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This paper generalizes the Kemeny-Snell distance function for distances between weak orderings to a distance function for the collection of all partial orderings of a set. This generalization explains some of the seemingly strange properties of the Kemeny-Snell distance, and extends it to such important classes of orderings as semiorders and interval orders. In section four I consider possible applications of the distance function and describe a number of problems that arise in attempts to apply the distance function. In section 3 I discuss the concept of a distance function in more general terms and introduce a new distance function defined by a set of axioms different from those given in Section 2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a synthesis of the necessary and sufficient restrictions that insure a transitive group preference if majority rule is the aggregation procedure. We show the equivalence between transitivity and an extension of the condition of Condorcet which states that if an alternative receives a majority over every other, then it should be the social choice. This extension is equivalent to finding a solution to a system of linear inequalities. We use these inequalities to demonstrate that the recent work on restrictions of voter preferences can be derived from this Extended Condorcet Condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of analyzing social structures through the use of graph theory, some binary matrix operations for valued graphs are presented. These operations are demonstrated in the analysis of social network data presented by Kapferer. Further examples of where the procedures should prove useful are suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the Bogart model and its potential application in social sciences. Derivation of a distance measure and computing devices by Bogart; Features of the model; Possible applications of the model.

Some segregation results from the practices of organizations, some from specialized communication systems, some from correlation with a variable that is non-random; and some results from the interplay of individual choices. This is an abstract study of the interactive dynamics of discriminatory individual choicest One model is a simulation in which individual members of two recognizable coups distribute themselves in neighborhoods defined by reference to their own locations. A second model is analytic and deals with compartmented space. A final section applies the analytics to `neighborhood tipping? The systemic effects are found, to be overwhelming; there is no simple correspondence of individual incentive to collective results, Exaggerated separation and patterning result from the dynamics of movement. Inferences about individual motives can usually not be drawn from aggregate patterns. Some unexpected phenomena, like density and vacancy, are generated. A general theory of `tipping' begins to emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]