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Mutually beneficial cooperation is a common part of economic systems as firms in partial cooperation with others can often make a higher sustainable profit. Though cooperative games were popular in 1950s, recent interest in noncooperative games is prevalent despite the fact that cooperative bargaining seems to be more useful in economic and political applications. In this paper we assume that the strategy space and time are inseparable with respect to a contract. Furthermore, it is assumed that each firm's strategy polygon is a geodesic polygon which changes its shape every point of time with the stubbornness strategy surface of firm's executive board follow a Gaussian free field. This gives us more flexibility to deal with generalized geodesic cooperative games which is the main contribution of this paper. Under this environment we show that the strategy spacetime is a dynamic curved Liouville-like 2-brane quantum gravity surface under asymmetric information and that traditional Euclidean geometry fails to give a proper feedback Nash equilibrium. Cooperation occurs when two firms' strategies fall into each other's influence curvature in this strategy spacetime. Small firms in an economy dominated by large firms are subject to the influence of large firms. We determine an optimal feedback semicooperation of the small firm in this case using a Liouville-Feynman path integral method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by debates about California's net migration loss, we employ valued exponential-family random graph models to analyze the inter-county migration flow network in the United States. We introduce a protocol that visualizes the complex effects of potential underlying mechanisms and perform in silico knockout experiments to quantify their contribution to the California Exodus. We find that racial dynamics contribute to the California Exodus, urbanization ameliorates it, and political climate and housing costs have little impact. Moreover, the severity of the California Exodus depends on how one measures it, and California is not the state with the most substantial population loss. This paper demonstrates how generative statistical models can provide mechanistic insights beyond simple hypothesis-testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Inequality Process (IP) has been tested and confirmed against data on incomes that are approximately gamma distributed. The IP's gamma pdf (probability density function) model expresses statistics of IP particle wealth algebraically in terms of IP parameters for the subset of IP parameters that generate approximately gamma distributions of particle wealth, a serious limitation, one leaving statistics of the many empirical distributions of income and wealth with heavier-than-gamma distribution right tails beyond algebraic expression in terms of IP particle parameters. This paper shows that an IP variance-gamma (VG) pdf model can do for the entire interval on which IP particle parameters are defined, (0,1), what the IP's gamma pdf model does for only a subset. This paper thus generalizes the IP's gamma pdf model, and it does so with no loss of parsimony since the IP's VG pdf model is, like the IP's gamma pdf model, expressed in terms of IP particle parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a comment on the paper "Institutions as Production Systems," by Thomas J. Fararo and John Skvoretz that appear in the 1984 issue of the "Journal of Mathematical Sociology." Adoption of a formal representation of the rules, that govern institutionalized social action, as "production rules"; Assertion that the paper by Fararo and Skvoretz provides a clear and informative introduction to their approach and demonstrates the importance of their general line of inquiry for sociology; Views on the three aspects of their work: the proposed formalism, the more substantive view or interpretation they suggest of the subject matter and the question of empirical testing.

Latent class analysis (LCA) is a cross-sectional latent variable mixture modeling (LVMM) approach. Like all LVMM approaches, LCA aims to find heterogeneity within the population by identifying homogenous subgroups of individuals, with each subgroup (called latent class) possessing a unique set of characteristics that differentiate it from other subgroups. LCA can be carried out with categorical latent and indicator variables. But, LCA is unable to examine the association between respective items and the latent variable among categories of individuals. Multiple-group LCA, in particular, is a useful extension of LCA which enables the testing of homogeneity of the class patterns between groups of the individual through a series of constraints. In this paper, we have performed a multi-group latent class analysis for measuring self reported academic dishonesty among the students of University of Jammu. From the analysis, three general behaviors of academic cheaters are identified as rare, frequent, and instant cheaters. Further, from the multi-group LCA, it is envisaged that female students of University of Jammu are more instantaneous cheaters than male students. Students who are self-reported cheaters from sciences and humanities of the University of Jammu are persistent in cheating whereas from professional courses they are more occasional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, by defining two types of signed detour distances and corresponding detour distance matrices, we introduce the notion of detour distance compatibility for signed graphs and later applying these concepts, we give yet another characterization of balance in signed graphs. Further, we discuss signed detour spectra of certain classes of unbalanced signed graphs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops and illustrates a method for empirically designing an income tax system that people will regard as fair. The paper begins with the classical Principles of Tax Justice, viz., as pretax income increases, three quantities should also increase – posttax income, tax amount, and tax rate. GSOEP data on residents' pretax income and the posttax income they regard as fair are used to estimate a just linear income tax system. Analytic results include a signature standard form of the tax system showing the intertwined fates of poor and rich and the conditions which threaten fairness. Empirical results show that the estimated tax system lowers taxes for a majority of respondents, especially the relatively poorer, and substantially reduces inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent months, the figure of Greta Thunberg and the theme of climate changings quickly became the focus of the debate. This has led to a polarization effect in opinion forming about the climate subject. Starting from the analysis of this phenomenon, we develop an opinion dynamics model in which several types of contrarian agents are considered. Each agent is supposed to have an opinion on several topics related to each other; thus, the opinions being formed on these topics are also mutually dependent. The aim of the paper is to investigate the indirect effects of contrarian agents on the collective opinion about these topics. Several numerical tests are presented in order to highlight the main features of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we present an empirical study of the opinion dynamics of a large-scale sample of online social network users. We estimate users' opinions as continuous scalars based on their subscriptions to information sources and analyze how friendship connections affect the dynamics of these estimations. Distinguishing between positive (toward friends' opinions) and negative (away from friends' opinions) opinion shifts, we find that the existence and magnitude of both types of shifts are positively related (largely through linear or inverted U-shaped form) to the distance in opinions between a user and their friends. The distance additionally moderates the balance between positive and negative movements: if the distance is within a certain moderate range, there is a relatively high chance of a positive shift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper intends to simulate a simple artificial society divided into two populations: criminal and non-criminal. The time evolution of the system is modeled using a set of differential equations, borrowing relevant features from the prey-predator, epidemic spread, and harvesting models. Each population can switch type upon interaction. The stability and equilibrium points of this system are examined, concluding that harvesting and interaction rates play an important role in the evolution of the system toward different stable equilibria between populations, which eventually coalesce into one. The results indicate that as long as the harvesting and conversion rates remain sufficiently small, the criminal population thrives. However, when either of the two crosses a certain value, the criminal population becomes extinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In digraphs representing asymmetric relations, the measured scores of previous spectral rankings are usually dominated by nodes in the largest strongly connected component. In our previous work, we proposed hierarchical alpha centrality to give higher scores for more reachable nodes not in the largest strongly connected component. However, without careful consideration of damping parameters, the scores obtained by this method may be unbounded. In this paper, we normalize the adjacency matrix to be stochastic, subsequently damping the resulting Markov chain with a reciprocal perturbation at each and every non-zero transition, and propose a new hierarchical measure of centrality for asymmetric relations. The proposed measure simplifies damping and ensures that the measured scores are bounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a class of Markov models of social mobility with duration memory. Several new duration memory structures as well as existing models, such as the Cornell model, are shown to be special cases of the general model. The model is also extended to heterogeneous populations thereby permitting age specific variants. Alternative axioms to cumulative inertia are included, pointing to new possibilities for duration specific modeling such as futuristic "memory" for currently planned programs. Given that duration effects are widespread and quite varied, the general model provides multiple possibilities for theoretically structuring these processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies structures for efficient and stable integration of multi-community networks where establishing bridges across communities incur additional link cost compared to those within communities. Building on the connections models with direct and indirect benefits, we show that the efficient structure for homogeneous cost and benefit parameters, and for communities of arbitrary size, always has a diameter no greater than 3. We further show that for non-trivial cases, integration always follows one of these three structures: single star, two hub-connected stars, and a new structure we introduce in this paper as parallel hyperstar, which is a special core/periphery structure with parallel bridges that connect the core nodes of different communities. Then we investigate stability conditions of these structures, using the standard pairwise stability, as well as post-transfer pairwise stability, a new stability notion we introduce in this paper, which allows for bilateral utility transfers. We show that while the parallel hyperstar structure can never be both efficient and pairwise stable, once post-transfer pairwise stability is used, efficiency guarantees stability. Furthermore, we show that all possible efficient structures can be simultaneously post-transfer pairwise stable. In the end, we provide some numerical results and discussion of empirical evidences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyze data on the opinion dynamics of 1,660,927 users of an online social network using formal models of opinion formation. We have observed that moderate users have a tendency to follow the average opinion of their online friends, which we interpret as a presence of bounded confidence. Further, we have discovered that the probability of moving toward the average opinion goes down if the difference between it and the user's opinion is too large. Another interesting feature uncovered is that if a user's opinion and the average opinion of their online friends are very similar, the influence also decreases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examined the effect of deliberative democracy on the polarization of opinion. Through three case analyses, we find that deliberative democracy has two major components – provision of information and group discussion. Polarization of opinion can be explained by several theories: social identity theory, social comparison, and confirmation bias. We constructed a deliberative democracy model that reflected these mechanisms of polarization. We found that deliberative democracy actually decreased polarization of opinion when group discussion was a strong factor. Our study provides guidelines for an institutional design incorporating deliberative democracy, with emphasis on the composition of unbiased group discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and for whom does it pay to make high-quality products? In this paper, I address this question through the lens of Harrison White's socioeconomic models of production. The socioeconomic models relate economist incentives of cost-efficiency to sociological insights into the construction of quality on markets. Differences in firm size and quality sustain distinct market niches whose appeal to producers vary. The ordering of niches by quality and associated implications for profitability establish the incentive structure of the market. As illustration, I trace the evolution of the Californian wine industry from its nadir under prohibition to today. The account motivates a productive reading of the socio-economic models that tempers their analytical focus and broadens their scope of application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Contentious politics" has become the main label to define a wide range of previously separated fields of research encompassing topics such as collective action, radicalization, armed insurgencies, and terrorism. Over the past two decades, scholars have tried to bring these various strands together into a unified field of study. In so doing, they have developed a methodology to isolate and analyze the common social and cognitive mechanisms underlying several diverse historical phenomena such as "insurgencies," "revolutions," "radicalization," or "terrorism." A multidisciplinary approach was adopted open to contributions from diverse fields such as economics, sociology, and psychology. The aim of this paper is to add to the multidisciplinarity of the field of Contentious Politics (CP) and introduce the instruments of Agent-Based Modeling and network game-theory to the study of some fundamental mechanisms analyzed within this literature. In particular, the model presented in this paper describes the dynamics of one process, here defined as "the radicalization of politics," and its main underlying mechanisms. Their mechanics are analyzed in diverse social contexts differentiated by the values of four parameters: the extent of repression, inequality, social tolerance, and interconnectivity. The model can be used to explain the basic dynamics underlying different phenomena such as the development of radicalization, populism, and popular rebellions. In the final part, different societies characterized by diverse values of the aforementioned four parameters are tested through Python simulations, thereby offering an overview of the different outcomes that the mechanics of our model can shape according to the contexts in which they operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies information-theoretic measures to consider the systemic effects on individual incomes of complex patterns of social and economic discrimination by race, ethnicity, and gender in the U.S. It estimates non-parametric indices of joint, conditional or incremental, and mutual information between income, social identity, and observable economic characteristics obtained using large-scale cross-sectional data from that economy. The paper advances new conceptual and empirical approaches to the nature and measurement of economic discrimination and inequalities of opportunity, founded on the formal informativeness of measures of social identity on economic outcomes. Estimated values for indices of informational association also cast new light on the effects of the intersections of gender and race/ethnicity on income, perverse patterns in the effects of education across different groups, and a few notable dynamic changes in patterns of income distribution in that economy over the past 40 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fragmentation, echo chambers, and their amelioration in social networks have been a growing concern in the academic and non-academic world. This paper shows how, under the assumption of homophily, echo chambers and fragmentation are system-immanent phenomena of highly flexible social networks, even under ideal conditions for heterogeneity. We achieve this by finding an analytical, network-based solution to the Schelling model and by proving that weak ties do not hinder the process. Furthermore, we derive that no level of positive algorithmic bias in the form of rewiring is capable of preventing fragmentation and its effect on reducing the fragmentation speed is negligible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many social and other networks exhibit stable size scaling relationships, such that features such as mean degree or reciprocation rates change slowly or are approximately constant as the number of vertices increases. Statistical network models built on top of simple Bernoulli baseline (or reference) measures often behave unrealistically in this respect, leading to the development of sparse reference models that preserve features such as mean degree scaling. In this paper, we generalize recent work on the micro-foundations of such reference models to the case of sparse directed graphs with non-vanishing reciprocity, providing a dynamic process interpretation of the emergence of stable macroscopic behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study mathematically models key factors influencing Risk Perception (RP) that involves knowledge inferred from present situations and social learning, past information and priming effect. It is a generalized perception-based model and in the present paper, it is applied to Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The computational model has been simulated for numerous rounds in two phases to find a quantitative value of the model factors. In the first phase, the model reflected dependency of RP upon recent past events and priming, while second phase revealed that social learning modulates RP, even in ASD. This further proves that peer-interaction plays a crucial role in building perception. Thus, our work provides a mathematical framework to evaluate perception objectively in any situation, such as risky/danger-situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pricing practices of firms are an important yet the least studied aspect of the price phenomenon in sociology. This paper answers the question: why do firms, even in the same market, tend to use different pricing practices – value-informed, competition-informed, or cost-informed pricing – to set prices? To that end, this study constructs a formal dynamic flocking model to investigate the inter-dynamics between market uncertainties and the viability of the three pricing practices. The model is a substantial revision and extension of Harrison White's static W(y) market model by reformulating the latter into a dynamic one and by explicitly incorporating different market uncertainties into the model as variables. The study shows that each kind of pricing practice is only viable under certain distributions of market uncertainties. The theory is then used to explain the distribution of pricing practices among firms in the Burgundy wine market. Theoretical and methodological innovations and the implications for firms and for sociological research on markets and uncertainties are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the dynamics of collective action through collective reputation, which indicates the extent to which groups succeed. Many previous works introduced psychological traits such as irrationality and a sense of fairness to explain the diffusion of collective action. However, this paper analyzes the relationship between cooperation and dynamic change in group size using game-theoretic models. The results show the sets of parameters in which positive feedback between cooperation and group size occurs. In these parameter sets, cooperation creates a good collective image (reputation) and encourages outsiders to join the group. In turn, the group expansion gives them incentives to cooperate. Additionally, when this positive feedback functions, punishment is found to be unnecessary for cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this note is to consider the effect of perception noise when voters form public opinions. We provide a simple theoretical framework that will form the basis to investigate empirically the effect of news uncertainty on voters' attentiveness when forming public opinion, or nowcasts. An attentive voter will consistently update their information set. Therefore, if voters' nowcasts are consistent, any revision of the nowcasts must only reflect new information. We specifically consider how news uncertainty may affect voter attentiveness. The paper focuses on US presidential competence and popularity indices. We find that the nowcasts are consistent during periods of low news uncertainty but highly persistent when news uncertainty is high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with a piecewise-deterministic differential game model of political regime changes. We modify and study the model proposed by Boucekkine et al. in [7]. The original model does not allow all players to take full controls as the situation progresses. Hence, it does not lead to closed-loop strategies. We fix the problem by deriving and using a system of quasi-variational inequalities associated with the differential game, and proving a criterion for the regime change. As a result, we find Markovian strategies for all players. A numerical example for illustration of the method is given. Implications of the results to political changes in a society are discussed. Some results are extended to more general models that incorporate gradual and abrupt changes, as well as continuous and impulse controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work revives the classic idea that the sense of justice is the first line of defense against inequality and shows that the link depends, in part, on ideas of the just reward. This paper extends earlier work, making three new contributions: (1) it expands the just reward scenarios from the micro scenarios (which start with the individual's idea of the just reward) to six new macro scenarios (which start with the distribution of everyone's ideas of the just reward); (2) it expands the set of justice measures from three to four, including now the proportion underrewarded; and (3) it obtains results for all the new cases, identifying the conditions that lead to radically different connections between inequality and justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For measuring the centrality in a digraph, Bonacich and Lloyd summarized a vector, from the power series of an attenuated adjacency matrix, as the alpha centrality. However, scores of alpha centrality are usually dominated by nodes in the strongly connected component, which owns the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. In this paper, based on reachability between strongly connected components, we consider not only the largest eigenvalue but also the other smaller ones to attenuate the adjacency matrix hierarchically; and obtain a measure from the power series of the hierarchically attenuated adjacency matrix. Consequently, we propose the hierarchical alpha centrality, which can yield higher scores for nodes at higher hierarchies of reachability in a digraph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Temporal motivation theory (TMT) has been criticized for its static representation and neglect of the environment. In this paper, I develop goal sampling theory (GST) to appease these criticisms and extend our understanding of goal choices beyond momentary preferences and into dynamic updating and sampling behavior across time. GST draws from temporal motivational theory, sampling models of impression formation, and organizational theory on how the environment constrains behavior and situates aspects of each into a formal model of goal sampling. Doing so addresses the limitations of our prior thinking, introduces new concepts and predictions, and provides a mathematical framework that lends itself to computational modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diffusion of Internet-based Intangible Network Goods (IINGs) shows new characteristics completely different from that of traditional material products. This paper aims to establish new models to describe and predict IING's diffusion at the aggregate level. Firstly, we transform the key factors affecting IING's diffusion into driving forces, resistant forces, and variable forces. Secondly, we analyse the dynamic changes of these forces in different diffusion stages and obtain the acceleration model of IING's diffusion. Then, since acceleration is the second derivative of scale, we further establish the scale model of IING's diffusion. As the scale model can predict the number of IING's adopters at a particular time and the acceleration model can explain the dynamic changes of scale, we combine them as the acceleration-scale model to describe IING's diffusion. Finally, we make comparisons between the acceleration-scale model and the Bass model based on three cases. Different from the previous studies, we found that IING's diffusion rate is asymmetric. The diffusion rate of successful IING is right skewed while the diffusion rate of failed IING is left skewed. The results also shows that the acceleration-scale model has a better predictive performance than the Bass model, no matter the diffusion is successful or failed [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we extend the voter model (VM) and the threshold voter model (TVM) to include external influences modeled as a jump process. We study the newly-formulated models both analytically and computationally, employing diffusion approximations and mean field approximations. We derive results pertaining to the probability of reaching consensus on a particular opinion and also the expected consensus time. We find that although including an external influence leads to a faster consensus in general, this effect is more pronounced in the VM as compared to the TVM. Our findings suggest the potential importance of external influences in addition to local interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a stochastic dynamic mathematical model, in which a Family Policy Index (XFPI) is included to measure and compare two different models of provision of resources to support families with children from 0 to 3 years old. The main variables in this model are the XFPI, fertility, mortality, emigration and immigration rates. This mathematical model was validated in two different countries, Spain and Norway, during the 2007–2015 period. A sensitivity analysis was applied to simulate the future trend (2016–2030), examining the influence of providing public pre-school services (0 to 3 years) on (XISF). The results obtained show that these services may indeed have an influence on fertility rates, as long as they are developed extensively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper constructs a new theory of social networks based on reputation. The model assumes that reputation is an asset and that individuals connect by buying options on the reputation of others. In networking, individuals construct portfolios of call options to leverage the reputations of others and put options to hedge the connections with others. A network then consists of portfolios of reputation options. The option model confers advantages not present in existing models. First, the payoff to connecting is the payoff on a portfolio of reputation options. Second, the network forms as individuals take option positions; the network evolves as individuals adjust those positions. Third, networking strategies become option strategies. The model allows for insights into network structure, the price of connecting and the value of connecting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Principal eigenvectors of adjacency matrices are often adopted as measures of centrality for a graph or digraph. However, previous principal-eigenvector-like measures for a digraph usually consider only the strongly connected component whose adjacency submatrix has the largest eigenvalue. In this paper, for each and every strongly connected component in a digraph, we add weights to diagonal elements of its member nodes in the adjacency matrix such that the modified matrix will have the new unique largest eigenvalue and corresponding principal eigenvectors. Consequently, we use the new principal eigenvectors of the modified matrices, based on different strongly connected components, not only to compose centrality measures but also to identify bowtie structures for a digraph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a rigorous mathematical analysis of the Krasnoshchekov model is presented. We have shown that in case a community does not contain any group of people having zero resistance to interpersonal influence, which are moreover isolated from the pressure of the rest of community, the Krasnoshchekov opinion readjustment procedure can be reduced to the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics. In turn, if one repeats the Krasnoshchekov opinion updating rule, the corresponding dynamics forces individuals' opinions to converge eventually to some terminal opinions, which are a consensus under the same conditions as in the French-Harary-DeGroot dynamics. Otherwise, the Krasnoshchekov dynamics exhibits patterns, which are much closer to the behavior of electrons in the superconductivity state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the influence of individual social capital on the persistence of socioeconomic inequality. The set of social relations constitute a form of capital that provides the individual with a wide range of resources. Social capital interacts with other forms of capital, particularly with human capital, to enhance inequality. The overlapping-generations model proposed here focuses on the long-term investment processes in human and social capital. When these effects are considered, a society may end up divided into two groups. The first comprises people stuck in a trap of low intergenerational mobility resources. The second group includes people with increasing levels of education and social capital. Within the last group, income inequalities persist due to initial differences in social capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a dynamic model of minority labor market discrimination. Employers repeatedly decide to hire either minority or majority job candidates whose productivities are unobservable beforehand. Hiring decisions are based on productivity expectations derived from the observable productivity of employers’ previously hired workers. If employers have fewer minority workers initially—a plausible assumption for (numerical) minorities—they discriminate against minority workers over time. Discrimination results from more dispersed minority expectations across the employer population and stronger effects of additional productivity observations on minority expectations. Both effects are a direct consequence of the minority’s initial underrepresentation in firms. I demonstrate the emergence of minority discrimination formally in a two-period hiring model and show simulation results for longer time frames. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper introduces a micro-simulation of job-worker matching with intermediaries (i.e., temp agencies). While many suggest that firms hire workers through intermediaries to save money on compensation, this paper finds that in a world of limited information and geographically limited job search, intermediaries' human resources ability could be a strong enough incentive, independent of compensation. The study also has some auxiliary findings showing that traditional fee structures encourage firms to use intermediaries for low-skill hires and that firms are more likely to use intermediaries when there is more worker heterogeneity. In the empirical analysis, it becomes clear that studies' estimates of indirect employment in the United States are inconsistent, partly because individuals are uncertain of their contractual status and their employer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The original paper (Baggs and Freedman, 1990) gave a model of the interaction of a bilingual with a unilingual population. This paper examines the original in an exhaustive fashion and identifies four possible scenarios in the long-term future of the bilingual population. Equilibrium points are found in a manner conducive to practical interpretation, and their stability is investigated. The original model is then applied to the situation in modern Wales and more briefly to that in Scotland, Ireland and Brittany. In conclusion the capacity of the model to inform policy is considered, and an amended model is suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The puzzle of origins and future of government and social complexity in human and social dynamics, arguably a characteristic feature of the emergence and long-term evolution of hierarchy and power in the history of civilizations, is an enduring topic that has challenged political scientists, anthropological archaeologists, and other social scientists and historians. This paper proposes a new computational theory for the emergence of social complexity that accounts for the earliest formation of systems of government (pristine polities) in prehistory and early antiquity, as well as present and future political development. This general social theory is based on a “fast process” of crisis and opportunistic decision-making through collective action, which feeds a “slow” process of political development or decay. The “fast” core iterative process is “canonical” in the sense that it undergoes variations on a recurring theme of signal detection, information-processing, problem-solving, successful adaptation and occasional failure. When a group is successful in managing or overcoming serious situational changes (stresses or opportunities, endogenous or exogenous, social or physical) a probabilistic phase transition may occur, under a specified set of conditions, yielding a long-term (slow) probabilistic accrual process of emergent sociopolitical complexity and development. A reverse process may account for decay. The canonical theory is being formally implemented through the “PoliGen” agent-based model (ABM), based on the new Multi-Agent Simulator of Networks and Neighborhoods (MASON). Empirically, the theory is testable with the datasets on polities developed by the Long-Range Analysis of War (LORANOW) Project. This paper focuses on the concepts, mechanisms, and basic formal structure that constitute the canonical theory and inform the subsequent simulation model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to develop the model formalized by Hamada (1999b), which generates a distribution of incomes obeying the lognormal law by starting with an individual's rational choice at the micro level. As in the previous work, we employ an iterated investment game as a baseline model in which each player has a binary choice between investing and not investing. Hamada (1999b) showed only that if the game time n is sufficiently large and γ > 1/(R + 1), then the distribution of the profit of an iterated investment game is subject to approximately the normal distribution without cumulative effect on one hand and the lognormal distribution with cumulative effect on the other hand. The present paper develops the previous work considerably and hence specifies the mathematical structure of the model to release special conditions. We succeed in showing that the proposition holds for every γ in (0, 1) by the change of variables theorem with respect to the probability density function of the multidimensional normal distribution. This generalization enables us to exhibit the relation between the Gini coefficient of the lognormal distribution derived from the model and the parameters determining a structure of the game, such as prize density γ and the rate of return R. As a result of analysis, we show some remarkable implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies draw attention on the highly specialized capacity of human beings in recognizing altruists versus cheaters in social interactions. These results hint at the existence of specialized abilities that support discriminating behavior in strategic interactions. In this paper, we explore the implications of discriminating behavior in the study of the indirect evolutionary selection of selfish versus altruistic motivations in the context of generic 2×2 base games, and in particular for coordination and cooperation scenarios. We find that inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism can enforce under rather general conditions socially optimal outcomes, including cases where selfishness cannot, such as in prisoner’s dilemmas. Inequality seeking (Nietzschian) altruism in no case improves upon Rawlsian altruism in terms of social optimality of outcomes, and often does worse. In the cooperation scenario in particular, Nietzschean altruism never manages to implement the cooperative outcome. Under perfect discrimination, moreover, inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism often evolves at the expense of selfishness. These results suggest that the development of sophisticated discrimination abilities may be strongly adaptive in supporting fairness-oriented forms of pro-sociality in humans in the context of social dilemmas and coordination problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When outcome variables are ordinal rather than continuous, the ordered logit model, aka the proportional odds model (ologit/po), is a popular analytical method. However, generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds models (gologit/ppo) are often a superior alternative. Gologit/ppo models can be less restrictive than proportional odds models and more parsimonious than methods that ignore the ordering of categories altogether. However, the use of gologit/ppo models has itself been problematic or at least sub-optimal. Researchers typically note that such models fit better but fail to explain why the ordered logit model was inadequate or the substantive insights gained by using the gologit alternative. This paper uses both hypothetical examples and data from the 2012 European Social Survey to address these shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aksoy and Weesie (2013) propose a formal-game-theoretic model that yields comparative statics predictions about the behavior of actors and actors’ expectations about behaviors of others in nonrepeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. They consider five competing specifications of this model. In this note, we present a Bayesian statistical method to test these five competing specifications, taking the hierarchical nature of the data into account. While this paper is a follow-up to Aksoy and Weesie (2013), the method we discuss is suitable to test multiple comparative statics and is, thus, useful to asses the fit of other game-theoretic models. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Raub and Snijders (1997) show that, under the assumption of S-shaped utility, conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas are more restrictive if outcomes represent losses than if outcomes represent gains. They neglected two interesting issues in their paper: conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas with both losses and gains as outcomes, and the effect of probability weighing on these conditions. In this paper it is shown that, under assumptions of Prospect Theory, conditions for cooperation are best if dilemmas include both positive and negative outcomes, and that these conditions improve with increasing loss aversion. Furthermore, it is shown that probability weighing can effect conditions to cooperate as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is concerned with a celebrated collection of love poems, the 14th century Italian poet Francis Petrarch's Canzoniere. A striking feature of these poems is the emotional ups and downs experienced by Petrarch and his platonic mistress Laura. Recently, attempts have been made to model these emotional swings by catastrophe theory or nonlinear differential equations. This paper takes a different approach. Starting with a pair of differential equations that model the dynamics of the emotions of the two individuals, we formulate an optimal control problem. A key hypothesis of this problem is that Petrarch was a rational addict of his desire for Laura. With specific functional forms and parameter values we identify a stable limit cycle that gives a representation of the oscillating emotions of Laura and Petrarch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the work of Noam Chomsky (1963), this paper presents a hierarchy of grammars and associated computational automata in order to inform social theory construction and method. A detailed exposition of linguistic forms within the grammar hierarchy reveals clear analogues with common social scientific paradigms. Two of these paradigms (which are termed structural and process approaches) are already being widely exploited by formal methodological techniques. A third paradigm, which is rooted in a tradition of interpretive sociology, has been more resistant to formalization. Using arguments from theoretical computer science, the paper suggests that existing quantitative methodologies can be extended to accommodate qualitative arguments which subsume empirical domains as diverse as natural language and structurational phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on the biological work of Boorman and Levitt's Genetics of Altruism to develop a model of diffusion in organizations specifically when the innovation being diffused is controversial. By "controversial", I mean an innovation whose value (and subsequent adoption) is socially determined and not rationally deter- mined - that is, there is no exogenous superior or inferior quality to the innovation that determines its eventual adoption. The purpose of this paper is to model the conditions under which the innovation may come to dominate the organization. The results parallel those of Roorman and Levitt's: (1) In a large undifferentiated organization, no controversial innovation can survive unless it begins with a large proportion of believers in the innovation. (2) However, there are structural conditions under which even a very small minority of innovators can take over a large organization. Contrary to intuition and some of the literature on innovation, these conditions that lead to unexpected innovative adoptions are enhanced by the organization's viscosity, that is, the lack of free movement and exchange of ideas and people throughout the organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Plea bargaining is often explained as a product of caseload pressure in the trial courts. Adherents of this position argue that plea bargaining expedites case flow and moves cases more speedily to sentencing. Yet there is substantial empirical evidence that the proportion of its population that a society incarcerates at any given moment has tended historically to remain relatively constant -- suggesting that, even with plea bargaining, crowded courts do not necessarily produce more convicted and sentenced offenders. More importantly, there is also substantial empirical evidence that changes in caseload have little effect on the prevalence of plea bargaining. Thus, the claim that crowded courts induce plea bargaining as part of an effort by prosecutors, judges and attorneys to move cases more rapidly has been called increasingly into question. The purpose of this paper is to advance an alternate explanation that contemporary plea bargaining, far from responding to case backlog, constitutes a flexible systemic response to fluctuations in the vacancies available in the prisons. The argument is formalized for subsequent empirical testing. The paper begins by developing the argument that prison vacancy, instead of caseload pressure, induces plea bargaining. The paper then formalizes the argument by means of an innovative application of a discrete time Markov process model. Drawing on the distinctive properties of the Markov chain, it is demonstrated how the model may be used to test the competing vacancy and case flow hypotheses, and to explore the incidence and dynamics of plea bargaining, speed of case flow, conviction and sentencing effects of bargaining, and the systemic potential for racial discrimination that bargains generate. Implications of this vacancy model for differential sentencing, racial discrimination, and possible reform of the criminal justice system are also delineated. In developing the ideas presented in this paper, the author has benefitted from valuable comments and advice on the part of Duncan Luce and David Karen, Ronald Breiger, Harrison White and John Padgett also read and commented on an earlier version of this manuscript. Their contributions are appreciatively acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]