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Odds ratio (OR) and the educational Gini coefficient (EGINI) defined on a specific social grouping scheme can both be used to gauge educational inequality. In this study, we systematically review the scholarship that underpins the utilities of OR and EGINI and evaluate their properties across four research scenarios of allocating newly created opportunities under educational expansion. Formal analyses suggest that (1) both OR and EGINI monotonically increase (decrease) if the newly created educational positions are entirely delivered to the upper (lower) class. However, the rate of change differs between OR and EGINI. (2) When educational opportunities within expansion are allocated according to the relative populations of social classes, the probabilities of upper and lower classes to receive better education rise by the same extent, suggesting that all social classes benefit from the proliferation of educational credentials. This would drive down the EGINI, but change in OR is not monotonic. (3) EGINI remains unchanged if the newly created educational opportunities are allocated based on the initial class composition of better educated individuals before educational expansion. However, OR is driven to increase by the “Matthew Effect” where the increment in educational probability for the upper class is larger than that for the lower class. The discrepancy of empirical patterns between OR and EGINI is explained, and the practical implications are discussed using a case study of the educational policy evaluation in Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We show in this article that temporary bluffing has the power of promoting the transition from a bad to a good state in social systems. The analysis is carried out with reference to the simplest unit of interest in sociology—the couple—but it can be certainly extended to larger social groups. More precisely, an already available mathematical model shows that couples composed of so-called secure individuals with neither too high nor too low appeals have two alternative romantic regimes—one satisfactory and one not. Thus, if one of these couples is trapped in its unsatisfactory regime the problem is how to escape from that trap and switch to the satisfactory regime. Temporary bluffing, namely, giving to the partner for a sufficiently long time a biased impression of the involvement or of the appeal, is a very effective, though not unique, way for performing the switch. This, in a sense, attenuates the negative moral value usually given to bluffing in social behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]