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Identity sharing systems, regardless of their architectural models, share common vulnerabilities. These systems compel users to divulge personal information and furnish proof of identity for accessing services, leaving them susceptible to data breaches that can culminate in identity theft and jeopardize online data security. While blockchain technology offers a potential remedy, delivering enhanced security, immutability, and traceability, it simultaneously raises pertinent concerns surrounding privacy and transparency. The integration of zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) technology has emerged as a promising solution, particularly in enhancing privacy within the transparent blockchain ecosystem. Our paper conducts an exhaustive survey of the existing literature, with a particular focus on the assimilation of ZKP technology into blockchain for the secure sharing of user identities. We undertake a critical evaluation of the advancements achieved in this domain, pinpoint the formidable challenges that must be confronted, and uncover nascent opportunities for further exploration. Our contribution transcends the realms of mere summarization and analysis; we go a step further by offering recommendations drawn from real-world case studies and delineating future research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AES is the most widely used symmetric cipher. Many cryptographic primitives are designed following the structure of AES, called AES-like ciphers. Mixture differential cryptanalysis is a structural cryptanalysis technique for AES, which gave the best key recovery attack on 5-round AES in the chosen-plaintext setting and attacks with practical data and memory complexities on round-reduced AES. In this paper, we study the mixture differential attacks on 6 rounds of AES-like ciphers, and propose two improved attacks towards optimizing time and data complexities respectively. As an application to AES, we give the improved mixture differential attack on 6 rounds of AES-128 with time complexity 2 62. 74 , reducing by a factor of 2 10. 26 compared with the previous mixture differential attack. For low data complexity, we show the improved 6-round mixture differential attack on AES-128 with data complexity 2 24. 05 , reducing by a factor of about 4. We also apply two attacks to 6 super-rounds of Saturnin, one of the second-round candidates in NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process, which is the first security evaluation of Saturnin against mixture differential cryptanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]