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British politics immediately following the Boer War featured a group of politicians and intellectuals known as the Liberal Imperialists and this account explores the political thought of their Australian counterparts. Australian liberal intellectuals of particular relevance for this study were located in Melbourne, which was at that time the federal capital, and they were loosely clustered around the key political figure of the period, Alfred Deakin. The extended circle of Alfred Deakin provides scholars with a useful group of active intellectuals from whom it is possible to derive an idea of the Australian inflection given to Liberal Imperialist thought, concentrating on the intersection of notions of imperial unity and progressive social reform agendas which flourished in both Australia and Britain during the Edwardian era. The group of politicians and public intellectuals, comprising an overlapping membership including the Imperial Federation League, friends and associates of Alfred Deakin and the Boobooks Club, would subsequently evolve into the main Australian branch of the Round Table organisation. This article is concerned with discovering the outlines of the Australian version of Liberal Imperialist thought and especially the nature of the Australian inflection superimposed on this British set of ideas, as found in a variety of contemporary pamphlets, printed books and Boobooks minutes. The Australians were less pessimistic than Richard Jebb about the possibilities of a supranational imperial organisation but also insisted that such an organisation must respect the sovereignty of dominions. They differed from most of their British counterparts in supporting the widespread use of tariffs to nurture industry and they also supported the restrictive immigration position enshrined in the infamous White Australia policy, yet they were much in favour of the notion of a strong British navy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the early 1970s, Australia and Britain found themselves embroiled in an embarrassing diplomatic controversy over Australia's failure to provide an assisted passage to Jan Allen, a British citizen of Jamaican descent. Allen lodged a formal complaint with the British Race Relations Board, arguing he had been denied assistance on the grounds of his race. The Board was compelled to investigate the case, raising the possibility that British and Australian officials would face legal charges. This article outlines the complex diplomatic negotiations that surrounded the case and assesses its outcome. It argues that the controversy marked an important milestone in Australia-British relations, reinforcing the fact that British race patriotism could no longer mediate the self-identities and interrelations of the two countries. It contributed to Britain's decision to withdraw its support for the United Kingdom-Australia Assisted Passage Scheme and the eventual abolition of Australia's ‘White Australia’ policy [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For the government of New Zealand, the role of high commissioner in the United Kingdom was of paramount significance. The Labour government's 1935 electoral success was followed quickly by the appointment of William Jordan to fill this role. British-born and with a very visible loyalty to the Crown and the imperial idea, during the pre-war years he was nonetheless not averse to offering stringent opinions on British foreign policy. An active participant in the League of Nations, he believed passionately in the value of collective security and the need to forcefully deter the dictators. The war's outbreak in September 1939 hit him particularly hard but his support for the British Empire's greatest challenge remained resolute. His High Commission was blessed with an abundance of talent to handle all the key issues and despite the considerable distances involved, a regular stream of visitors from New Zealand were prepared to make the arduous journey, including among them Prime Minister Peter Fraser. Their host was a complex character who was noted for a ‘volcanic’ temper and clashed regularly with members of his staff, visiting political figures from home, fellow dominions' high commissioners and even British dignitaries. Yet, for the sake of the Commonwealth alliance, all this was kept successfully behind closed doors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines Stanley Melbourne Bruce's role as Australian high commissioner in London during the approach to the Second World War and the European War from 1939 to 1941. It argues that Bruce in this period was an influential high commissioner who strongly influenced Australian foreign policy and exercised some influence, albeit with limitations, on the British government. After 1933, Bruce had transformed the office of Australian high commissioner in London from a largely commercial position into one with real diplomatic influence. In the approach to war, Bruce tended to bolster the policy of appeasement on which the Chamberlain government was already decided and in the Phoney War his cautious arguments contributed to the delay of the Allied intervention in Norway. With the accession of Winston Churchill to the prime ministership in May 1940, Bruce lost some of the influence he had had with Neville Chamberlain and he was on the losing side of the argument inside the British Cabinet about the possibility of a negotiated peace in May–June 1940. Despite the limitations of his personal relationship with Churchill, he was nonetheless an influential voice with other British ministers and senior officials and with the US ambassador in London and key members of the Roosevelt administration. This equipped him to play an effective part in the emerging Anglo-American alliance and issues of post-war international reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike the high commissioners from the other dominions, Sidney Waterson was not in London before the war and represented his country only until the end of 1942. Because of this, while Waterson is the focus of this essay, a discussion of his predecessor, Charles Te Water (1929–39), and of his two successors, Deneys Reitz (1943–44) and George Heaton Nicholls (1945–47), places his term of office in context. The essay touches on Waterson's background and examines his attitude to Britain and the war effort. Initially inexperienced and without the political clout of high commissioners like Massey of Canada and Bruce of Australia, he was also overshadowed by Smuts who, enjoying direct contact with Churchill and other British officials, frequently bypassed him. Smuts's instructions to his high commissioners were explicit: their task of representing South African interests in London was to take second place to that of offering uncritical support to the British government in its prosecution of the war. Despite his commitment to the war effort, Waterson found it difficult giving this support. Throughout his term of office he was critical of the way in which the British government prosecuted the war and was resentful of Churchill's attitude to the dominions in general and the high commissioners in particular, believing that he fobbed them off with second-rate men as secretaries of state for the dominions. Thus, although he was a highly successful high commissioner and under him South Africa House was run as a tight ship, he never succeeded in persuading Smuts of the necessity of urging Churchill to pay more attention to the dominions nor did he succeed in gaining more political clout for the high commissioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The demands of the Second World War had long-term consequences for Britain's future relations with its four self-governing dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Forged by war, a key component in this evolving diplomatic relationship was the office of the high commissioner, which by 1950, became the main conduit of communications between the British and dominion governments. This essay introduces some of the main actors and tensions within the ‘family circle’, especially during the first three years of the conflict, when, after the fall of France in June 1940, the British Empire stood almost alone until the United States entered hostilities in December 1941. Christened the ‘junior war cabinet’, the influence of the dominion high commissioners reached its height in 1940, only to decline rapidly with the coming of Winston Churchill to power in May 1940. Indeed, their influence within Whitehall was directly linked with who was dominions secretary and the influence, or not, they had with the prime minister. This article pursues several lines of inquiry. First, there is a brief outline of the growing historiography on this subject which is followed by how the modern-day high commissioner was created during the inter-war period. Second, there is an examination of the dominion high commissioners themselves, their activities as a group, their varying approaches to their office and their relations with the Dominions Office. Finally, interwoven within the analysis, is an exploration of how these men were viewed by their counterparts in Whitehall, especially Churchill, who was determined to control the strategic direction of the war without any interference from the dominions or their representatives in London. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 13 March 1979, the first unconstitutional change of power in the Eastern Caribbean occurred in Grenada, a member of the Commonwealth, when the radical New Jewel Movement overthrew Prime Minister Eric Gairy. This article examines the policy of the British government towards the new People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) during the first month of the 'revolution'. It demonstrates that in contrast to the alarmist reactions of some of Grenada's neighbours, and the United States' intense concern about the PRG's pro-Cuban leanings, British policy was more optimistic and relaxed and designed to 'keep a line open' to Grenada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship has shown how conceptualisations of religion were not a given but the site of historical conflict in the creation of nation-states. In light of this insight, it is time to revisit the history of Britain's political engagement with the phenomenon of nationalism during the era of decolonisation. One important but under-studied case involves Britain's relationship with Muhammad Idris ibn al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (1889-1983) and the Sanusi brotherhood during the Second World War, a crucial phase in the evolution of Anglo-Libyan relations. Although the assessment of military exigencies and the calculation of strategic interests played an important part in determining Britain's attitude towards the Sanusi they do not tell the whole story. British support of Idris was also premised on the adaptability of the Sanusi Order and the probable reformulation of the role of Islam in the context of an emerging nation-state. By charting the evolution of the pro-Sanusi, pro-Idris case within British circles, this article highlights the interesting interaction between orientalism, religion and nationalism that shaped Anglo-Sanusi relations during the Second World War. While historians have long recognised the links between orientalism and formal imperialism there were also interesting connections between orientalism and nationalism that deserve equal consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing interpretations stress that challenges to British interests elsewhere in the Mediterranean were central to Britain's initial support for Maltese incorporation into the United Kingdom. Through a close examination of official British records, this article demonstrates, by contrast, that Britain saw integration primarily as a means of solving the complex constitutional and financial problems which had impeded smooth Anglo-Maltese relations since the restoration of responsible government in 1947. Equally, the waning of British enthusiasm for integration can be traced to concerns about the costs of the scheme, especially in the face of Maltese insistence on ‘economic equivalence’, rather than to any downgrading of Malta's importance in the wake of the 1956 Suez debacle. The Maltese premier Dom Mintoff's insistence on equivalence as the price of integration and Britain's equal determination to resist such claims provide the key to explaining the scheme's demise. Ultimately, Malta followed a more conventional path to independence within the Commonwealth by September 1964. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the reasons behind the reluctance of Canada under the leadership of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King to support Great Britain's aim to develop Canada as the Arsenal of the British Empire, or at least as a major arsenal during the Second World War. Economic condition of Canada during the war; Reasons why British departments did not contract with Canadian firms to meet their requirements; Controversy over the contract to manufacture the Bren machine gun.

Reassesses the decision of Great Britain to withdraw from negotiations to form a new federation for its remaining federal territories in the Eastern Caribbean following the dissolution of the Federation of the West Indies in 1962. British territories involved in the negotiations; Observations about the disintegration of the Federation of West Indies; Reasons behind the failure of the negotiations.