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In this paper we both describe and analyze the meeting process and the evolution of a friendship network among sociology freshmen in the Netherlands. We develop a theory that explains how changes in the network structure depend on one or more of four main effects; proximity, visible similarity, invisible similarity, and network opportunity. We formulate expectations with regard to what factors are important at what stages of the friendship development, making a distinction between 'meeting' and 'mating.' To some extent, the results confirm our expectations. The proximity and visible similarity variables determine change in network structure in the early stages, whereas network opportunity is important during all stages. Unfortunately, no significant effects of invisible similarity are found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the development of a semigroup model of social networks. Data matrices which represent the perceived relationships between members of a social network are used to construct a (possibly infinite) data semigroup of derived relations defined by (real) matrix multiplication. This complex structure is analyzed by forming interaction semigroups. These semigroups are homomorphic images of the data semigroup. The corresponding congruences are generated by identifying products of finite order which are highly positively correlated. Several methods of generating the interaction semigroups are examined and are shown to generate nonhomomorphic semigroups. For each congruence, an associated triple of numbers can be defined which may serve as an indicator of the validity and/or a measure of the stability of the semigroup model. A series of hypothetical examples is developed to study how the algebraic properties of interaction semigroups reflect and uncover properties of associated networks. Specifically, relationships between homogeneity of a network and the algebraic structure of the corresponding interaction semigroup are addressed. The applicability of the above techniques to blockmodels is demonstrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In policy networks actors use access relations to influence preferences of other actors. Establishment and shifts of access relations and their consequences for outcomes of decisions are the main focal points In this paper. Unlike most policy network studies, we therefore do not take the network and its relations as given and constant. Instead we device computer simulation models to account for the dynamics in policy networks. We compare different models and investigate the resulting network structures and predicted outcomes of decisions. The choice among the alternative models is made by their correspondence with empirical network structures and actual outcomes of decisions. In our models, we assume that all relevant actors aim at policy outcomes as close as possible to their own preferences. Policy outcomes are determined by the preferences of the final decision makers at the moment of the vote. In general, only a small fraction of the actors takes part in the final vote. Most actors have therefore to rely on access relations for directly or indirectly shaping the preferences of the final decision makers. For this purpose actors make access requests to other actors. An access relation is assumed to be established if such a request is accepted by the other actor. Access relations require time and resources. Actors are therefore assumed to be restricted in the number of access requests they can make and the number of requests they can accept. Moreover, due to incomplete information and simultaneous actions by other actors, actors have to make simplifying assumptions in the selection of their "best" requests and learn by experience. We device two base models that correspond to two basic views on the nature of political processes. In the first view politics is seen as power driven. Corresponding to this view, actors aim at access relations with the most powerful actors in the field. They estimate their likelihood of success by comparing their own resources with those of the target actors. Power also determines the order in which actors accept requests. In the second view, policy matters and actors roughly estimate the effects access relations might have on the outcome of decisions. Actors select requests to "bolster" their own preference as much as possible. We will show that these base models and some intermediate ones result in fundamentally different network structures and predicted outcomes. Moreover, we will show that the policy driven models do fundamentally better than the power driven models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friendship networks usually show a certain degree or segmentation: subgroups of friends. The explanation of the emergence of such groups from initially dyadic pair friendships is a difficult but important problem. In this paper we attempt to provide a first contribution to the explanation of subgroup formation in friendship networks by using the LS set as a definition for a friendship group. We construct a dynamic individual oriented model of friendship formation and provide preliminary simulation results that give an idea of how to continue the process of explaining group formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the usefulness for theoretical work of the narrative method proposed by Peter Abell. Our assessment proceeds by using the narrative method to perform the two main tasks of theoretical analysis--constructing postulates and deriving predictions. To illustrate, we focus on the theory of distributive justice and the more general theory of comparison processes to which it led. The results of our assessment of the usefulness of Abell's narrative method for theoretical work indicate that the narrative method has far wider applicability than Abell has claimed for it. For example, (i) it is useful for all theoretical work in the sociobehavioral sciences, not only for theoretical work based on game theory, (ii) it is useful for analyzing thought-experiments as well as narrative accounts of actual actions and events, and (iii) the events in the narrative need not be restricted to human actions but can include events not traceable to human agency. We conclude also that Abell's narrative method complements the use of mathematical analysis in theoretical work and that it may be especially valuable for theoretical derivation involving two or more theories jointly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]