceptualization for the understanding of intrinsic motivation is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of happiness in the good life of a person. There are three aspects of the notion of good life, well-being or quality of life. Philosophers have formulated different theories of the good life including the hedonistic theory, the desire-fulfillment theory and the objectivist pluralism theory. Good life can be classified as subjective or objective, internalist or externalist. There are four conceptions of happiness with regards to the pure happiness theory.

The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narrow hedonism is defined and defended, as a view according to which pleasurable states are individuated as concrete and total experiential situations of a sentient being at a time. Typical of such situations is that, when we are in them, we are at a certain hedonic level. They feel in a certain way for the creature in them. On this understanding of narrow hedonism, which is the only one making good sense of the theory and which was probably also intended by classical hedonists such as Bentham and Edgeworth, standard objections to hedonism, based on the claim that different pleasures have nothing in common, can be set to one side as misplaced and irrelevant. It is also hard to see how this kind of hedonism can be refined, or revised, in the direction indicated by J.S. Mill, when he wants to distinguish “higher” pleasures from “lower” ones. On this understanding of hedonism, we must claim that, those who want to follow Mill will have to rely on non-hedonistic intuitions and thus desert the hedonist camp altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although attaining happiness is a nearly universal goal, surprisingly little research has focused on how happiness can be increased and then sustained. Three studies test predictions of a model (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005) positing that sustainable happiness is possible through intentional activity changes, more so than through circumstantial changes. Study 1 shows that less hedonic adaptation is reported in response to activity changes than to circumstantial changes. Study 2 tests a dynamic process model, showing that while both positive activity changes and positive circumstantial changes predict rank-order increases in subjective well-being from Time 1 to Time 2, only activity changes predict maintained gains at Time 3. Study 3 replicates the Study 2 findings and extends them to psychological well-being (Ryff and Keyes, 1995). Implications for positive psychology and “the pursuit of happiness” are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pleasures of eating were explored in semi-structured interviews with nine female and seven male persons. Qualitative analysis of interview transcripts revealed two substantial features of hedonic eating experiences. First, they encompass a variety of components: In the stimulus domain, the foods, features of the physical environment, and social factors; in the domain of the organism a specific somato-psychic state and an attitude towards hedonism; in the domain of responses preparatory activities, specific characteristics of eating behavior, and positive sensations and emotions. Second, pleasures of eating depend on a variety of external and internal conditions. External conditions go far beyond the food itself: Physical features of the environment and social factors amplify food-induced positive affective reactions and embed them in an individually unique setting. Internal conditions include motivational, cognitive and behavioral factors: People who enjoy eating have the explicit intention to enjoy, they eat slowly and focus upon salient features of foods and environments, and they often engage in social activities before, during and after the meal. Hedonic eating experiences can best be understood as “appetite gestalten”, i.e. individually specific configurations of stimuli, organism variables, and responses. A holistic, multi-component perspective is suggested as a framework for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between forgiveness and happiness using a two-dimensional model of happiness (hedonic and eudaimonic happiness). 224 United Kingdom students were administered the Enright Forgiveness Inventory, The Depression-Happiness Scale and the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire - Short-form. The present findings suggest that forgiveness accounts for statistically significant variance, albeit quite low, in both hedonic and eudaimonic happiness and the relationships may vary depending on which aspect of happiness is being considered. In terms of shorter-term hedonic happiness, the present findings suggest it is important not to engage in negative cognitions about the transgression. In terms of maintaining eudaimonic happiness, engaging in positive behaviours and feelings may lead to, be the result of, or be very much part of longer-term happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different orientations to happiness and their association with life satisfaction were investigated with 845 adults responding to Internet surveys. We measured life satisfaction and the endorsement of three different ways to be happy through pleasure, through engagement, and through meaning. Each of these three orientations individually predicted life satisfaction. People simultaneously low on all three orientations reported especially low life satisfaction. These findings point the way toward a distinction between the full life and the empty life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hedonism is a way of life, characterised by openness to pleasurable experience. There are many qualms about hedonism. It is rejected on moral grounds and said to be detrimental to long-term happiness. Several mechanisms for this 'paradox of hedonism' have been suggested and telling examples of pleasure seekers ending up in despair have been given. But is that the rule? If so, how much pleasure is too much? An overview of the available knowledge is given in this paper. The relation between hedonism and happiness has been studied at two levels: that of the nation and the individual. At the national level average happiness is correlated with moral acceptance of pleasure and with active leisure. At the individual level it is similarly linked with hedonistic attitudes and also correlated with hedonistic behaviours such as frequent sex and use of stimulants. In most cases the pattern is linearly positive. The relation between happiness and consumption of stimulants follows an inverted U-curve, spoilsports and guzzlers are less happy than modest consumers. Yet, these data cannot settle the issue, since the observed relations may be spurious or due to the effects of happiness on hedonism rather than the reverse. Even if we can prove a positive effect of (mild) hedonism on happiness, there is still the question of how that gains balances against a possible loss of health. A solution is to assess the effect of hedonistic living on the number of years lived happily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experience-sampling studies are used to study the emotional component of subjective well-being (hedonic balance). This manuscript examines conceptual and methodological issues in the measurement of hedonic balance, and it relates aspects of affective experiences (frequency, intensity, and duration) to affective dispositions (extraversion, neuroticism) and life-satisfaction. Aggregates of experience-sampling data are influenced by response styles, but the effect is negligible. Pleasant affects and unpleasant affects show high discriminant validity. Extraversion is more highly related to aspects of pleasant affects than unpleasant affects, and neuroticism is more highly related to aspects of unpleasant affects than pleasant affects. Mean levels (i.e., frequency * intensity) of affects are the aspects that best predict life-satisfaction. The specific item happiness is a better predictor of life-satisfaction than the average of all pleasant affects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]