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This paper extends a recently proposed model of dynamical interactions between the macro structures of a society to hierarchically ordered societies. The so extended model helps interpreting some social and political phenomena such as coalitions, their hierarchical level and the degree of anarchy on a certain hierarchical level. The surprising property of the underlined model that stability is certain in the constant parameter case strikingly extends to this model. One of the main results of the paper is that the system has a unique equilibrium exactly when there is no anarchy on the highest hierarchical level. These results apply to a study of changes in the equilibria as determined by the changes in the system parameters [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research tested Laing and Morrison's myopic and hyperopic models for sequential, three-person coalition games when the goal is maximizing rank position. The myopic model assumes that people behave as if the present trial were the last, while the hyperopic model assumes that people behave as if the coalition formed on the present trial will continue forever. The experiment involved three different planning horizon conditions: an indefinite number of trials (the condition specified by Laing and Morrison for their models), one trial remaining, and eight trials remaining. Four different accumulated point totals were used: 300-250-50, 350-150-100, 250-200-150, and 225-200-175. In general, the myopic model was more successful than the hyperopic model, though neither model was especially accurate. Changes in the myopic model were proposed, and the difficulties in developing a theory of social decision making involving long range planning were discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]