1. Benign moral hazard and the cost-effectiveness analysis of insurance coverage
- Author
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Mark V. Pauly and Philip J. Held
- Subjects
Cost effectiveness ,Moral hazard ,Cost-Benefit Analysis ,Decision Making ,Medicare ,Morale hazard ,Humans ,Revenue ,health care economics and organizations ,Aged ,Service (business) ,Health Services Needs and Demand ,Insurance, Health ,Models, Statistical ,Actuarial science ,Public economics ,Health Policy ,Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health ,Cost-effectiveness analysis ,Pneumonia, Pneumococcal ,United States ,Intervention (law) ,Immunization ,Business ,Social Welfare ,Insurance coverage - Abstract
When a medical intervention is found to be cost effective, what level of insurance coverage should apply to it? The optimal level of coverage may be less than or greater than full coverage of medical care costs; a finding of cost effectiveness for a service does not necessarily imply v full coverage or coverage at the same rate as other services. If there is some imperfection in the ability to translate higher insurance benefits into higher insurer revenues, the optimal level of coverage will be greater the higher the degree of moral hazard applying to the service.
- Published
- 1990
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