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The exchanges that individualist, prosocial, and competitive actors will make and the kind of negotiations they will carry out in dyads and power structures are predicted here for the first time. The predictions are generated by bridging two previously independent streams of thought, network exchange theory and social value orientations. In so doing, this article shows that formal, mathematical theory and metric predictions are not threatened by using multiple actors with contrasting utilities. Results offered here are hypothetical and provide a baseline against which empirical studies can be compared. A later paper will compare these predictions with experiments now ongoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the most comprehensive data set now available, this investigation tests the precision of all exchange theories that now contend. Beyond precision, the investigation focuses on broad issues of effectiveness including consistency, parsimony, and whether the theories can be applied to structures larger than normally studied in the lab. Seeking greater parsimony, this investigation introduces a new model by combining parts of two contending theories. We find that all ten theories have scientific merit for all can predict with some effectiveness for the exchange structures experimentally investigated. Nevertheless, the ten vary in precision. Elementary Theory is the most precise. The new Expected-value Resistance model ranks second in precision and is the simplest. Both apply to large networks as well as the best of the other theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Applications of game theory frequently presume but do not show that social structures contain games. This study shows that multiple games are embedded in strong power structures and that power is exercised because 1) the game of those low in power contains a dilemma whereas 2) the game of those high in power does not. As in previous analyses, we find those low in power play the Prisoner's Dilemma game. New to this analysis is the discovery that those high in power play the Privileged game, a game with no dilemma. Also new is the extension of the analysis to the design of coalitions. That extension shows that, when coalition formation succeeds, it eliminates the dilemma of those low in power by transforming their game from Prisoner's Dilemma to Privileged. By contrast, exactly the same coalition structure does not alter the game played by those high in power. Applying well-known game theoretic solution concepts, we predict that low power coalitions will countervail power, but that coalitions of those high in power will not affect power exercise. Experiments testing this theory investigate 1) coalitions of those high in power, 2) low power coalitions organized against multiple high power positions, and 3) opposed coalitions struggling for power against each other. Results strongly support the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper demonstrates that paths of social determination cannot be drawn on the basis of Abells method and uses an example case to show how they are drawn using theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distribution and structural determinants of power are central concerns of network exchange theory. In this paper, using formulations from elementary theory, we present an exhaustive typology of network connections: exclusion, inclusion and null. This typology is compared to the typology of positive and negative connection of power-dependence theory. Inclusion which has not been previously recognized is investigated. Experimental results supportive of our formulations for inclusion are offered. Some implications of the formulations for inclusion outside the laboratory are discussed. Also discussed is the possibility of using exclusion and inclusion as opposed principles in the analysis of empirical structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article refers to the theoretical aspects in mathematical sociology. Mathematical and sociology consider theory as a list of hypothetical statements. A variety of geometries have been used to make abstract objects and events in a physical theory. Both classical social and classical physical theory stand opposite one another. The contrast between the two is more if the focus in more on the end product of theory work. A social theory has to include general hypothesis about people and their actions and relationships if theory would have been a list of hypothesis.